ATR × OWASP Top 10 for Agentic Applications (2026)
Last updated: 2026-10-15 ATR version: v4.1.5 (844 rules with OWASP Agentic tags) OWASP framework: Agentic Top 10 v1.0 (December 2025)
Summary
- Categories covered: 10/10
- Total rule -> category mappings: 1098
- Tagged ATR rules: 833 of 833 total rules in repo
- ATR version:
v4.1.5-- OWASP Agentic Top 10:v1.0 (December 2025)
Strength tiers: STRONG >= 8 rules · MODERATE 4-7 rules · LIMITED 1-3 rules.
Coverage by ASI category
| ASI | Title | Rule count | Strength | Reference attack |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASI01 | Agent Goal Hijack | 490 | STRONG | EchoLeak |
| ASI02 | Tool Misuse and Exploitation | 70 | STRONG | Amazon Q |
| ASI03 | Identity and Privilege Abuse | 125 | STRONG | n/a |
| ASI04 | Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities | 98 | STRONG | GitHub MCP exploit |
| ASI05 | Unexpected Code Execution (RCE) | 106 | STRONG | AutoGPT RCE |
| ASI06 | Memory & Context Poisoning | 105 | STRONG | Gemini Memory Attack |
| ASI07 | Insecure Inter-Agent Communication | 23 | STRONG | n/a |
| ASI08 | Cascading Failures | 52 | STRONG | n/a |
| ASI09 | Human-Agent Trust Exploitation | 21 | STRONG | n/a |
| ASI10 | Rogue Agents | 8 | STRONG | Replit meltdown |
Per-category detail
ASI01: Agent Goal Hijack (490 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Attackers manipulate the agent's decision pathways or objectives so it pursues an adversary-controlled goal instead of its assigned task. Canonical instance: EchoLeak.
ATR coverage shape. Direct + indirect prompt injection, persona hijack, encoding evasion, jailbreak chains, multi-turn assembly, multilingual paraphrase.
Reference attack (EchoLeak). Covered by the rules below; ATR's general-purpose detection layers match the technique signature without needing an attack-specific rule.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00004 | System Prompt Override Attempt | critical | Detects attempts to override, replace, or redefine the agent's system prompt. Attackers c… |
| ATR-2026-00030 | Cross-Agent Attack Detection | critical | Consolidated detection for cross-agent attacks in multi-agent systems, covering both impe… |
| ATR-2026-00081 | Semantic Evasion via Multi-Turn Prompt Injection | critical | Detects multi-turn prompt injection attacks that use semantic manipulation to bypass rege… |
| ATR-2026-00091 | Advanced Structured Data Injection with Nested Payloads | critical | Detects advanced structured data injection where malicious prompts are deeply nested with… |
| ATR-2026-00092 | Multi-Agent Consensus Poisoning and Sybil Attack | critical | Detects attacks targeting multi-agent consensus systems through coordinated fake proposal… |
Plus 485 additional rules tagged ASI01 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI02: Tool Misuse and Exploitation (70 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Legitimate tools are used unsafely because the agent acts on ambiguous instructions or has over-privileged access. Canonical instance: Amazon Q assistant tool-misuse incident.
ATR coverage shape. Unauthorized tool calls, SSRF via tool, MCP malicious response, schema-description contradiction, consent bypass.
Reference attack (Amazon Q). Covered by the rules below; ATR's general-purpose detection layers match the technique signature without needing an attack-specific rule.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00010 | Malicious Content in MCP Tool Response | critical | Detects malicious content embedded in MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool responses. Attack… |
| ATR-2026-00013 | SSRF via Agent Tool Calls | critical | Detects high-confidence Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that targets cloud CREDENTIAL… |
| ATR-2026-00062 | Hidden Capability in MCP Skill | critical | Detects MCP skills that expose hidden or undocumented capabilities beyond their declared… |
| ATR-2026-00063 | Multi-Skill Chain Attack | critical | Detects attack sequences where multiple MCP skills are chained together to achieve a mali… |
| ATR-2026-00066 | Parameter Injection via Tool Arguments | critical | Detects injection attacks delivered through MCP tool arguments. An attacker crafts tool a… |
Plus 65 additional rules tagged ASI02 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI03: Identity and Privilege Abuse (125 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Agents operate in an attribution gap; leaked credentials or escalated privileges let them act beyond intended scope.
