Agent HTTP Request Claims a Loopback Origin While Targeting an External Host

Detects an agent HTTP tool call that sends a request to a NAMED external host while declaring a loopback origin in a header the server is likely to trust -- `Host: 127.0.0.1`, `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`, `X-Real-IP: localhost`, `X-Originating-IP: ::1`. Mined from CVE-2026-61435 (PraisonAI), whose bind-host authorization check derived "is this request local?" from `request.url.hostname`, i.e. from the Host header the caller supplies, so an internet-reachable deployment granted localhost-only privileges to anyone who asked for them. Verified on the shipped engine: two payload forms across all five event types matched nothing, and a grep of rules/ finds no Host/X-Forwarded-For spoofing rule at all. RULE_VERSION 2, after adversarial review fired version 1 on 6 of 22 benign probes. Three constraints were added, each forced by a probe. (1) THE CALL MUST BE REQUEST-ISSUING. Version 1 checked only the argument text, so an agent writing a penetration-test note through write_file -- `ffuf -u https://target.example/admin -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1"` -- matched, because the payload was in the file body. Code-block suppression, which version 1 relied on for exactly this sample, only helps when the example is fenced, and a note file is not. (2) `host` NEEDS A REAL HEADER CONTEXT. Version 1 accepted any QUOTED key named host, and its false-positive note claimed configuration files were excluded by that quoting requirement. They are not: JSON quotes its keys, so `{"tool":"db_query","arguments":{"host":"localhost","schema_url":"https://schemas.corp.example/..."}}` matched. `host` now requires -H, --header, a headers object, or an HTTP wire line. The `x-*` names keep the looser form, since nothing else is called x-forwarded-for. (3) THE TWO HALVES MUST BE ADJACENT AND IN THE SAME STATEMENT. Version 1 only asked that both appear somewhere in the arguments, so `curl -H 'Host: localhost' http://127.0.0.1:8080/health; curl https://status.corp.example/ping` satisfied them from two different commands. The gap is now 120 characters with no `;`, no newline, no `://`, no pipe and no `&` -- the last four because every remaining false positive was a loopback header attached to a LOOPBACK request, with an unrelated external URL in a trailing comment, an echo, or the other half of a pipeline. The pairing remains the precision handle: a request TO 127.0.0.1 carrying a virtual-host `Host:` header is ordinary local testing and does not match, because the external-URL condition demands a hostname ending in an alphabetic TLD, which no dotted-quad or bare `localhost` target satisfies.

Response Actions

References

1. 01

   The call is issued by an HTTP-request tool, or by a shell tool running an HTTP client

   field: tool_argsop: regex
2. 02

   A named external host and a loopback-valued origin header, adjacent and in the same statement

   field: tool_argsop: regex

Attack Examples (Rule Triggers)

1. {"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"http://target.example:8000/api/v1/agents","headers":{"Host":"127.0.0.1"}}}

2. {"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.target.example/admin","headers":{"X-Forwarded-For":"127.0.0.1","Host":"localhost"}}}

3. {"tool":"bash","command":"curl -s -H \"X-Real-IP: ::1\" https://console.target.example/internal/metrics"}

4. {"tool":"http_post","arguments":{"url":"https://staging.target.example/api/webhook","headers":{"x-forwarded-for":"127.0.0.2","Content-Type":"application/json"}}}

Real-world attack payloads, sanitized and versioned alongside the rule as regression tests — so a future revision can't silently stop catching them.

Benign Examples (Rule Doesn't Trigger)

1. A database tool given a local host and a remote schema URL -- JSON quotes its keys, which is why quoting alone never excluded configuration

   {"tool":"db_query","arguments":{"host":"localhost","database":"app","schema_url":"https://schemas.corp.example/v1/app.json","sql":"SELECT 1"}}

2. A local vhost check and an unrelated external ping in one command -- version 1 took one half from each

   {"tool":"bash","command":"curl -sS -H 'Host: localhost' http://127.0.0.1:8080/health; curl -sS https://status.corp.example/ping"}

3. The ffuf example written into an UNFENCED note file, which code-block suppression cannot reach

   {"tool":"write_file","arguments":{"path":"notes.txt","content":"Header bypass check: ffuf -w words.txt -u https://target.example/admin -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\" -mc 200"}}

4. A loopback request whose trailing comment names the production URL

   {"tool":"bash","command":"curl -H 'Host: localhost' http://127.0.0.1:3000/healthz # mirrors https://app.corp.example"}

