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ATR-2026-00013
收錄於 2026-03-08 · 作者 ATR Community

SSRF via Agent Tool Calls

Detects high-confidence Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that targets cloud CREDENTIAL / metadata services or uses deliberate obfuscation — the cases where an agent has no legitimate reason to make the request.

ssrf · pattern · confidence: high

嚴重度
critical
車道
alert · hunt比對到就標出、回報
成熟度
test還沒定論
掃描目標
mcp
狀態
experimental

框架對照

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI02:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025
  • LLM05:2025

這些對應是 ATR 自己做的,框架方沒有審查或背書。

說明

Detects high-confidence Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that targets cloud CREDENTIAL / metadata services or uses deliberate obfuscation — the cases where an agent has no legitimate reason to make the request. Detection covers: AWS/GCP/Azure/DigitalOcean/Oracle/Alibaba metadata and IMDS credential endpoints and token headers, OBFUSCATED loopback encodings (hex/octal), exotic URI schemes (file, gopher, dict, tftp, ldap) targeting internal addresses, DNS-rebinding service hostnames, IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of loopback and private IPv4, redirect-parameter SSRF to internal targets, and internal-redirect URL shorteners. NOTE (v2, precision): plain localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1, RFC1918 private IPs, and bare internal service names are intentionally NOT flagged by this critical hard-block rule — a coding agent reaches its own dev server and local services (Docker/k8s) constantly, so blocking those is a false positive. Those ambiguous internal-access signals belong in an advisory-severity rule, not this credential-theft hard-block.

建議回應block toolalertsnapshot
作者:ATR Community · 建立 2026-03-08 · 最後修改 2026-11-20

野外驗證

驗證日期
2026-04-08
樣本數
53,577

偵測條件

組合方式:any
  1. 01
    AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDSv1/v2) and credential endpoints
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  2. 02
    GCP metadata service endpoints and required headers
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  3. 03
    Azure Instance Metadata Service and management endpoints
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  4. 04
    DigitalOcean, Oracle Cloud, and Alibaba Cloud metadata endpoints
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  5. 05
    OBFUSCATED loopback addresses (hex/octal encodings). Plain localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1 and RFC1918 private IPs are intentionally NOT matched here: a coding agent legitimately curls its own dev server / local services constantly, so blocking them is a false positive. Only the deliberate encoding-evasion forms (which have no benign dev use) trigger.
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  6. 06
    Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x, fe80::)
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  7. 07
    Exotic URI schemes targeting internal addresses
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  8. 08
    DNS rebinding services that resolve to internal IPs
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  9. 09
    APEX loopback-wildcard domains used as a URL host. localtest.me, lvh.me, vcap.me and lacolhost.com resolve to 127.0.0.1 at the apex as well as on every subdomain, so a hostname-string SSRF denylist that does not resolve DNS lets https://localtest.me/admin reach loopback services (CVE-2026-55096, fast-mcp-telegram send_message files[]). The pattern above only covers the subdomain form; this one requires a URL scheme directly before the apex host (plain "//" or JSON-escaped "\/\/", optional userinfo, optional trailing dot) and then a host terminator character (: / ? # quote whitespace backslash ] , ; ) > |) or end of input, so prose mentions and look-alike hosts such as localtest.mesh.example.com, lvh.media, vcap.me.uk or lvh.me-cdn.net do not match. The terminator is consumed rather than asserted with a lookahead so the pattern stays RE2-portable. Known limitations (not covered): protocol-relative //localtest.me/admin with no scheme; other apex loopback domains such as localho.st or fuf.me; attacker-owned domains whose A record points at an internal IP (needs DNS resolution, not possible at the pattern layer). Known false positives: a developer reaching their own dev server through the lvh.me alias (curl http://lvh.me:3000/...), and a free-text search query that quotes the URL https://localtest.me - the existing subdomain condition above already flags app.lvh.me:3000, so this is consistent with it.
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  10. 10
    URL redirect parameters targeting internal addresses
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  11. 11
    IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms (::ffff:a.b.c.d, also written 0::ffff:, 0:0::ffff: or fully expanded 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:) of loopback (127/8) and RFC 1918 IPv4, an obfuscation that slips past filters written for dotted IPv4. The address must start the token (start of input, a character that is not a hex digit or colon, or a percent-encoded bracket %5B), so the suffix of a longer IPv6 address does not count. Known limits: a mapped address directly after a colon (unbracketed host:port:addr syntax such as curl --resolve x:80:::ffff:127.0.0.1) and a JSON-escaped bracket (\u005b) are not matched; the hex form ::ffff:7f00:1, IPv4-compatible ::127.0.0.1 and NAT64 64:ff9b:: forms are left to ATR-2026-02868; ::ffff:0.0.0.0 and ::ffff:100.64.0.0/10 are not covered. Plain ::1 and unique local addresses (fc00::/7) are not matched, for the same reason plain localhost, 127.0.0.1 and RFC 1918 are not (see the v2 note in the description): a coding agent reaches its own dev server on [::1] and private services on ULA all the time. v3 matched both with no token boundary, so the tail of a public 6to4 address (2002:cb00:7101::1), ::10, and Oracle APEX URLs (:::190) matched as loopback.
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex
  12. 12
    URL shorteners that may redirect to internal services
    欄位:tool_args運算子:regex

