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ATR-2026-01986
Recorded 2026-07-04 · Author ATR Community

Windows-MCP Unauthenticated HTTP PowerShell via Wildcard CORS (CVE-2026-48989)

Detects CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g (CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function): Windows-MCP's SSE and Streamable HTTP transports build the FastMCP control plane with no auth provider (src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113) and install blanket wildcard CORS (allow_origins=*, allow_methods=*, allow_headers=*, __main__.py:37-42), answering every OPTIONS preflight with the same wildcard headers regardless of Origin.

unauth mcp control plane rce · pattern · confidence: high

Severity
critical
Lanes
alert · huntmarks and reports a match
Maturity
testnot yet settled
Scan target
mcp
Status
experimental

Framework mappings

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI03:2026
  • ASI06:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025

ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.

Description

Detects CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g (CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function): Windows-MCP's SSE and Streamable HTTP transports build the FastMCP control plane with no auth provider (src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113) and install blanket wildcard CORS (allow_origins=*, allow_methods=*, allow_headers=*, __main__.py:37-42), answering every OPTIONS preflight with the same wildcard headers regardless of Origin. The same server registers the PowerShell tool (src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24), which executes caller-controlled commands via PowerShell -EncodedCommand (src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204). A client that can reach http://<host>:<port>/mcp — including a cross-origin browser page, since the wildcard CORS grants it — can initialize an MCP session and call tools/call for PowerShell with no credential of any kind, achieving arbitrary PowerShell execution as the Windows user running Windows-MCP. Affected: CursorTouch/Windows-MCP < 0.7.5; the default stdio transport is not affected. Detection covers: (a) the OPTIONS preflight / control-plane response on the /mcp endpoint carrying the wildcard access-control-allow-origin marker, which is the structural precondition for the cross-origin bypass; (b) a tools/call JSON-RPC request naming the PowerShell tool over the HTTP/SSE control plane co-occurring with that wildcard-CORS marker; (c) explicit CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g exploitation framing. The detection target is the request/response shape at the MCP control plane — a PowerShell tool invocation reachable through an unauthenticated, wildcard-CORS-exposed /mcp endpoint — which is the exact remote-code- execution primitive, caught before PowerShellExecutor.execute_command runs. Bound to the PowerShell tool name plus the wildcard-CORS marker so a legitimate, authenticated PowerShell call over a properly-scoped-CORS deployment does not fire.

Suggested responsealertblock tool
Author: ATR Community · Created 2026-07-04 · Last modified 2026-11-16

Detection conditions

Combinator: any
  1. 01
    OPTIONS preflight against the /mcp control plane answered with wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin and Access-Control-Allow-Methods — the structural CORS-bypass precondition from GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g.
    field: contentop: regex
  2. 02
    A tools/call JSON-RPC request naming the PowerShell tool co-occurring with a wildcard access-control-allow-origin marker on the same MCP exchange — unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell invocation.
    field: contentop: regex
  3. 03
    Wildcard CORS marker followed by a PowerShell tool argument carrying a command/EncodedCommand payload — the end-to-end control-plane-to-shell-execution shape.
    field: contentop: regex
  4. 04
    Explicit CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g reference combined with Windows-MCP PowerShell/CORS exploitation language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.
    field: contentop: regex

Attacks it catches

  1. tool_description:
    curl -i -X OPTIONS 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp/' -H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' response: access-control-allow-origin: * access-control-allow-methods: * access-control-allow-headers: *
  2. tool_description:
    {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"PowerShell","arguments":{"command":"calc.exe"}}} response headers: access-control-allow-origin: *
  3. tool_description:
    Exploiting CVE-2026-48989 (GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g): Windows-MCP's HTTP transport is unauthenticated with wildcard CORS, so a cross-origin page can call the PowerShell tool.

Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.

