Agent Disabling of Host Security Controls

Detects an agent tool call that disables or tears down a host defense: stopping/flushing the firewall, disabling SELinux/AppArmor, turning off or clearing the audit daemon, stopping an EDR/AV service, or wiping shell history to hide activity. This is the agent-context form of ATT&CK T1562 (Impair Defenses) — the agent is being driven to blind the host before or during an intrusion. Detects: explicit disable/stop/flush/clear commands against named security controls. Does NOT detect: application/build teardown (docker compose down, rm node_modules), or reading the status of a control.

Response Actions

References

1. 01

   Stopping/disabling firewall, audit, or EDR/AV services

   field: contentop: regex
2. 02

   Disabling SELinux or AppArmor mandatory-access-control

   field: contentop: regex
3. 03

   Clearing audit rules or wiping shell history to hide tracks

   field: contentop: regex
4. 04

   Same defense-disable resolved from tool_args

   field: tool_argsop: regex

Attack Examples (Rule Triggers)

1. systemctl stop auditd && systemctl disable auditd

2. setenforce 0

3. ufw disable && iptables -F

4. systemctl stop falcon-sensor

5. history -c && rm -f ~/.bash_history

Real-world attack payloads, sanitized and versioned alongside the rule as regression tests — so a future revision can't silently stop catching them.

Benign Examples (Rule Doesn't Trigger)

1. Normal container lifecycle, no security control

   docker compose up -d && docker compose logs -f

2. Rebuilding dependencies, not impairing defenses

   rm -rf node_modules && npm install

3. Reading firewall status, not disabling it

   systemctl status firewalld

4. Restarting an app service, not a security control

   systemctl restart nginx

5. Viewing git history, not shell-history wipe

   git log --oneline -20

Known False Positive Contexts

• ▸A sanctioned maintenance window that briefly stops a security agent for an upgrade (context-dependent)
• ▸A CI job that resets iptables in an isolated throwaway container

Documented Evasion Techniques

1. Technique: process kill by pid

   kill -9 $(pgrep -f falcon-sensor)

   Kills the EDR via pgrep/kill instead of systemctl; the service name is resolved indirectly, out of this pattern's scope.

Publicly documented bypasses. A standard earns trust by publishing its worst figures, not hiding them — so known limitations ship inside the rule, not in a footnote.

title: Agent Disabling of Host Security Controls
id: ATR-2026-01993
rule_version: 1
status: draft
description: |
  Detects an agent tool call that disables or tears down a host defense:
  stopping/flushing the firewall, disabling SELinux/AppArmor, turning off or
  clearing the audit daemon, stopping an EDR/AV service, or wiping shell
  history to hide activity. This is the agent-context form of ATT&CK T1562
  (Impair Defenses) — the agent is being driven to blind the host before or
  during an intrusion.
  Detects: explicit disable/stop/flush/clear commands against named security
  controls.
  Does NOT detect: application/build teardown (docker compose down, rm
  node_modules), or reading the status of a control.
author: ATR Community (sigma-gap-18tech)
date: 2026/07/05
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: high
references:
  mitre_attack:
  - "T1562 - Impair Defenses"
  mitre_atlas:
  - "AML.T0011 - User Execution"
  owasp_agentic:
  - "ASI01:2026 - Agent Behaviour Hijack"
  owasp_llm:
  - LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency
tags:
  category: excessive-autonomy
  subcategory: impair-defenses
  scan_target: both
  confidence: high
agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
  - any
  provider:
  - any
detection:
  conditions:
  - field: content
    operator: regex
    value: "(?i)(systemctl\\s+(stop|disable|mask)\\s+(firewalld|ufw|auditd|falcon-sensor|crowdstrike|osqueryd|wazuh-agent|clamav-daemon)|ufw\\s+disable|iptables\\s+-F\\b|service\\s+(auditd|firewalld)\\s+stop)"
    description: "Stopping/disabling firewall, audit, or EDR/AV services"
  - field: content
    operator: regex
    value: "(?i)(setenforce\\s+0|selinux=disabled|aa-disable\\s+\\S+|systemctl\\s+(stop|disable)\\s+apparmor)"
    description: "Disabling SELinux or AppArmor mandatory-access-control"
  - field: content
    operator: regex
    value: "(?i)(auditctl\\s+-D\\b|history\\s+-c\\b[^\\n]{0,20}(rm|>\\s*~?/?\\.?bash_history)|(\\bcat\\s+/dev/null|:)\\s*>\\s*~?/\\.?bash_history|export\\s+HISTFILE=/dev/null)"
    description: "Clearing audit rules or wiping shell history to hide tracks"
  - field: tool_args
    operator: regex
    value: "(?i)(systemctl\\s+(stop|disable|mask)\\s+(firewalld|ufw|auditd|falcon-sensor|crowdstrike|wazuh-agent)|setenforce\\s+0|ufw\\s+disable)"
    description: "Same defense-disable resolved from tool_args"
  condition: any
  false_positives:
  - "A sanctioned maintenance window that briefly stops a security agent for an upgrade (context-dependent)"
  - "A CI job that resets iptables in an isolated throwaway container"
response:
  actions:
  - block_tool
  - alert
  - snapshot
  auto_response_threshold: high
  message_template: |
    [ATR-2026-01993] Agent tool call disables a host security control
    (firewall / SELinux / audit / EDR / history). Likely T1562 impair-defenses.
    Tool call blocked pending review.
confidence: 82
test_cases:
  true_positives:
  - input: "systemctl stop auditd && systemctl disable auditd"
    expected: triggered
    description: "Stopping and disabling the audit daemon"
  - input: "setenforce 0"
    expected: triggered
    description: "Putting SELinux into permissive mode"
  - input: "ufw disable && iptables -F"
    expected: triggered
    description: "Disabling the firewall and flushing iptables"
  - input: "systemctl stop falcon-sensor"
    expected: triggered
    description: "Stopping the CrowdStrike EDR sensor"
  - input: "history -c && rm -f ~/.bash_history"
    expected: triggered
    description: "Clearing shell history to hide activity"
  true_negatives:
  - input: "docker compose up -d && docker compose logs -f"
    expected: not_triggered
    description: "Normal container lifecycle, no security control"
  - input: "rm -rf node_modules && npm install"
    expected: not_triggered
    description: "Rebuilding dependencies, not impairing defenses"
  - input: "systemctl status firewalld"
    expected: not_triggered
    description: "Reading firewall status, not disabling it"
  - input: "systemctl restart nginx"
    expected: not_triggered
    description: "Restarting an app service, not a security control"
  - input: "git log --oneline -20"
    expected: not_triggered
    description: "Viewing git history, not shell-history wipe"
evasion_tests:
- input: "kill -9 $(pgrep -f falcon-sensor)"
  expected: not_triggered
  bypass_technique: process_kill_by_pid
  notes: "Kills the EDR via pgrep/kill instead of systemctl; the service name is resolved indirectly, out of this pattern's scope."
compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
  - article: '15'
    context: EU AI Act Article 15 cybersecurity/robustness requirements are engaged by detection of impairing host security defenses by an agent, a security-relevant event against an AI system.
    strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
  - subcategory: MS.2.7
    context: NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience) is supported by runtime detection of impairing host security defenses by an agent.
    strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
  - clause: '8.1'
    context: ISO/IEC 42001 clause 8.1 operational controls cover detection of impairing host security defenses by an agent against AI-agent tooling.
    strength: secondary