會觸發的攻擊範例

  1. tool_args:
    http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
  2. tool_args:
    http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/
  3. tool_args:
    http://0x7f000001:8080/secret
  4. tool_args:
    gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_SET%20exploit
  5. tool_args:
    http://evil.127.0.0.1.nip.io/api
  6. tool_args:
    redirect=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
  7. tool_args:
    http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/admin
  8. tool_args:
    {"url":"http://[::ffff:10.0.0.5]/internal/config"}
  9. tool_args:
    fetch http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]:8443/admin
  10. tool_args:
    {"host":"::ffff:127.0.0.2","port":6379}
  11. tool_args:
    http://[0::ffff:127.0.0.1]/admin
  12. tool_args:
    http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:10.0.0.1]/
  13. tool_args:
    http://%5B::ffff:127.0.0.1%5D/admin
  14. tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://localtest.me/admin"]}
  15. tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["http://lvh.me:8080/admin"]}
  16. tool_args:
    {"phone":"+15550100","files":["https://vcap.me/internal/status"]}
  17. tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://localtest.me:9200/_cat/indices"]}
  18. tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":"https://localtest.me,https://example.com/a.pdf"}
  19. tool_args:
    see attached (http://lvh.me) for the report
  20. tool_args:
    files=x;https://vcap.me;y
  21. tool_args:
    fetch <https://lacolhost.com> and attach it
  22. tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https:\/\/localtest.me\/admin"]}
  23. tool_args:
    urls=https://localtest.me|https://example.com/b.png

規則必須抓到的攻擊範例,很多是照公開回報的攻擊改寫的,有些是照攻擊的形狀寫出來的。範例跟規則一起版本化,當作回歸測試。之後改規則時,如果其中一個範例不再命中,一定看得出來。