ATR coverage shape. API key exposure, OAuth token abuse, env var harvesting, scope creep, credential file theft, privilege escalation.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00021 | Credential and Secret Exposure in Agent Output | critical | Detects when an AI agent exposes API keys, secret tokens, private keys, database connecti… |
| ATR-2026-00040 | Privilege Escalation and Admin Function Access | critical | Consolidated detection for privilege escalation attempts, covering both tool permission e… |
| ATR-2026-00074 | Cross-Agent Privilege Escalation | critical | Detects agents using inter-agent communication channels to escalate privileges beyond the… |
| ATR-2026-00113 | Credential File Theft from Agent Environment | critical | Detects tools or agent instructions that access well-known credential files from the host… |
| ATR-2026-00115 | Bulk Environment Variable Harvesting and Exfiltration | critical | Detects tools or agent instructions that perform bulk extraction of environment variables… |
Plus 120 additional rules tagged ASI03 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI04: Agentic Supply Chain Vulnerabilities (98 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Runtime composition of third-party capabilities (MCP servers, plugins, skills, A2A endpoints) lets adversaries poison the call graph after deployment. Canonical instance: GitHub MCP exploit.
ATR coverage shape. Skill impersonation, hidden capability, polymorphic skill, registry poisoning, malicious skill code, parameter injection.
Reference attack (GitHub MCP exploit). Covered by the rules below; ATR's general-purpose detection layers match the technique signature without needing an attack-specific rule.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00072 | Model Behavior Extraction | critical | Detects systematic probing attempts to extract model behavior, decision boundaries, syste… |
| ATR-2026-00073 | Malicious Fine-tuning Data | critical | Detects poisoned fine-tuning datasets that contain instruction-following backdoors, trigg… |
| ATR-2026-00121 | Malicious Code in Skill Package | critical | Detects malicious code patterns in SKILL.md files and associated scripts. 100% of confirm… |
| ATR-2026-00149 | Skill Data Exfiltration via Compound Patterns | critical | Detects compound exfiltration patterns in SKILL.md files where sensitive data (credential… |
| ATR-2026-00200 | Agent Memory and Configuration File Tampering | critical | Detects attempts to write, append, or modify agent memory files (MEMORY.md, SOUL.md, CLAU… |
Plus 93 additional rules tagged ASI04 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI05: Unexpected Code Execution (RCE) (106 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Agents generate and execute code ("vibe coding"), opening RCE paths through natural-language instructions. Canonical instance: AutoGPT RCE.
ATR coverage shape. eval injection, shell metacharacter escape, dynamic import exploitation, indirect tool injection leading to code exec.
Reference attack (AutoGPT RCE). Covered by the rules below; ATR's general-purpose detection layers match the technique signature without needing an attack-specific rule.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00010 | Malicious Content in MCP Tool Response | critical | Detects malicious content embedded in MCP (Model Context Protocol) tool responses. Attack… |
| ATR-2026-00062 | Hidden Capability in MCP Skill | critical | Detects MCP skills that expose hidden or undocumented capabilities beyond their declared… |
| ATR-2026-00095 | MCP Tool Supply Chain Poisoning | critical | Detects tool poisoning attacks targeting the MCP (Model Context Protocol) skill/tool supp… |
| ATR-2026-00096 | Skill Registry Poisoning and Compromised Tool Distribution | critical | Detects supply chain attacks that target skill/tool registries and distribution channels.… |
| ATR-2026-00110 | Remote Code Execution via eval() and Dynamic Code Injection | critical | Detects tools or agent instructions that invoke eval(), Function(), vm.runInNewContext(),… |
Plus 101 additional rules tagged ASI05 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI06: Memory & Context Poisoning (105 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Long-term memory, RAG stores, or shared context are corrupted so the agent's future behavior is shaped by attacker payloads. Canonical instance: Gemini Memory Attack.
ATR coverage shape. Agent memory manipulation, RAG poisoning, audit evasion, malicious finetuning data, consensus poisoning, persistent context drift.
