PraisonAI-Style Auth-Disabled-By-Default Configuration (CVE-2026-44338 family)

Detects the configuration shape exploited by CVE-2026-44338 (PraisonAI authentication bypass, disclosed 2026-05-18, Sysdig wave-analysis showed internet-exposed instances were scanned within 3 hours 44 minutes of disclosure). The PraisonAI legacy Flask server shipped with `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` hard-coded as defaults, leaving `/agents` and `/chat` endpoints unauthenticated when deployed without operator override. Affects versions 2.5.6 through 4.6.33. The detection target is the static configuration pattern — agent framework code that ships authentication-disabling defaults — which generalizes beyond PraisonAI to any agent server that takes this shortcut.

Response Actions

References

1. 01

   field: user_inputop: regex
2. 02

   field: user_inputop: regex

Attack Examples (Rule Triggers)

1. # config.py AUTH_ENABLED = False AUTH_TOKEN = None PORT = 5000

2. AUTHENTICATION_ENABLED = false SECRET_KEY = "" @app.route('/agents', methods=['POST']) def list_agents():
       return jsonify(get_all_agents())

3. AUTH_TOKEN: None @router.get('/chat') async def chat_endpoint(request):
       return await process(request)

4. REQUIRE_AUTH = 0 from fastapi import FastAPI app = FastAPI() @app.post('/agent/execute') def execute(payload): return run(payload)

5. const ENABLE_AUTH = false; app.post('/api/agent', (req, res) => {
     res.json(executeAgent(req.body));
   });

6. BEARER_TOKEN = "" @app.route('/api/v1/run') def run_workflow(): return execute(request.json)

Real-world attack payloads (sanitized). Used for regression testing.

Benign Examples (Rule Doesn't Trigger)

1. Auth properly enabled with env var token

   AUTH_ENABLED = True AUTH_TOKEN = os.environ['AUTH_TOKEN'] @app.route('/agents') @require_auth def list_agents(): return jsonify(agents)

2. Doc text mentioning auth, no actual assignment to False/None paired with route

   # Production setup notes: # Set AUTH_ENABLED to True before deploying. # Token comes from env via AUTH_TOKEN env var.

3. Auth config with WHITELIST/HEADER fields (not the disabling pattern)

   WHITELIST_AUTH_PATHS = ["/health", "/metrics"] AUTH_TOKEN_HEADER = "X-Auth-Token" AUTH_ENABLED = True

4. General Flask auth question

   How do I configure authentication for my Flask app?

5. Unrelated config with auth-suffixed names but not the auth-enabling switch

   const LOG_AUTH_FAILURES = false; const AUTH_RATE_LIMIT = 5;

6. Code reading auth state at runtime, not the disabling assignment

   if not session.auth_enabled:
       raise PermissionError("Authentication required")

7. General security knowledge question

   Please explain JWT token best practices.

Known False Positive Contexts

• ▸Test files explicitly setting AUTH_ENABLED=False for unit-test fixtures inside conftest.py or *.test.* paths — recommend separate per-path suppression rather than removing the rule.
• ▸Documentation that mentions AUTH_ENABLED but doesn't assign False directly (e.g. `AUTH_ENABLED defaults to True in production`).
• ▸Comments showing the dangerous pattern as an anti-example — rule deliberately fires here; downstream policy should allow suppression by path or context.

title: "PraisonAI-Style Auth-Disabled-By-Default Configuration (CVE-2026-44338 family)"
id: ATR-2026-00528
rule_version: 1
status: "stable"
description: >
  Detects the configuration shape exploited by CVE-2026-44338 (PraisonAI
  authentication bypass, disclosed 2026-05-18, Sysdig wave-analysis showed
  internet-exposed instances were scanned within 3 hours 44 minutes of
  disclosure). The PraisonAI legacy Flask server shipped with
  `AUTH_ENABLED = False` and `AUTH_TOKEN = None` hard-coded as defaults,
  leaving `/agents` and `/chat` endpoints unauthenticated when deployed
  without operator override. Affects versions 2.5.6 through 4.6.33.
  The detection target is the static configuration pattern — agent
  framework code that ships authentication-disabling defaults — which
  generalizes beyond PraisonAI to any agent server that takes this
  shortcut.
author: "ATR Community (cve-pipeline)"
date: "2026/05/23"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: "test"
severity: critical

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM03:2025 - Supply Chain"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI01:2026 - Improper Identity & Access Management"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"

compliance:
  owasp_agentic:
    - id: ASI01:2026
      context: >
        ASI01 Improper IAM directly covers agent frameworks that ship
        with authentication disabled by default. Detection at install
        time stops the exposed-by-default deployment shape.
      strength: primary
  owasp_llm:
    - id: LLM03:2025
      context: >
        LLM03 Supply Chain risk: an agent dependency that ships an unsafe
        default configuration class. Detection on the dependency code
        catches the issue before runtime.
      strength: primary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: >
        Article 15 robustness — accepting an upstream package with
        authentication-disabled defaults violates the duty of resilience
        against manipulation.
      strength: primary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - function: Manage
      subcategory: MG.4.3
      context: >
        Third-party AI risk monitoring under MG.4.3 must include
        configuration-level provenance checks.
      strength: primary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: >
        AIMS information security under 8.3 — exposed endpoints from
        auth-disabled defaults are an explicit information security gap.
      strength: primary