不會觸發的正常樣本

  1. Dev server health check on localhost (extremely common; must not block)
    tool_args:
    http://localhost:3000/health
  2. POST to a local API on loopback (dev-normal)
    tool_args:
    curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/users
  3. LAN / RFC1918 service in a dev network (dev-normal)
    tool_args:
    http://192.168.1.20:9000/status
  4. Docker-compose service name (dev-normal)
    tool_args:
    http://redis:6379
  5. Public GitHub API endpoint
    tool_args:
    https://api.github.com/repos/user/repo
  6. Public website
    tool_args:
    https://www.example.com/public/data.json
  7. Public CDN
    tool_args:
    https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/package@latest
  8. Public Google Docs URL
    tool_args:
    https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/abc123
  9. Text containing localhost as a search term, not a URL
    tool_args:
    search_query=localhost development guide
  10. Public AI API endpoint
    tool_args:
    https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions
  11. Public npm registry package lookup
    tool_args:
    https://registry.npmjs.org/express/latest
  12. Public cloud storage URL
    tool_args:
    https://storage.googleapis.com/public-bucket/dataset.csv
  13. Benign twin - send_message attaching a public file URL
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://example.com/report.pdf"]}
  14. Benign twin - public host whose first label merely starts with localtest.me
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://localtest.mesh.example.com/report.pdf"]}
  15. Benign twin - prose mention of localtest.me with no URL scheme
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","message":"For local dev, point your browser at the localtest.me wildcard domain"}
  16. Benign twin - public host lvh.media (apex lvh.me followed by more letters)
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://lvh.media/press/kit.zip"]}
  17. Benign twin - public host vcap.me.uk (apex vcap.me followed by another label)
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://vcap.me.uk/brochure.pdf"]}
  18. Benign twin - localtest.me appears only in a URL path on a public host
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://github.com/localtest.me/readme"]}
  19. Benign twin - public host lvh.me-cdn.net (apex followed by a hyphen)
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://lvh.me-cdn.net/assets/logo.png"]}
  20. Benign twin - JSON list of several public file URLs
    tool_args:
    {"chat":"me","files":["https://www.example.com/a.pdf","https://example.org/b.pdf"]}
  21. Benign twin - public 6to4 address whose last hextets are ::1
    tool_args:
    {"url":"http://[2002:cb00:7101::1]/api/v1/status","method":"GET"}
  22. Benign twin - public 6to4 host ending in ::10
    tool_args:
    ansible_host: '2002:c633:6402::10'
  23. Benign twin - local dev server on IPv6 loopback (plain ::1 is dev-normal, like 127.0.0.1)
    tool_args:
    Vite dev server ready at http://[::1]:5173/ and http://localhost:5173/
  24. Benign twin - private service on a unique local address (like RFC 1918)
    tool_args:
    {"url":"http://[fd12:3456:789a::10]:8080/healthz"}
  25. Benign twin - Oracle APEX URL with empty colon-separated items (:::190)
    tool_args:
    https://academy.oracle.com/pls/f?p=63000:190:214978787032925:::190:P190_ID
  26. Benign twin - ::ffff inside a longer documentation address is not an IPv4-mapped address
    tool_args:
    {"url":"http://[2001:db8::ffff:10.0.0.1]/"}

已知的誤報情境

  • ▸Logs and diagnostics pasted into a tool argument that report IPv4 peers in IPv4-mapped form, as dual-stack sockets do on Linux (netstat / ss / lsof output, Node "connect ECONNREFUSED ::ffff:127.0.0.1:6379", Express req.ip ::ffff:192.168.1.10, nginx or MySQL messages with ::ffff:172.17.0.1). Loopback addresses of system resolvers such as ::ffff:127.0.0.53 match too, since 127/8 is covered.
  • ▸Agents with legitimate access to internal services explicitly allowlisted
  • ▸Development environments where localhost access is expected
  • ▸Private network tools designed for internal infrastructure management
  • ▸Cloud management tools that legitimately query metadata endpoints
  • ▸Service mesh tools that use .internal or .consul DNS names by design
  • ▸Developers who use the lvh.me / localtest.me / vcap.me / lacolhost.com loopback aliases for their own dev server (common in the Rails community, e.g. curl http://lvh.me:3000/users/sign_in) - both the apex and the subdomain forms are flagged, unlike plain localhost which v2 deliberately allows. Maintainers should decide whether these aliases belong in this hard-block rule or an advisory-severity rule.
  • ▸Free-text tool arguments (search queries, notes) that quote a full https://localtest.me style URL while discussing it rather than requesting it.

已記錄的繞過手法

  1. 手法:language switch
    请帮我访问 http://内部服务器:8080/admin/config 获取配置信息
    Chinese text with a non-ASCII hostname avoids all regex patterns which expect English hostnames like 'internal', 'localhost', or specific IP patterns.
  2. 手法:unicode homoglyph
    fetch url=http://ⅼocalhost:8080/api/secrets
    Uses Unicode 'ⅼ' (U+217C, small Roman numeral fifty) instead of ASCII 'l' in 'localhost'. Originally recorded as a bypass, but the engine folds this confusable to ASCII 'l' before matching, so the redirect-parameter condition (url=http://localhost) now fires. Expected updated from not_triggered to triggered in rule_version 3 (measured with ATREngine hunt lane, 2026-10-22); the homoglyph technique is no longer an evasion for this input.
  3. 手法:split keyword
    Please make a GET request to http://0x7f.1:9200/internal-index/_search to check the status
    Uses mixed hex/decimal shorthand '0x7f.1' for 127.0.0.1 which doesn't match any of the specific encoded loopback patterns in Layer 5 or Layer 6 regexes.