Reference attack (Gemini Memory Attack). Covered by the rules below; ATR's general-purpose detection layers match the technique signature without needing an attack-specific rule.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00004 | System Prompt Override Attempt | critical | Detects attempts to override, replace, or redefine the agent's system prompt. Attackers c… |
| ATR-2026-00136 | Tool Response Data Piggybacking | critical | Detects malicious tool responses that embed sensitive data extraction within legitimate-l… |
| ATR-2026-00139 | Casual Authority Data Redirect | critical | Detects social engineering claiming authority to redirect agent output to attacker-contro… |
| ATR-2026-00201 | Credential Exfiltration via Shell Pipe | critical | Detects credential theft patterns where environment variables containing API keys, secret… |
| ATR-2026-00212 | mcp-atlassian Credential Leak via Hint Parameter Injection (CVE-2026-27825/27826) | critical | Detects the mcp-atlassian credential-leak attack pattern (CVE-2026-27825 and CVE-2026-278… |
Plus 100 additional rules tagged ASI06 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI07: Insecure Inter-Agent Communication (23 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Multi-agent systems exchange messages without authentication or integrity guarantees, letting adversaries spoof or replay messages between agents.
ATR coverage shape. A2A message spoofing, agent identity spoofing, consensus sybil attack, cross-agent attack vectors.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00030 | Cross-Agent Attack Detection | critical | Consolidated detection for cross-agent attacks in multi-agent systems, covering both impe… |
| ATR-2026-00108 | Multi-Agent Consensus Sybil Attack | critical | Detects attempts to manipulate multi-agent consensus or voting systems through Sybil-styl… |
| ATR-2026-00117 | Agent Identity Spoofing and Authority Impersonation | critical | Detects agents or messages that impersonate other agents, system components, or superviso… |
| ATR-2026-00161 | MCP Tool Description — IMPORTANT Tag Cross-Tool Shadowing Attack | critical | Detects MCP tool poisoning attacks that embed hidden instructions inside an <IMPORTANT> X… |
| ATR-2026-00162 | Credential Access with Exfiltration in Skill Instructions | critical | Detects SKILL.md files that combine credential file access (SSH keys, AWS credentials, AP… |
Plus 18 additional rules tagged ASI07 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI08: Cascading Failures (52 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. A single fault in one agent, tool, or signal propagates system-wide because automated downstream consumers act on it without independent validation.
ATR coverage shape. Runaway agent loop, resource exhaustion, cascading failure detection, model behavior extraction triggering downstream cascade.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00097 | CJK Prompt Injection - Expanded Chinese/Japanese/Korean Patterns | critical | Expanded CJK-language prompt injection patterns targeting the gap where attackers use nat… |
| ATR-2026-00098 | Unauthorized Financial Action by AI Agent | critical | Detects when an AI agent attempts to execute financial operations (payments, transfers, r… |
| ATR-2026-00136 | Tool Response Data Piggybacking | critical | Detects malicious tool responses that embed sensitive data extraction within legitimate-l… |
| ATR-2026-00141 | API Key Leakage via Example Format | critical | Detects attempts to leak API keys by providing example formats with real key prefixes, ho… |
| ATR-2026-00142 | Data Piggybacking via Casual Transition Words | critical | Detects tool response piggybacking using casual transition words (oh and, P.S., BTW, inte… |
Plus 47 additional rules tagged ASI08 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI09: Human-Agent Trust Exploitation (21 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Adversaries exploit anthropomorphism and authority bias so humans approve harmful agent actions they would otherwise reject.
ATR coverage shape. Human trust exploitation, approval fatigue, social engineering via agent, unauthorized financial action, high-risk tool gate bypass.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00098 | Unauthorized Financial Action by AI Agent | critical | Detects when an AI agent attempts to execute financial operations (payments, transfers, r… |
| ATR-2026-00419 | Cursor MCP JSON Zero-Click Configuration RCE (CVE-2025-54136) | critical | Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-54136 in Cursor and the same-class issue surfaced by the… |
| ATR-2026-00523 | Claude Code Hooks SessionStart Pre-Trust RCE (CVE-2025-59536) | critical | Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-59536 (Critical), pre-trust remote code execution in Cla… |
| ATR-2026-00524 | Claude Code ANTHROPICBASEURL Credential Exfiltration (CVE-2026-21852) | critical | Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-21852 (Moderate, CVSS 5.3), credential exfiltration in C… |
| ATR-2026-00858 | Indirect PI — Data Exfiltration with Evidence Destruction (Exfil-and-Delete) | critical | Detects indirect prompt injection payloads instructing an agent to exfiltrate sensitive d… |
Plus 16 additional rules tagged ASI09 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
ASI10: Rogue Agents (8 rules) -- STRONG
OWASP description. Agents deviate from their intended function, optionally collude with other agents, and operate as autonomous threats. Canonical instance: Replit meltdown.