Benign inputs it leaves alone

  1. Preflight scoped to a specific trusted origin, not a wildcard
    tool_description:
    curl -i -X OPTIONS 'https://mcp.internal.corp/mcp/' -H 'Origin: https://ops.internal.corp' response: access-control-allow-origin: https://ops.internal.corp access-control-allow-methods: POST
  2. Authenticated PowerShell call over stdio with a session token, no wildcard CORS marker
    tool_description:
    {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"PowerShell","arguments":{"command":"Get-Process"}}} over stdio transport with mcp-auth-token: valid-session-token-abc, no CORS headers present
  3. General configuration question, not an exploitation attempt
    tool_description:
    How do I configure authentication for the Windows-MCP HTTP transport?
  4. Unrelated read-only tool call, no PowerShell tool name and no CORS marker
    tool_description:
    {"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":5,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"ListDirectory","arguments":{"path":"C:\\Users"}}}

Known false positives

  • ▸A legitimate, authenticated PowerShell tool call over stdio transport or an HTTP deployment with an auth provider and origin-scoped CORS configured — expected to match if wildcard CORS markers are also present; review confirms intent.
  • ▸Security advisory or PR text quoting the GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g / CVE-2026-48989 PoC for review purposes.
  • ▸An OPTIONS preflight response that scopes Access-Control-Allow-Origin to a specific trusted origin rather than a wildcard.
title: "Windows-MCP Unauthenticated HTTP PowerShell via Wildcard CORS (CVE-2026-48989)"
id: ATR-2026-01986
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g (CWE-306 Missing Authentication
  for Critical Function): Windows-MCP's SSE and Streamable HTTP transports
  build the FastMCP control plane with no auth provider
  (src/windows_mcp/__main__.py:75-113) and install blanket wildcard CORS
  (allow_origins=*, allow_methods=*, allow_headers=*, __main__.py:37-42),
  answering every OPTIONS preflight with the same wildcard headers regardless
  of Origin. The same server registers the PowerShell tool
  (src/windows_mcp/tools/shell.py:10-24), which executes caller-controlled
  commands via PowerShell -EncodedCommand
  (src/windows_mcp/desktop/powershell.py:176-204). A client that can reach
  http://<host>:<port>/mcp — including a cross-origin browser page, since the
  wildcard CORS grants it — can initialize an MCP session and call
  tools/call for PowerShell with no credential of any kind, achieving
  arbitrary PowerShell execution as the Windows user running Windows-MCP.
  Affected: CursorTouch/Windows-MCP < 0.7.5; the default stdio transport is
  not affected.

  Detection covers:
  (a) the OPTIONS preflight / control-plane response on the /mcp endpoint
      carrying the wildcard access-control-allow-origin marker, which is the
      structural precondition for the cross-origin bypass;
  (b) a tools/call JSON-RPC request naming the PowerShell tool over the
      HTTP/SSE control plane co-occurring with that wildcard-CORS marker;
  (c) explicit CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g exploitation framing.

  The detection target is the request/response shape at the MCP control
  plane — a PowerShell tool invocation reachable through an unauthenticated,
  wildcard-CORS-exposed /mcp endpoint — which is the exact remote-code-
  execution primitive, caught before PowerShellExecutor.execute_command runs.
  Bound to the PowerShell tool name plus the wildcard-CORS marker so a
  legitimate, authenticated PowerShell call over a properly-scoped-CORS
  deployment does not fire.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/07/04"
schema_version: "0.1"
Show all (129 more lines)
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI03:2026"
    - "ASI06:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
  cve:
    - "CVE-2026-48989"
  ghsa:
    - "GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g"

metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - { article: "15", context: "Article 15 cybersecurity — runtime detection of unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell tool invocation on Windows-MCP's HTTP control plane.", strength: primary }
    - { article: "9",  context: "Article 9 risk management — runtime risk-treatment control for unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell tool invocation.", strength: secondary }
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - { subcategory: "MP.5.1", context: "MAP 5.1 — adversarial input characterised/detected for unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell tool invocation.", strength: primary }
    - { subcategory: "MG.3.2", context: "MANAGE 3.2 — runtime monitoring control for unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell tool invocation.", strength: secondary }
  iso_42001:
    - { clause: "8.1", context: "Clause 8.1 operational control — detection of unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell tool invocation payload.", strength: primary }
    - { clause: "8.3", context: "Clause 8.3 AI risk treatment — runtime detection as treatment control.", strength: secondary }