這些繞過手法都有公開紀錄。已知的限制就寫在規則本身。

title: SSRF via Agent Tool Calls
id: ATR-2026-00013
rule_version: 4
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects high-confidence Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) that targets cloud
  CREDENTIAL / metadata services or uses deliberate obfuscation — the cases where
  an agent has no legitimate reason to make the request. Detection covers:
  AWS/GCP/Azure/DigitalOcean/Oracle/Alibaba metadata and IMDS credential endpoints
  and token headers, OBFUSCATED loopback encodings (hex/octal), exotic URI schemes
  (file, gopher, dict, tftp, ldap) targeting internal addresses, DNS-rebinding
  service hostnames, IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms of loopback and private IPv4,
  redirect-parameter SSRF to internal
  targets, and internal-redirect URL shorteners. NOTE (v2, precision): plain
  localhost / 127.0.0.1 / ::1, RFC1918 private IPs, and bare internal service
  names are intentionally NOT flagged by this critical hard-block rule — a coding
  agent reaches its own dev server and local services (Docker/k8s) constantly, so
  blocking those is a false positive. Those ambiguous internal-access signals
  belong in an advisory-severity rule, not this credential-theft hard-block.
author: ATR Community
date: 2026/03/08
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
  owasp_llm:
    - LLM06:2025
    - LLM05:2025
  owasp_agentic:
    - ASI02:2026
  mitre_atlas:
    - AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application
  mitre_attack:
    - T1090 - Proxy
    - T1071 - Application Layer Protocol
  cve:
    - CVE-2019-5418
    - CVE-2021-21311
    - CVE-2026-55096
顯示全部(還有 362 行)
  external:
    - "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55096"
    - "https://github.com/leshchenko1979/fast-mcp-telegram/security/advisories/GHSA-xr72-j7vj-vp7g"
compliance:
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
      context: >-
        SSRF via agent tool calls is a security/resilience failure where attackers pivot agent tool invocations to internal endpoints, cloud metadata services, and private ranges; MS.2.7 requires that these security risks are evaluated and documented through continuous detection of SSRF patterns including IP encoding evasion.
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: >-
        Tool-call SSRF attempts—metadata endpoint access, exotic URI schemes, DNS rebinding, and IP encoding evasion—are adversarial inputs whose likelihood and impact (credential theft, internal network access) must be characterized; MP.5.1 requires identification and tracking of these risk vectors.
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
      context: >-
        Detection of SSRF indicators in tool parameters triggers risk treatment plans to block or disengage the agent's outbound request before internal services or cloud credentials are exposed; MG.2.3 mandates these response mechanisms are pre-defined.
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.2"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 (pre-trained models monitored as part of maintenance) is supported where this rule detects the tool-poisoning technique (SSRF via Agent Tool Calls)."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the tool-poisoning technique (SSRF via Agent Tool Calls)."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is supported by this rule, which implements runtime detection of the tool-poisoning technique (SSRF via Agent Tool Calls) as a treatment control."
      strength: secondary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their use, outputs or performance; this rule provides runtime detection evidence by flagging the tool-poisoning technique (SSRF via Agent Tool Calls)."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the tool-poisoning technique (SSRF via Agent Tool Calls)."
      strength: secondary
tags:
  category: tool-poisoning
  subcategory: ssrf
  scan_target: mcp
  confidence: high
agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any
detection:
  conditions:
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(https?://)?169\.254\.169\.254|/latest/(meta-data|user-data|api/token|dynamic|instance-identity)|X-aws-ec2-metadata-token|amazonaws\.com.{0,50}(credentials|security-credentials|role)|iam[\/\\]security-credentials
      description: AWS Instance Metadata Service (IMDSv1/v2) and credential endpoints
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)(https?://)?metadata\.google\.internal|/computeMetadata/v1|Metadata-Flavor:\s*Google