ATR coverage shape. Goal hijacking, cross-agent privilege escalation, runaway loop, scope creep, delayed execution bypass, polymorphic behavior.
Reference attack (Replit meltdown). Covered by the rules below; ATR's general-purpose detection layers match the technique signature without needing an attack-specific rule.
Top rules by severity:
| Rule ID | Title | Severity | Description |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATR-2026-00030 | Cross-Agent Attack Detection | critical | Consolidated detection for cross-agent attacks in multi-agent systems, covering both impe… |
| ATR-2026-00074 | Cross-Agent Privilege Escalation | critical | Detects agents using inter-agent communication channels to escalate privileges beyond the… |
| ATR-2026-00104 | Persona Hijacking via Mandatory System Prompt Override | critical | Detects MCP tools that attempt to override system prompts or behavioral guidelines by ins… |
| ATR-2026-00108 | Multi-Agent Consensus Sybil Attack | critical | Detects attempts to manipulate multi-agent consensus or voting systems through Sybil-styl… |
| ATR-2026-00117 | Agent Identity Spoofing and Authority Impersonation | critical | Detects agents or messages that impersonate other agents, system components, or superviso… |
Plus 3 additional rules tagged ASI10 -- see docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json for the complete list.
Methodology
Each YAML file under rules/ is scanned for OWASP Agentic Top 10 tags in two locations:
references.owasp_agentic-- string list of bare ids (e.g."ASI01:2026")compliance.owasp_agentic[].id-- structured form (e.g.id: ASI01:2026)
Bucketing is done on the ASI[0-9]{2} prefix to absorb legacy taxonomy suffixes. A rule mapping to multiple ASI categories counts in each. Strength tiers: STRONG >= 8 · MODERATE 4-7 · LIMITED 1-3.
Regenerate with:
npx tsx scripts/generate-owasp-mapping.ts
Outputs docs/OWASP-AGENTIC-MAPPING.md (this file) and docs/owasp-agentic-mapping.json (programmatic consumption).
Reciprocal mappings
- MITRE ATLAS -- see per-rule
mitre_atlasfield plus aggregate coverage in COVERAGE.md - NIST AI RMF -- see per-rule
compliance.nist_ai_rmf[]plus the AI RMF OSCAL catalog - EU AI Act -- per-rule
compliance.eu_ai_act[](Article 9, Article 15) - ISO/IEC 42001 -- per-rule
compliance.iso_42001[] - OWASP LLM Top 10 (2025) -- per-rule
compliance.owasp_llm[] - SAF-MCP -- see SAFE-MCP-MAPPING.md (reviewed candidate mappings against SAF Framework Model v2)
- OWASP Agentic Skills Top 10 (AST) -- see OWASP-AST10-MAPPING.md (skill supply chain framework)
- OWASP Agentic AI Maturity Model -- see OWASP-AGENTIC-MATURITY-MAPPING.md (which ASI detections substantiate governance maturity)
Contributing
To propose a new mapping or correct an existing one:
- Open a PR editing the relevant rule under
rules/<category>/ATR-2026-NNNNN-*.yaml - Add or update the
references.owasp_agenticand/orcompliance.owasp_agenticblock - Run
npx tsx scripts/generate-owasp-mapping.tsto regenerate this file - Include the regenerated
docs/OWASP-AGENTIC-MAPPING.mdanddocs/owasp-agentic-mapping.jsonin the PR
See CONTRIBUTING.md for the full contribution flow.
References
- OWASP Agentic Top 10 (2026) -- https://genai.owasp.org/resource/owasp-top-10-for-agentic-applications-for-2026/
- OWASP GenAI Security Project -- https://genai.owasp.org/
- Project Chair: John Sotiropoulos -- ASI Co-lead
- Agentic Top 10 Co-leads: Keren Katz, Ron F. Del Rosario
- Project contact: https://genai.owasp.org/contact/
- ATR repository: https://github.com/Agent-Threat-Rule/agent-threat-rules
- ATR npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/agent-threat-rules