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: unauth-mcp-control-plane-rce
  scan_target: mcp
  confidence: high
  source: cve-disclosure
  vendor_sources: windows-mcp-cve-2026-48989

agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
    - windows-mcp
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "A legitimate, authenticated PowerShell tool call over stdio transport or an HTTP deployment with an auth provider and origin-scoped CORS configured — expected to match if wildcard CORS markers are also present; review confirms intent."
    - "Security advisory or PR text quoting the GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g / CVE-2026-48989 PoC for review purposes."
    - "An OPTIONS preflight response that scopes Access-Control-Allow-Origin to a specific trusted origin rather than a wildcard."
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)OPTIONS\s+.{0,40}/mcp/?[\s\S]{0,200}access-control-allow-origin["\x27]?\s*:\s*["\x27]?\*[\s\S]{0,200}access-control-allow-methods["\x27]?\s*:\s*["\x27]?\*'
      description: >
        OPTIONS preflight against the /mcp control plane answered with
        wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin and Access-Control-Allow-Methods
        — the structural CORS-bypass precondition from GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)"method"\s*:\s*"tools/call"[\s\S]{0,150}"name"\s*:\s*"PowerShell"[\s\S]{0,300}access-control-allow-origin["\x27]?\s*:\s*["\x27]?\*'
      description: >
        A tools/call JSON-RPC request naming the PowerShell tool
        co-occurring with a wildcard access-control-allow-origin marker on
        the same MCP exchange — unauthenticated cross-origin PowerShell
        invocation.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)access-control-allow-origin["\x27]?\s*:\s*["\x27]?\*[\s\S]{0,300}\bPowerShell\b[\s\S]{0,150}(?:command|EncodedCommand)["\x27]?\s*[:=]'
      description: >
        Wildcard CORS marker followed by a PowerShell tool argument carrying
        a command/EncodedCommand payload — the end-to-end
        control-plane-to-shell-execution shape.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)(?:CVE-2026-48989|GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g)[\s\S]{0,200}(?:windows-mcp|powershell|wildcard\s*CORS|unauthenticat)'
      description: >
        Explicit CVE-2026-48989 / GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g reference combined with
        Windows-MCP PowerShell/CORS exploitation language — attack framing
        in a skill or tool description.

response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - block_tool
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-01986] CRITICAL: Windows-MCP unauthenticated HTTP PowerShell via
    wildcard CORS detected (CVE-2026-48989, CWE-306). A tools/call for
    PowerShell reached the /mcp control plane alongside a wildcard
    access-control-allow-origin marker; Windows-MCP before 0.7.5 runs SSE/
    Streamable-HTTP transports with no auth provider and allow_origins=*.
    Block the tool call and upgrade Windows-MCP to >= 0.7.5 or restrict to
    the stdio transport.

confidence: 82


test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - tool_description: "curl -i -X OPTIONS 'http://127.0.0.1:18123/mcp/' -H 'Origin: https://attacker.example' response: access-control-allow-origin: * access-control-allow-methods: * access-control-allow-headers: *"
      expected: triggered
      description: "OPTIONS preflight on /mcp answered with wildcard ACAO + ACAM — CVE-2026-48989 PoC step 1"
    - tool_description: "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"PowerShell\",\"arguments\":{\"command\":\"calc.exe\"}}} response headers: access-control-allow-origin: *"
      expected: triggered
      description: "tools/call for PowerShell co-occurring with wildcard ACAO on the same exchange — CVE-2026-48989 PoC step 3"
    - tool_description: "Exploiting CVE-2026-48989 (GHSA-vrxg-gm77-7q5g): Windows-MCP's HTTP transport is unauthenticated with wildcard CORS, so a cross-origin page can call the PowerShell tool."
      expected: triggered
      description: "Explicit CVE-2026-48989 Windows-MCP exploitation framing"
  true_negatives:
    - tool_description: "curl -i -X OPTIONS 'https://mcp.internal.corp/mcp/' -H 'Origin: https://ops.internal.corp' response: access-control-allow-origin: https://ops.internal.corp access-control-allow-methods: POST"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Preflight scoped to a specific trusted origin, not a wildcard"
    - tool_description: "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":2,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"PowerShell\",\"arguments\":{\"command\":\"Get-Process\"}}} over stdio transport with mcp-auth-token: valid-session-token-abc, no CORS headers present"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Authenticated PowerShell call over stdio with a session token, no wildcard CORS marker"
    - tool_description: "How do I configure authentication for the Windows-MCP HTTP transport?"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "General configuration question, not an exploitation attempt"
    - tool_description: "{\"jsonrpc\":\"2.0\",\"id\":5,\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"ListDirectory\",\"arguments\":{\"path\":\"C:\\\\Users\"}}}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Unrelated read-only tool call, no PowerShell tool name and no CORS marker"

Revision history

Created
2026-07-04
Last modified
2026-11-16
Full commit history on GitHub