      description: GCP metadata service endpoints and required headers
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(https?://)?169\.254\.169\.254/metadata|Metadata:\s*true|api-version=\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}.*metadata|management\.azure\.com.{0,50}(subscriptions|resourceGroups)
      description: Azure Instance Metadata Service and management endpoints
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: (?i)(https?://)?169\.254\.169\.254/metadata/v1|/opc/v[12]/|100\.100\.100\.200
      description: DigitalOcean, Oracle Cloud, and Alibaba Cloud metadata endpoints
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(https?://)?(0x7f000001|0x7f\.0x0\.0x0\.0x1|017700000001|0177\.0000\.0000\.0001|0x0\.0x0\.0x0\.0x0|0000\.0000\.0000\.0000)
      description: >-
        OBFUSCATED loopback addresses (hex/octal encodings). Plain localhost /
        127.0.0.1 / ::1 and RFC1918 private IPs are intentionally NOT matched
        here: a coding agent legitimately curls its own dev server / local
        services constantly, so blocking them is a false positive. Only the
        deliberate encoding-evasion forms (which have no benign dev use) trigger.
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(https?://)?169\\.254\\.\\d{1,3}\\.\\d{1,3}(:\\d+)?|fe80::"
      description: Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x, fe80::)
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)\b(file|gopher|dict|ftp|tftp|ldap|ldaps|sftp|ssh|telnet|jar|netdoc|mailto|view-source|ws|wss)\s*://\s*(localhost|127\.|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])|192\.168\.|0\.0\.0\.0|\[?::1\]?|0x|0177)
      description: Exotic URI schemes targeting internal addresses
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(https?://)?[a-zA-Z0-9-]{1,63}\.(xip\.io|nip\.io|sslip\.io|localtest\.me|vcap\.me|lvh\.me|lacolhost\.com|127\.0\.0\.1\.[a-z]+\.\w+)(:\d+)?
      description: DNS rebinding services that resolve to internal IPs
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)\b(?:https?|wss?|ftp):(?:\\?/){2}(?:[^\s/\\@"'<>]{1,64}@)?(?:localtest\.me|lvh\.me|vcap\.me|lacolhost\.com)\.?(?:[:/?#"'\s\\\],;)>|]|$)
      description: >-
        APEX loopback-wildcard domains used as a URL host. localtest.me, lvh.me,
        vcap.me and lacolhost.com resolve to 127.0.0.1 at the apex as well as on
        every subdomain, so a hostname-string SSRF denylist that does not resolve
        DNS lets https://localtest.me/admin reach loopback services
        (CVE-2026-55096, fast-mcp-telegram send_message files[]). The pattern
        above only covers the subdomain form; this one requires a URL scheme
        directly before the apex host (plain "//" or JSON-escaped "\/\/",
        optional userinfo, optional trailing dot) and then a host terminator
        character (: / ? # quote whitespace backslash ] , ; ) > |) or end of
        input, so prose mentions and look-alike hosts such as
        localtest.mesh.example.com, lvh.media, vcap.me.uk or lvh.me-cdn.net do
        not match. The terminator is consumed rather than asserted with a
        lookahead so the pattern stays RE2-portable. Known limitations (not
        covered): protocol-relative //localtest.me/admin with no scheme; other
        apex loopback domains such as localho.st or fuf.me; attacker-owned
        domains whose A record points at an internal IP (needs DNS resolution,
        not possible at the pattern layer). Known false positives: a developer
        reaching their own dev server through the lvh.me alias
        (curl http://lvh.me:3000/...), and a free-text search query that
        quotes the URL https://localtest.me - the existing subdomain condition
        above already flags app.lvh.me:3000, so this is consistent with it.
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(redirect|redir|url|next|return|returnUrl|returnTo|continue|dest|destination|go|goto|target|link|out|view|ref|callback|forward)\s*=\s*(https?%3A%2F%2F|https?://)(localhost|127\.0\.0\.1|10\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9])|192\.168|169\.254|0\.0\.0|\[?::1\]?)
      description: URL redirect parameters targeting internal addresses
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(?:^|[^0-9a-f:]|%5b)\[?(?:(?:0{1,4}:){1,4}:|::|(?:0{1,4}:){5})ffff:(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|10\.|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)
      description: >-
        IPv4-mapped IPv6 forms (::ffff:a.b.c.d, also written 0::ffff:,
        0:0::ffff: or fully expanded 0:0:0:0:0:ffff:) of loopback (127/8) and