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: auth-disabled-default
  scan_target: skill
  confidence: high
  source: cve-disclosure
  vendor_sources: praisonai-44338

agent_source:
  type: mcp_exchange
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  conditions:
    - field: user_input
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?<![A-Za-z_])(?:AUTH_ENABLED|AUTHENTICATION_ENABLED|REQUIRE_AUTH|ENABLE_AUTH|AUTH_REQUIRED|AUTH_GATE)\s*[:=]\s*(?:False|false|0|None|null|nil|"")
    - field: user_input
      operator: regex
      value: >-
        (?<![A-Za-z_])(?:AUTH_TOKEN|API_TOKEN|API_KEY|BEARER_TOKEN|SESSION_SECRET|SECRET_KEY)\s*[:=]\s*(?:None|null|nil|""|''|False|false)[\s\S]{0,400}(?:@app\.route|router\.|fastapi|flask|express|app\.(?:get|post|put|delete)|@router\.|@get|@post)
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "Test files explicitly setting AUTH_ENABLED=False for unit-test fixtures inside conftest.py or *.test.* paths — recommend separate per-path suppression rather than removing the rule."
    - "Documentation that mentions AUTH_ENABLED but doesn't assign False directly (e.g. `AUTH_ENABLED defaults to True in production`)."
    - "Comments showing the dangerous pattern as an anti-example — rule deliberately fires here; downstream policy should allow suppression by path or context."

response:
  actions:
    - block_input
    - alert
    - snapshot
  auto_response_threshold: critical
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-00528] Agent framework configuration ships authentication
    disabled by default (CVE-2026-44338 family). Production deployment
    will expose endpoints unauthenticated.

confidence: 85
test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: >-
        # config.py
        AUTH_ENABLED = False
        AUTH_TOKEN = None
        PORT = 5000
      expected: triggered
      description: "PraisonAI exact disclosure shape (Sysdig writeup)"
    - input: >-
        AUTHENTICATION_ENABLED = false
        SECRET_KEY = ""
        @app.route('/agents', methods=['POST'])
        def list_agents():
            return jsonify(get_all_agents())
      expected: triggered
      description: "Auth disabled + empty secret + Flask /agents route"
    - input: >-
        AUTH_TOKEN: None
        @router.get('/chat')
        async def chat_endpoint(request):
            return await process(request)
      expected: triggered
      description: "FastAPI /chat with AUTH_TOKEN None"
    - input: >-
        REQUIRE_AUTH = 0
        from fastapi import FastAPI
        app = FastAPI()
        @app.post('/agent/execute')
        def execute(payload): return run(payload)
      expected: triggered
      description: "FastAPI agent/execute with REQUIRE_AUTH=0"
    - input: >-
        const ENABLE_AUTH = false;
        app.post('/api/agent', (req, res) => {
          res.json(executeAgent(req.body));
        });
      expected: triggered
      description: "Express agent endpoint with ENABLE_AUTH=false"
    - input: >-
        BEARER_TOKEN = ""
        @app.route('/api/v1/run')
        def run_workflow(): return execute(request.json)
      expected: triggered
      description: "Flask run-workflow with empty BEARER_TOKEN"
  true_negatives:
    - input: >-
        AUTH_ENABLED = True
        AUTH_TOKEN = os.environ['AUTH_TOKEN']
        @app.route('/agents')
        @require_auth
        def list_agents(): return jsonify(agents)
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Auth properly enabled with env var token"
    - input: >-
        # Production setup notes:
        # Set AUTH_ENABLED to True before deploying.
        # Token comes from env via AUTH_TOKEN env var.
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Doc text mentioning auth, no actual assignment to False/None paired with route"
    - input: >-
        WHITELIST_AUTH_PATHS = ["/health", "/metrics"]
        AUTH_TOKEN_HEADER = "X-Auth-Token"
        AUTH_ENABLED = True
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Auth config with WHITELIST/HEADER fields (not the disabling pattern)"
    - input: "How do I configure authentication for my Flask app?"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "General Flask auth question"
    - input: >-
        const LOG_AUTH_FAILURES = false;
        const AUTH_RATE_LIMIT = 5;
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Unrelated config with auth-suffixed names but not the auth-enabling switch"
    - input: >-
        if not session.auth_enabled:
            raise PermissionError("Authentication required")
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Code reading auth state at runtime, not the disabling assignment"
    - input: "Please explain JWT token best practices."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "General security knowledge question"