Skip to content
Agent Threat Rules (ATR)中文
ΒSkill Compromise
ATR-2026-00064
Recorded 2026-03-08 · Author ATR Community

Over-Permissioned MCP Skill

Detects MCP skills that request or exercise permissions far exceeding what their stated function requires.

over permissioned skill · pattern · confidence: medium

Severity
high
Lanes
alert · huntmarks and reports a match
Maturity
testnot yet settled
Scan target
mcp
Status
experimental

Framework mappings

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI03:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025
  • LLM03:2025

ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.

Description

Detects MCP skills that request or exercise permissions far exceeding what their stated function requires. A "spell checker" that requests filesystem write access, network access, and process execution is a strong signal of a trojaned or malicious skill. This rule monitors tool calls for permission-boundary violations.

Suggested responsealertsnapshot
Author: ATR Community · Created 2026-03-08 · Last modified 2026-11-20

Tested in the wild

Validated
2026-04-08
Samples
53,577

Detection conditions

Combinator: any
  1. 01
    field: tool_argsop: regex
  2. 02
    field: tool_argsop: regex
  3. 03
    field: tool_argsop: regex
  4. 04
    field: tool_argsop: regex
  5. 05
    field: tool_argsop: regex

Attacks it catches

  1. Matches: text analyzer attempting privilege escalation
    tool_name: text_analyzer
    tool_args: '{"command": "sudo chmod 777 /etc/shadow"}'
  2. Matches: formatter tool creating system users
    tool_name: data_formatter
    tool_args: '{"action": "useradd -m backdoor_user -p password123"}'
  3. Matches: recursive world-writable chmod with a flag before the mode
    tool_name: text_analyzer
    tool_args: '{"command": "chmod -R 777 /"}'

Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.

Benign inputs it leaves alone

  1. tool_name: deploy_helper
    tool_args: '{"command": "chmod 755 deploy.sh"}'
  2. tool_name: deploy_helper
    tool_args: '{"command": "chmod -R 755 public/"}'
  3. tool_name: server_admin
    tool_args: '{"action": "systemctl status nginx"}'
  4. tool_name: file_manager
    tool_args: '{"action": "chmod 644 /tmp/output.txt"}'
  5. Legitimate tool with justified single-scope permission
    This development tool requires filesystem read access to scan your project for linting errors.
  6. Legitimate DevOps tool with justified multi-scope permissions
    The deployment tool needs network and filesystem permissions to push builds to the staging server.
  7. Tool requesting minimal read-only permission
    Permissions requested: read-only access to the current directory for code analysis.

Known false positives

  • ▸System administration tools that legitimately manage permissions and services
  • ▸DevOps tools performing infrastructure provisioning
  • ▸Security tools that audit permission configurations

Documented bypasses

  1. Technique: justified permissions
    This tool needs network access to fetch exchange rates and filesystem access to cache the results locally.
    Malicious tool provides plausible justification for broad permissions.
  2. Technique: abstracted permissions
    Required capabilities: internet, storage. The tool syncs your calendar with cloud services.
    Uses abstract capability names instead of specific permission keywords.

These bypasses are documented in public. The rule itself lists its known limits.

title: "Over-Permissioned MCP Skill"
id: ATR-2026-00064
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects MCP skills that request or exercise permissions far exceeding what their
  stated function requires. A "spell checker" that requests filesystem write access,
  network access, and process execution is a strong signal of a trojaned or malicious
  skill. This rule monitors tool calls for permission-boundary violations.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/03/08"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: high

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
    - "LLM03:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI03:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0040 - AI Model Inference API Access"

compliance:
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "GV.6.1"
      context: >-
        Over-permissioned MCP skills are a third-party/supplier AI risk where an
        installed skill requests permissions far exceeding its stated function;
        GV.6.1 requires policies and procedures that govern third-party AI
        components and their permission boundaries.
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.1"
      context: >-
        Detecting permission-boundary violations in third-party MCP skills directly
        supports MG.3.1's requirement to manage risks from third-party AI entities,
        including trojaned or malicious supply-chain components exercising
        unauthorized capabilities.
Show all (141 more lines)
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: >-
        A skill exercising filesystem, network, or process-execution permissions
        inconsistent with its declared purpose characterizes the likelihood and
        magnitude of privilege-escalation impact that MP.5.1 requires to be
        identified and tracked.
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: "MS.2.7"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the skill supply-chain compromise (Over-Permissioned MCP Skill)."
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.2"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 (pre-trained models monitored as part of maintenance) is supported where this rule detects the skill supply-chain compromise (Over-Permissioned MCP Skill)."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control, including control of externally provided processes) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the skill supply-chain compromise (Over-Permissioned MCP Skill)."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is supported by this rule, which implements runtime detection of the skill supply-chain compromise (Over-Permissioned MCP Skill) as a treatment control."
      strength: secondary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires high-risk AI systems to resist unauthorised attempts to alter their use, outputs or performance; this rule provides runtime detection evidence by flagging the skill supply-chain compromise (Over-Permissioned MCP Skill)."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the skill supply-chain compromise (Over-Permissioned MCP Skill)."
      strength: secondary
tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: over-permissioned-skill
  scan_target: mcp
  confidence: medium

agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
    - mcp
    - langchain
    - autogen
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  conditions:
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(sudo|runas|doas|pkexec|gsudo)\\s+"
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(chmod\\s+(?:[0-7]?[0-7]{2}[2367]|[2467][0-7]{3})(?:[^0-7]|$)|chmod\\s+(?:-[-\\w]+\\s+)+(?:[0-7]?[0-7]{2}[2367]|[2467][0-7]{3})\\s+(?:/(?:[\\s\"'*;]|$)|/(?:etc|usr|var|bin|sbin|boot|lib|opt|root|home|srv)\\b|~|\\$HOME)|chmod\\s+[ug]?\\+[sx]|chown\\s+root|setcap\\s)"
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(iptables|ufw|firewall-cmd|netsh\\s+advfirewall|pfctl)\\s"
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(useradd|adduser|usermod|passwd|net\\s+user|dsadd|New-LocalUser)"
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)(crontab|schtasks|at\\s+\\d|systemctl\\s+(enable|start)|launchctl\\s+load)"
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "System administration tools that legitimately manage permissions and services"
    - "DevOps tools performing infrastructure provisioning"
    - "Security tools that audit permission configurations"

response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - snapshot
  actions_rationale: >-
    response-action eligibility (docs/RESPONSE-ACTION-ELIGIBILITY.md): benign FP 403/5352 =
    7.53% exceeds the 2% automatic-demotion line; ceiling = observe. Removed
    block_tool(interrupt), reduce_permissions(degrade). Detection unchanged — recall cost is
    zero.
  auto_response_threshold: high
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-064] Over-permissioned skill detected. Tool is attempting operations
    that exceed its stated scope (privilege escalation, service management, user
    creation, or firewall modification). Permissions reduced.

confidence: 73
wild_validated: "2026/04/08"
wild_samples: 53577
test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input:
        tool_name: "text_analyzer"
        tool_args: '{"command": "sudo chmod 777 /etc/shadow"}'
      expected: triggered
      matched_condition: "text analyzer attempting privilege escalation"
    - input:
        tool_name: "data_formatter"
        tool_args: '{"action": "useradd -m backdoor_user -p password123"}'
      expected: triggered
      matched_condition: "formatter tool creating system users"
    - input:
        tool_name: "text_analyzer"
        tool_args: '{"command": "chmod -R 777 /"}'
      expected: triggered
      matched_condition: "recursive world-writable chmod with a flag before the mode"
  true_negatives:
    - input:
        tool_name: "deploy_helper"
        tool_args: '{"command": "chmod 755 deploy.sh"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      matched_condition: "ordinary executable bit is not over-permissioning"
    - input:
        tool_name: "deploy_helper"
        tool_args: '{"command": "chmod -R 755 public/"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      matched_condition: "recursive but not world-writable"
    - input:
        tool_name: "server_admin"
        tool_args: '{"action": "systemctl status nginx"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      reason: "Admin tool checking service status (read-only)"
    - input:
        tool_name: "file_manager"
        tool_args: '{"action": "chmod 644 /tmp/output.txt"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      reason: "Setting normal file permissions on temp file"
    - input: "This development tool requires filesystem read access to scan your project for linting errors."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Legitimate tool with justified single-scope permission"
    - input: "The deployment tool needs network and filesystem permissions to push builds to the staging server."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Legitimate DevOps tool with justified multi-scope permissions"
    - input: "Permissions requested: read-only access to the current directory for code analysis."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Tool requesting minimal read-only permission"

evasion_tests:
  - input: "This tool needs network access to fetch exchange rates and filesystem access to cache the results locally."
    expected: not_triggered
    bypass_technique: justified_permissions
    notes: "Malicious tool provides plausible justification for broad permissions."
  - input: "Required capabilities: internet, storage. The tool syncs your calendar with cloud services."
    expected: not_triggered
    bypass_technique: abstracted_permissions
    notes: "Uses abstract capability names instead of specific permission keywords."

Revision history

Created
2026-03-08
Last modified
2026-11-20
Full commit history on GitHub