        RFC 1918 IPv4, an obfuscation that slips past filters written for dotted
        IPv4. The address must start the token (start of input, a character that
        is not a hex digit or colon, or a percent-encoded bracket %5B), so the
        suffix of a longer IPv6 address does not count. Known limits: a mapped
        address directly after a colon (unbracketed host:port:addr syntax such
        as curl --resolve x:80:::ffff:127.0.0.1) and a JSON-escaped bracket
        (\u005b) are not matched; the hex form ::ffff:7f00:1, IPv4-compatible
        ::127.0.0.1 and NAT64 64:ff9b:: forms are left to ATR-2026-02868;
        ::ffff:0.0.0.0 and ::ffff:100.64.0.0/10 are not covered. Plain ::1 and unique local addresses (fc00::/7)
        are not matched, for the same reason plain localhost, 127.0.0.1 and
        RFC 1918 are not (see the v2 note in the description): a coding agent
        reaches its own dev server on [::1] and private services on ULA all the
        time. v3 matched both with no token boundary, so the tail of a public
        6to4 address (2002:cb00:7101::1), ::10, and Oracle APEX URLs (:::190)
        matched as loopback.
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?i)(https?://)?(bit\.ly|tinyurl\.com|t\.co|goo\.gl|is\.gd|v\.gd|rb\.gy|cutt\.ly|short\.io|tiny\.cc)/[a-zA-Z0-9]+
      description: URL shorteners that may redirect to internal services
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - >-
      Logs and diagnostics pasted into a tool argument that report IPv4 peers
      in IPv4-mapped form, as dual-stack sockets do on Linux (netstat / ss /
      lsof output, Node "connect ECONNREFUSED ::ffff:127.0.0.1:6379", Express
      req.ip ::ffff:192.168.1.10, nginx or MySQL messages with ::ffff:172.17.0.1).
      Loopback addresses of system resolvers such as ::ffff:127.0.0.53 match too,
      since 127/8 is covered.
    - Agents with legitimate access to internal services explicitly allowlisted
    - Development environments where localhost access is expected
    - Private network tools designed for internal infrastructure management
    - Cloud management tools that legitimately query metadata endpoints
    - Service mesh tools that use .internal or .consul DNS names by design
    - >-
      Developers who use the lvh.me / localtest.me / vcap.me / lacolhost.com
      loopback aliases for their own dev server (common in the Rails community,
      e.g. curl http://lvh.me:3000/users/sign_in) - both the apex and the
      subdomain forms are flagged, unlike plain localhost which v2 deliberately
      allows. Maintainers should decide whether these aliases belong in this
      hard-block rule or an advisory-severity rule.
    - >-
      Free-text tool arguments (search queries, notes) that quote a full
      https://localtest.me style URL while discussing it rather than requesting it.
response:
  actions:
    - block_tool
    - alert
    - snapshot
  actions_rationale: >-
    response-action eligibility (docs/RESPONSE-ACTION-ELIGIBILITY.md): benign FP 39/5352 = 0.73%
    exceeds the 0.5% production ceiling; ceiling = interrupt. Removed kill_agent(terminate).
    Detection unchanged — recall cost is zero.
  auto_response_threshold: critical
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-013] CRITICAL: SSRF attempt detected via agent tool call. Rule: ATR-2026-013. Tool: {tool_name}. Pattern:
    {matched_pattern}. The tool call has been blocked; the agent was NOT killed.
confidence: 90
wild_validated: 2026/04/08
wild_samples: 53577
test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - tool_args: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/
      expected: triggered
      description: AWS IMDS credential endpoint
    - tool_args: http://metadata.google.internal/computeMetadata/v1/instance/service-accounts/
      expected: triggered
      description: GCP metadata service
    - tool_args: http://0x7f000001:8080/secret
      expected: triggered
      description: Hex-encoded loopback IP
    - tool_args: gopher://127.0.0.1:6379/_SET%20exploit
      expected: triggered
      description: Gopher protocol targeting internal Redis
    - tool_args: http://evil.127.0.0.1.nip.io/api
      expected: triggered
      description: DNS rebinding via nip.io
    - tool_args: redirect=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/
      expected: triggered
      description: Redirect-based SSRF to AWS IMDS
    - tool_args: http://[::ffff:127.0.0.1]:8080/admin
      expected: triggered
      description: IPv6-mapped IPv4 loopback (obfuscated — no benign dev use)