5. External call piped into a POST to a LOCAL collector -- the spoofed header belongs to the loopback request

   {"tool":"bash","command":"curl -sS https://api.corp.example/v1/ping -o /dev/null -w '%{time_total}' | curl -X POST --header 'X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1' http://127.0.0.1:9000/timing --data-binary @-"}

6. External API call routed through a local debugging proxy

   {"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/v1/items","headers":{"X-Request-Id":"a91f"},"proxy":{"host":"127.0.0.1","port":8888}}}

7. A genuine virtual-host header on an external request

   {"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/v1","headers":{"Host":"api.corp.example"}}}

8. Fetching a spec whose prose documents the header

   {"tool":"http_get","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/openapi.json","note":"spec documents x-real-ip: 127.0.0.1 as ignored"}}

9. Non-English note instructing the agent NOT to send the header

   {"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/health","headers":{"X-Request-Id":"abc"},"備註":"不要送 x-forwarded-for: 127.0.0.1"}}

10. Test config: local web server, external baseURL

    {"tool":"write_file","arguments":{"path":"playwright.config.json","content":"{\"use\":{\"baseURL\":\"https://staging.corp.example\"},\"webServer\":{\"host\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"port\":3000}}"}}

11. Ordinary local virtual-host testing: loopback is the target, the header carries a real name

    {"tool":"bash","command":"curl -H \"Host: app.example.com\" http://127.0.0.1:8080/healthz"}

12. A normal external request with routine headers

    {"tool":"http_get","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/v1/status","headers":{"X-Request-Id":"a91f","Authorization":"Bearer <redacted>"}}}

13. Reverse-proxy configuration passing variables, not loopback literals

    {"tool":"write_file","path":"nginx.conf","content":"proxy_set_header Host $host;\n proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;\n proxy_pass http://backend.internal.example;"}

14. An ordinary config file binding the database locally while naming a remote API -- one of the three measured false positives that forced the header-context requirement

    {"tool":"write_file","path":"config.yml","content":"database:\n  host: localhost\n  port: 5432\napi:\n  base_url: https://api.corp.example/v1"}

Known False Positive Contexts

• ▸A deliberate penetration test replaying a webhook with X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 against a staging host. This matches, and matching is correct: the act being performed is the bypass, whoever is performing it.
• ▸Local virtual-host testing (`curl -H 'Host: app.example.com' http://127.0.0.1:8080/`), where the loopback address is the TARGET and the header carries a real name. Neither half matches.
• ▸A reverse-proxy configuration using `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, since the value is a variable rather than a loopback literal.
• ▸Configuration that binds a service locally while naming a remote API -- `{"host":"localhost"}` beside `https://api.corp.example`, `- HOST=0.0.0.0` in a compose file, a local debugging proxy on a request to an external API. All of these FIRED version 1; `host` now needs a real header context.
• ▸Security-tool documentation whose examples contain the payload, fenced or not. The rule now also requires the call itself to be request-issuing, so writing the ffuf line into a notes file does not match.

Documented Evasion Techniques

1. Technique: zero padded loopback octets

   {"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://target.example/admin","headers":{"HOST":"127.000.000.001"}}}

   KNOWN GAP, stated rather than papered over: zero-padded and alternate encodings of 127.0.0.1 (127.000.000.001, 2130706433, 0x7f000001) are not in the loopback alternation. Adding a decimal-integer branch here would collide with ordinary numeric header values, and the encoded-loopback family is better handled by one dedicated rule than by a branch in every rule that mentions loopback.

Publicly documented bypasses. A standard earns trust by publishing its worst figures, not hiding them — so known limitations ship inside the rule, not in a footnote.

