Agent Disabling of Host Security Controls
Detects an agent tool call that disables or tears down a host defense: stopping/flushing the firewall, disabling SELinux/AppArmor, turning off or clearing the audit daemon, stopping an EDR/AV service, or wiping shell history to hide activity.
impair defenses · pattern · confidence: high
- Severity
- high
- Lanes
- alert · huntmarks and reports a match
- Maturity
- testnot yet settled
- Scan target
- both
- Status
- experimental
Framework mappings
- MITRE ATLAS
- OWASP Agentic Top 10
- ASI02:2026
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM06:2025
ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.
Description
Detects an agent tool call that disables or tears down a host defense: stopping/flushing the firewall, disabling SELinux/AppArmor, turning off or clearing the audit daemon, stopping an EDR/AV service, or wiping shell history to hide activity. This is the agent-context form of ATT&CK T1562 (Impair Defenses) — the agent is being driven to blind the host before or during an intrusion. Detects: explicit disable/stop/flush/clear commands against named security controls. Does NOT detect: application/build teardown (docker compose down, rm node_modules), or reading the status of a control.
Detection conditions
Combinator: any- 01Stopping/disabling firewall, audit, or EDR/AV servicesfield: contentop: regex
- 02Disabling SELinux or AppArmor mandatory-access-controlfield: contentop: regex
- 03Clearing audit rules or wiping shell history to hide tracksfield: contentop: regex
- 04Same defense-disable resolved from tool_argsfield: tool_argsop: regex
Attacks it catches
systemctl stop auditd && systemctl disable auditd
setenforce 0
ufw disable && iptables -F
systemctl stop falcon-sensor
history -c && rm -f ~/.bash_history
Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.
Benign inputs it leaves alone
- Normal container lifecycle, no security control
docker compose up -d && docker compose logs -f
- Rebuilding dependencies, not impairing defenses
rm -rf node_modules && npm install
- Reading firewall status, not disabling it
systemctl status firewalld
- Restarting an app service, not a security control
systemctl restart nginx
- Viewing git history, not shell-history wipe
git log --oneline -20
Known false positives
- ▸A sanctioned maintenance window that briefly stops a security agent for an upgrade (context-dependent)
- ▸A CI job that resets iptables in an isolated throwaway container
Documented bypasses
- Technique: process kill by pid
kill -9 $(pgrep -f falcon-sensor)
Kills the EDR via pgrep/kill instead of systemctl; the service name is resolved indirectly, out of this pattern's scope.
These bypasses are documented in public. The rule itself lists its known limits.
Full YAML
Edit on GitHubtitle: Agent Disabling of Host Security Controls id: ATR-2026-01993 rule_version: 1 status: experimental description: | Detects an agent tool call that disables or tears down a host defense: stopping/flushing the firewall, disabling SELinux/AppArmor, turning off or clearing the audit daemon, stopping an EDR/AV service, or wiping shell history to hide activity. This is the agent-context form of ATT&CK T1562 (Impair Defenses) — the agent is being driven to blind the host before or during an intrusion. Detects: explicit disable/stop/flush/clear commands against named security controls. Does NOT detect: application/build teardown (docker compose down, rm node_modules), or reading the status of a control. author: ATR Community (sigma-gap-18tech) date: 2026/07/05 schema_version: "0.1" detection_tier: pattern maturity: test severity: high references: mitre_attack: - "T1562 - Impair Defenses" mitre_atlas: - "AML.T0053 - AI Agent Tool Invocation" owasp_agentic: - "ASI02:2026" owasp_llm: - LLM06:2025 tags: category: excessive-autonomy subcategory: impair-defenses scan_target: both confidence: high agent_source: type: tool_call framework: - any provider:
Show all (85 more lines)Show less
- any
detection:
conditions:
- field: content
operator: regex
value: "(?i)(systemctl\\s+(stop|disable|mask)\\s+(firewalld|ufw|auditd|falcon-sensor|crowdstrike|osqueryd|wazuh-agent|clamav-daemon)|ufw\\s+disable|iptables\\s+-F\\b|service\\s+(auditd|firewalld)\\s+stop)"
description: "Stopping/disabling firewall, audit, or EDR/AV services"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: "(?i)(setenforce\\s+0|selinux=disabled|aa-disable\\s+\\S+|systemctl\\s+(stop|disable)\\s+apparmor)"
description: "Disabling SELinux or AppArmor mandatory-access-control"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: "(?i)(auditctl\\s+-D\\b|history\\s+-c\\b[^\\n]{0,20}(rm|>\\s*~?/?\\.?bash_history)|(\\bcat\\s+/dev/null|:)\\s*>\\s*~?/\\.?bash_history|export\\s+HISTFILE=/dev/null)"
description: "Clearing audit rules or wiping shell history to hide tracks"
- field: tool_args
operator: regex
value: "(?i)(systemctl\\s+(stop|disable|mask)\\s+(firewalld|ufw|auditd|falcon-sensor|crowdstrike|wazuh-agent)|setenforce\\s+0|ufw\\s+disable)"
description: "Same defense-disable resolved from tool_args"
condition: any
false_positives:
- "A sanctioned maintenance window that briefly stops a security agent for an upgrade (context-dependent)"
- "A CI job that resets iptables in an isolated throwaway container"
response:
actions:
- block_tool
- alert
- snapshot
auto_response_threshold: high
message_template: |
[ATR-2026-01993] Agent tool call disables a host security control
(firewall / SELinux / audit / EDR / history). Likely T1562 impair-defenses.
Tool call blocked pending review.
confidence: 82
test_cases:
true_positives:
- input: "systemctl stop auditd && systemctl disable auditd"
expected: triggered
description: "Stopping and disabling the audit daemon"
- input: "setenforce 0"
expected: triggered
description: "Putting SELinux into permissive mode"
- input: "ufw disable && iptables -F"
expected: triggered
description: "Disabling the firewall and flushing iptables"
- input: "systemctl stop falcon-sensor"
expected: triggered
description: "Stopping the CrowdStrike EDR sensor"
- input: "history -c && rm -f ~/.bash_history"
expected: triggered
description: "Clearing shell history to hide activity"
true_negatives:
- input: "docker compose up -d && docker compose logs -f"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Normal container lifecycle, no security control"
- input: "rm -rf node_modules && npm install"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Rebuilding dependencies, not impairing defenses"
- input: "systemctl status firewalld"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Reading firewall status, not disabling it"
- input: "systemctl restart nginx"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Restarting an app service, not a security control"
- input: "git log --oneline -20"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Viewing git history, not shell-history wipe"
evasion_tests:
- input: "kill -9 $(pgrep -f falcon-sensor)"
expected: not_triggered
bypass_technique: process_kill_by_pid
notes: "Kills the EDR via pgrep/kill instead of systemctl; the service name is resolved indirectly, out of this pattern's scope."
compliance:
eu_ai_act:
- article: '15'
context: EU AI Act Article 15 cybersecurity/robustness requirements are engaged by detection of impairing host security defenses by an agent, a security-relevant event against an AI system.
strength: secondary
nist_ai_rmf:
- subcategory: MS.2.7
context: NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience) is supported by runtime detection of impairing host security defenses by an agent.
strength: secondary
iso_42001:
- clause: '8.1'
context: ISO/IEC 42001 clause 8.1 operational controls cover detection of impairing host security defenses by an agent against AI-agent tooling.
strength: secondary