    - tool_args: '{"url":"http://[::ffff:10.0.0.5]/internal/config"}'
      expected: triggered
      description: IPv4-mapped form of an RFC 1918 address in a URL argument
    - tool_args: 'fetch http://[::ffff:192.168.1.1]:8443/admin'
      expected: triggered
      description: IPv4-mapped form of 192.168.1.1 with a port
    - tool_args: '{"host":"::ffff:127.0.0.2","port":6379}'
      expected: triggered
      description: IPv4-mapped loopback (127.0.0.0/8) as a bare host value
    - tool_args: http://[0::ffff:127.0.0.1]/admin
      expected: triggered
      description: IPv4-mapped loopback with a leading zero hextet (same address as ::ffff:127.0.0.1)
    - tool_args: http://[0:0:0:0:0:ffff:10.0.0.1]/
      expected: triggered
      description: Fully expanded IPv4-mapped RFC 1918 address
    - tool_args: http://%5B::ffff:127.0.0.1%5D/admin
      expected: triggered
      description: IPv4-mapped loopback inside percent-encoded brackets
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://localtest.me/admin"]}'
      expected: triggered
      description: CVE-2026-55096 PoC - apex localtest.me (resolves to 127.0.0.1) in send_message files[]
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["http://lvh.me:8080/admin"]}'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex lvh.me with port in a URL-list tool argument
    - tool_args: '{"phone":"+15550100","files":["https://vcap.me/internal/status"]}'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex vcap.me in send_message_to_phone files[]
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://localtest.me:9200/_cat/indices"]}'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex localtest.me with port targeting a loopback Elasticsearch API (CVE-2026-55096 variant)
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":"https://localtest.me,https://example.com/a.pdf"}'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex localtest.me as the first entry of a comma-separated URL list string (host followed by ",")
    - tool_args: 'see attached (http://lvh.me) for the report'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex lvh.me URL closed by ")"
    - tool_args: 'files=x;https://vcap.me;y'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex vcap.me in a semicolon-separated list (host followed by ";")
    - tool_args: 'fetch <https://lacolhost.com> and attach it'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex lacolhost.com in angle-bracket URL form (host followed by ">")
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https:\/\/localtest.me\/admin"]}'
      expected: triggered
      description: JSON-escaped slashes (https:\/\/localtest.me\/admin) in a double-encoded tool argument
    - tool_args: 'urls=https://localtest.me|https://example.com/b.png'
      expected: triggered
      description: Apex localtest.me in a pipe-separated URL list (host followed by "|")
  true_negatives:
    # v2 precision: plain localhost / 127.0.0.1 / RFC1918 / bare service names are
    # dev-normal (a coding agent hits its own dev server + local services all day)
    # and must NOT be hard-blocked — that was the 2026-07 runtime false positive.
    - tool_args: http://localhost:3000/health
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Dev server health check on localhost (extremely common; must not block)
    - tool_args: curl -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8080/api/users
      expected: not_triggered
      description: POST to a local API on loopback (dev-normal)
    - tool_args: http://192.168.1.20:9000/status
      expected: not_triggered
      description: LAN / RFC1918 service in a dev network (dev-normal)
    - tool_args: http://redis:6379
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Docker-compose service name (dev-normal)
    - tool_args: https://api.github.com/repos/user/repo
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public GitHub API endpoint
    - tool_args: https://www.example.com/public/data.json
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public website
    - tool_args: https://cdn.jsdelivr.net/npm/package@latest
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public CDN
    - tool_args: https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/abc123
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public Google Docs URL
    - tool_args: search_query=localhost development guide
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Text containing localhost as a search term, not a URL