title: "Agent HTTP Request Claims a Loopback Origin While Targeting an External Host"
id: ATR-2026-02708
rule_version: 2
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects an agent HTTP tool call that sends a request to a NAMED external host
  while declaring a loopback origin in a header the server is likely to trust --
  `Host: 127.0.0.1`, `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1`, `X-Real-IP: localhost`,
  `X-Originating-IP: ::1`. Mined from CVE-2026-61435 (PraisonAI), whose
  bind-host authorization check derived "is this request local?" from
  `request.url.hostname`, i.e. from the Host header the caller supplies, so an
  internet-reachable deployment granted localhost-only privileges to anyone who
  asked for them. Verified on the shipped engine: two payload forms across all
  five event types matched nothing, and a grep of rules/ finds no
  Host/X-Forwarded-For spoofing rule at all.
  RULE_VERSION 2, after adversarial review fired version 1 on 6 of 22 benign
  probes. Three constraints were added, each forced by a probe.
  (1) THE CALL MUST BE REQUEST-ISSUING. Version 1 checked only the argument
  text, so an agent writing a penetration-test note through write_file --
  `ffuf -u https://target.example/admin -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1"` --
  matched, because the payload was in the file body. Code-block suppression,
  which version 1 relied on for exactly this sample, only helps when the
  example is fenced, and a note file is not.
  (2) `host` NEEDS A REAL HEADER CONTEXT. Version 1 accepted any QUOTED key
  named host, and its false-positive note claimed configuration files were
  excluded by that quoting requirement. They are not: JSON quotes its keys, so
  `{"tool":"db_query","arguments":{"host":"localhost","schema_url":"https://schemas.corp.example/..."}}`
  matched. `host` now requires -H, --header, a headers object, or an HTTP wire
  line. The `x-*` names keep the looser form, since nothing else is called
  x-forwarded-for.
  (3) THE TWO HALVES MUST BE ADJACENT AND IN THE SAME STATEMENT. Version 1 only
  asked that both appear somewhere in the arguments, so
  `curl -H 'Host: localhost' http://127.0.0.1:8080/health; curl
  https://status.corp.example/ping` satisfied them from two different commands.
  The gap is now 120 characters with no `;`, no newline, no `://`, no pipe and
  no `&` -- the last four because every remaining false positive was a loopback
  header attached to a LOOPBACK request, with an unrelated external URL in a
  trailing comment, an echo, or the other half of a pipeline.
  The pairing remains the precision handle: a request TO 127.0.0.1 carrying a
  virtual-host `Host:` header is ordinary local testing and does not match,
  because the external-URL condition demands a hostname ending in an alphabetic
  TLD, which no dotted-quad or bare `localhost` target satisfies.
author: "ATR Community (CVE sweep)"
date: "2026/08/23"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: high

references:
  cwe:
    - "CWE-290"
    - "CWE-350"
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI06:2026"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1078 - Valid Accounts"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise"
  cve:
    - "CVE-2026-61435"
  external:
    - "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61435"

metadata_provenance:
  cwe: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
  mitre_attack: human-reviewed
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires resistance to unauthorised use; this rule detects an agent request forging a loopback origin to satisfy a localhost-only authorization check on a remote service."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be treated; this rule is the runtime treatment for header-derived trust decisions in agent-reachable services."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MG.2.3"
      context: "Authorization bypass via a spoofed origin header is an identified AI risk requiring an active runtime countermeasure; this rule implements it."
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: "Cataloguing caller-controlled origin headers as an AI-specific authorization risk in the organizational risk register."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by detecting forged origin headers before the request is issued."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is implemented through runtime detection of the spoofed header."
      strength: secondary

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: forged-loopback-origin-header
  scan_target: runtime
  confidence: high
  suppress_in_code_blocks: true

agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  condition: all
  conditions:
    # (1) The event must be a REQUEST-ISSUING tool call. Version 1 had no such
    # requirement, so an agent writing a penetration-test note containing the
    # ffuf example line (`-u https://target.example/admin -H
    # "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1"`) through write_file matched: the payload is
    # in the file body, not in a request. Code-block suppression, which version 1
    # relied on for this, only helps when the example is fenced.
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: '(?:["\x27](?:tool|tool_name|toolName|name|function|mcp_tool)["\x27]\s{0,3}:\s{0,3}["\x27][\w.\-]{0,40}(?:http|curl|wget|fetch|request|req|api|webhook|url|browse|axios|httpx)[\w.\-]{0,20}["\x27]|["\x27](?:command|cmd|script|shell|args|argv)["\x27]\s{0,3}:\s{0,3}[\s\S]{0,20}\b(?:curl|wget|httpie|\bxh\b|invoke-webrequest)\b)'
      description: "The call is issued by an HTTP-request tool, or by a shell tool running an HTTP client"

    # (2) The external target and the loopback-valued origin header must be
    # ADJACENT -- within 120 characters and with no statement break between them.
    # Version 1 asked only that both appear somewhere in the arguments, so
    # `curl -H 'Host: localhost' http://127.0.0.1:8080/health; curl
    # https://status.corp.example/ping` -- a local vhost check followed by an
    # unrelated external ping -- satisfied both halves from two different commands.
    # The gap also admits no `://`, no pipe and no `&`, because the remaining
    # false positives were all the same shape: a loopback header attached to a
    # LOOPBACK request, with an unrelated external URL in a trailing comment, an
    # echo, or the other half of a pipeline.
    # `host` additionally requires a real header context (-H, --header, a headers
    # object, or an HTTP wire line), because `{"host":"localhost"}` is a connection
    # parameter in every database and service config; version 1 accepted any quoted
    # key named host, and its "config files do not match" claim held only for
    # UNQUOTED yaml keys.
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: '(?:https?://[a-z0-9-]{2,30}(?:\.[a-z0-9-]{1,30}){0,4}\.[a-z]{2,12}(?:[:/?"\x27]|\s|$)(?:[^:;\n|&]|:[^/;\n|&]|:/[^/;\n|&]){0,120}(?:(?:-H\s{1,3}["\x27]?|--header\s{1,3}["\x27]?|\bheaders?\b["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]?\s{0,3}[{(\[]?\s{0,3}["\x27]?)host["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]\s{0,3}["\x27]?\s{0,2}(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|localhost|\[?::1\]?|0\.0\.0\.0)\b|(?:^|[\r\n])\s{0,3}host["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]\s{0,3}["\x27]?\s{0,2}(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|localhost|\[?::1\]?|0\.0\.0\.0)\b|(?:["\x27]|(?:-H\s{1,3}["\x27]?|--header\s{1,3}["\x27]?|\bheaders?\b["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]?\s{0,3}[{(\[]?\s{0,3}["\x27]?))(?:x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|x-originating-ip|x-client-ip|x-forwarded-host)["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]\s{0,3}["\x27]?\s{0,2}(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|localhost|\[?::1\]?|0\.0\.0\.0)\b)|(?:(?:-H\s{1,3}["\x27]?|--header\s{1,3}["\x27]?|\bheaders?\b["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]?\s{0,3}[{(\[]?\s{0,3}["\x27]?)host["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]\s{0,3}["\x27]?\s{0,2}(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|localhost|\[?::1\]?|0\.0\.0\.0)\b|(?:^|[\r\n])\s{0,3}host["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]\s{0,3}["\x27]?\s{0,2}(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|localhost|\[?::1\]?|0\.0\.0\.0)\b|(?:["\x27]|(?:-H\s{1,3}["\x27]?|--header\s{1,3}["\x27]?|\bheaders?\b["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]?\s{0,3}[{(\[]?\s{0,3}["\x27]?))(?:x-forwarded-for|x-real-ip|x-originating-ip|x-client-ip|x-forwarded-host)["\x27]?\s{0,3}[:=]\s{0,3}["\x27]?\s{0,2}(?:127\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}|localhost|\[?::1\]?|0\.0\.0\.0)\b)(?:[^:;\n|&]|:[^/;\n|&]|:/[^/;\n|&]){0,120}https?://[a-z0-9-]{2,30}(?:\.[a-z0-9-]{1,30}){0,4}\.[a-z]{2,12}(?:[:/?"\x27]|\s|$))'
      description: "A named external host and a loopback-valued origin header, adjacent and in the same statement"
  false_positives:
    - "A deliberate penetration test replaying a webhook with X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1 against a staging host. This matches, and matching is correct: the act being performed is the bypass, whoever is performing it."
    - "Local virtual-host testing (`curl -H 'Host: app.example.com' http://127.0.0.1:8080/`), where the loopback address is the TARGET and the header carries a real name. Neither half matches."
    - "A reverse-proxy configuration using `proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for`, since the value is a variable rather than a loopback literal."
    - "Configuration that binds a service locally while naming a remote API -- `{\"host\":\"localhost\"}` beside `https://api.corp.example`, `- HOST=0.0.0.0` in a compose file, a local debugging proxy on a request to an external API. All of these FIRED version 1; `host` now needs a real header context."
    - "Security-tool documentation whose examples contain the payload, fenced or not. The rule now also requires the call itself to be request-issuing, so writing the ffuf line into a notes file does not match."

response:
  actions:
    - alert
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-02708] Agent request targets a named external host while
    declaring a loopback origin (Host / X-Forwarded-For / X-Real-IP). Derive
    locality from the socket, never from a caller-supplied header.