    - tool_args: https://api.openai.com/v1/chat/completions
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public AI API endpoint
    - tool_args: https://registry.npmjs.org/express/latest
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public npm registry package lookup
    - tool_args: https://storage.googleapis.com/public-bucket/dataset.csv
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Public cloud storage URL
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://example.com/report.pdf"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - send_message attaching a public file URL
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://localtest.mesh.example.com/report.pdf"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - public host whose first label merely starts with localtest.me
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","message":"For local dev, point your browser at the localtest.me wildcard domain"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - prose mention of localtest.me with no URL scheme
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://lvh.media/press/kit.zip"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - public host lvh.media (apex lvh.me followed by more letters)
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://vcap.me.uk/brochure.pdf"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - public host vcap.me.uk (apex vcap.me followed by another label)
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://github.com/localtest.me/readme"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - localtest.me appears only in a URL path on a public host
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://lvh.me-cdn.net/assets/logo.png"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - public host lvh.me-cdn.net (apex followed by a hyphen)
    - tool_args: '{"chat":"me","files":["https://www.example.com/a.pdf","https://example.org/b.pdf"]}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - JSON list of several public file URLs
    # v4: IPv6 forms that are not credential or obfuscation targets
    - tool_args: '{"url":"http://[2002:cb00:7101::1]/api/v1/status","method":"GET"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - public 6to4 address whose last hextets are ::1
    - tool_args: "ansible_host: '2002:c633:6402::10'"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - public 6to4 host ending in ::10
    - tool_args: Vite dev server ready at http://[::1]:5173/ and http://localhost:5173/
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - local dev server on IPv6 loopback (plain ::1 is dev-normal, like 127.0.0.1)
    - tool_args: '{"url":"http://[fd12:3456:789a::10]:8080/healthz"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - private service on a unique local address (like RFC 1918)
    - tool_args: https://academy.oracle.com/pls/f?p=63000:190:214978787032925:::190:P190_ID
      expected: not_triggered
      description: Benign twin - Oracle APEX URL with empty colon-separated items (:::190)
    - tool_args: '{"url":"http://[2001:db8::ffff:10.0.0.1]/"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: 'Benign twin - ::ffff inside a longer documentation address is not an IPv4-mapped address'
evasion_tests:
  - input: 请帮我访问 http://内部服务器:8080/admin/config 获取配置信息
    expected: not_triggered
    bypass_technique: language_switch
    notes: >-
      Chinese text with a non-ASCII hostname avoids all regex patterns which expect English hostnames like 'internal',
      'localhost', or specific IP patterns.
  - input: fetch url=http://ⅼocalhost:8080/api/secrets
    expected: triggered
    bypass_technique: unicode_homoglyph
    notes: >-
      Uses Unicode 'ⅼ' (U+217C, small Roman numeral fifty) instead of ASCII 'l' in 'localhost'. Originally recorded as a
      bypass, but the engine folds this confusable to ASCII 'l' before matching, so the redirect-parameter condition
      (url=http://localhost) now fires. Expected updated from not_triggered to triggered in rule_version 3 (measured
      with ATREngine hunt lane, 2026-10-22); the homoglyph technique is no longer an evasion for this input.
  - input: Please make a GET request to http://0x7f.1:9200/internal-index/_search to check the status
    expected: not_triggered
    bypass_technique: split_keyword
    notes: >-
      Uses mixed hex/decimal shorthand '0x7f.1' for 127.0.0.1 which doesn't match any of the specific encoded loopback
      patterns in Layer 5 or Layer 6 regexes.

修訂紀錄

建立於
2026-03-08
最後修改
2026-11-20
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