confidence: 80

test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: '{"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"http://target.example:8000/api/v1/agents","headers":{"Host":"127.0.0.1"}}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "CVE-2026-61435 shape -- the Host header the bind-host check reads is set to loopback on a remote target"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.target.example/admin","headers":{"X-Forwarded-For":"127.0.0.1","Host":"localhost"}}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "X-Forwarded-For and Host both forged against an external admin endpoint"
    - input: '{"tool":"bash","command":"curl -s -H \"X-Real-IP: ::1\" https://console.target.example/internal/metrics"}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "IPv6 loopback spelling through a shell curl invocation"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_post","arguments":{"url":"https://staging.target.example/api/webhook","headers":{"x-forwarded-for":"127.0.0.2","Content-Type":"application/json"}}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Any address in 127.0.0.0/8 satisfies the same localhost checks"
  true_negatives:
    - input: '{"tool":"db_query","arguments":{"host":"localhost","database":"app","schema_url":"https://schemas.corp.example/v1/app.json","sql":"SELECT 1"}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A database tool given a local host and a remote schema URL -- JSON quotes its keys, which is why quoting alone never excluded configuration"
    - input: '{"tool":"bash","command":"curl -sS -H ''Host: localhost'' http://127.0.0.1:8080/health; curl -sS https://status.corp.example/ping"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A local vhost check and an unrelated external ping in one command -- version 1 took one half from each"
    - input: '{"tool":"write_file","arguments":{"path":"notes.txt","content":"Header bypass check: ffuf -w words.txt -u https://target.example/admin -H \"X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1\" -mc 200"}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "The ffuf example written into an UNFENCED note file, which code-block suppression cannot reach"
    - input: '{"tool":"bash","command":"curl -H ''Host: localhost'' http://127.0.0.1:3000/healthz # mirrors https://app.corp.example"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A loopback request whose trailing comment names the production URL"
    - input: '{"tool":"bash","command":"curl -sS https://api.corp.example/v1/ping -o /dev/null -w ''%{time_total}'' | curl -X POST --header ''X-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1'' http://127.0.0.1:9000/timing --data-binary @-"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "External call piped into a POST to a LOCAL collector -- the spoofed header belongs to the loopback request"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/v1/items","headers":{"X-Request-Id":"a91f"},"proxy":{"host":"127.0.0.1","port":8888}}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "External API call routed through a local debugging proxy"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/v1","headers":{"Host":"api.corp.example"}}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A genuine virtual-host header on an external request"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_get","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/openapi.json","note":"spec documents x-real-ip: 127.0.0.1 as ignored"}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Fetching a spec whose prose documents the header"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/health","headers":{"X-Request-Id":"abc"},"備註":"不要送 x-forwarded-for: 127.0.0.1"}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Non-English note instructing the agent NOT to send the header"
    - input: '{"tool":"write_file","arguments":{"path":"playwright.config.json","content":"{\"use\":{\"baseURL\":\"https://staging.corp.example\"},\"webServer\":{\"host\":\"127.0.0.1\",\"port\":3000}}"}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Test config: local web server, external baseURL"
    - input: '{"tool":"bash","command":"curl -H \"Host: app.example.com\" http://127.0.0.1:8080/healthz"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Ordinary local virtual-host testing: loopback is the target, the header carries a real name"
    - input: '{"tool":"http_get","arguments":{"url":"https://api.corp.example/v1/status","headers":{"X-Request-Id":"a91f","Authorization":"Bearer <redacted>"}}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A normal external request with routine headers"
    - input: '{"tool":"write_file","path":"nginx.conf","content":"proxy_set_header Host $host;\n proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-For $proxy_add_x_forwarded_for;\n proxy_pass http://backend.internal.example;"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Reverse-proxy configuration passing variables, not loopback literals"
    - input: '{"tool":"write_file","path":"config.yml","content":"database:\n  host: localhost\n  port: 5432\napi:\n  base_url: https://api.corp.example/v1"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "An ordinary config file binding the database locally while naming a remote API -- one of the three measured false positives that forced the header-context requirement"

evasion_tests:
  - input: '{"tool":"http_request","arguments":{"url":"https://target.example/admin","headers":{"HOST":"127.000.000.001"}}}'
    expected: not_triggered
    bypass_technique: zero_padded_loopback_octets
    notes: "KNOWN GAP, stated rather than papered over: zero-padded and alternate encodings of 127.0.0.1 (127.000.000.001, 2130706433, 0x7f000001) are not in the loopback alternation. Adding a decimal-integer branch here would collide with ordinary numeric header values, and the encoded-loopback family is better handled by one dedicated rule than by a branch in every rule that mentions loopback."