Network-AI ApprovalInbox Unauthenticated Cross-Origin Approval Bypass (GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj)
Detects GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj (CWE-862 Missing Authorization + CWE-352 CSRF via wildcard CORS): network-ai's ApprovalInbox HTTP server (lib/approval-inbox.ts) has no authentication of any kind and sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every route, including the state-changing POST /approvals/:id/approve and /deny.
unauth approval gate bypass · pattern · confidence: high
- Severity
- high
- Lanes
- alert · huntmarks and reports a match
- Maturity
- testnot yet settled
- Scan target
- tool_call
- Status
- experimental
Framework mappings
- OWASP Agentic Top 10
- ASI03:2026
- ASI06:2026
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM06:2025
ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.
Description
Detects GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj (CWE-862 Missing Authorization + CWE-352 CSRF via wildcard CORS): network-ai's ApprovalInbox HTTP server (lib/approval-inbox.ts) has no authentication of any kind and sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on every route, including the state-changing POST /approvals/:id/approve and /deny. ApprovalInbox is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval Gate that gates high-risk operations (writes, shell commands, budget spend). Any caller that can reach the inbox port — a co-located process, an SSRF, a non-loopback remote client, or any website the operator visits in a browser via the wildcard CORS — can enumerate pending approvals (GET /approvals/) and approve them (POST /approvals/:id/approve) with no Authorization header, defeating the Approval Gate so a gated shell command executes without consent. Affected: network-ai <= 5.11.0. Detection covers: (a) a state-changing request to the approval control plane (/approvals/<id>/approve or /deny) with no auth context, matching the unauthenticated-client PoC shape; (b) an enumeration request to the approval queue (GET /approvals/) paired with the wildcard-CORS marker on the approval control plane; (c) explicit GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj / ApprovalInbox exploitation framing. The detection target is the request shape at the approval control plane — an unauthenticated approve/deny or enumerate call combined with the wildcard-CORS marker — which is the exact bypass primitive, caught before the gated action is released.
Detection conditions
Combinator: any- 01Unauthenticated POST to the approval control plane's approve/deny route — approvedBy defaults to anonymous/attacker with no Authorization header, matching the GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj PoC shape.field: contentop: regex
- 02Enumeration of the pending-approvals queue paired with a wildcard Access-Control-Allow-Origin marker on the approval control plane — the cross-origin approval-inbox reconnaissance step.field: contentop: regex
- 03Explicit GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj reference combined with ApprovalInbox exploitation language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.field: contentop: regex
Attacks it catches
tool_description: POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve {"approvedBy": "anonymous"}tool_description: GET /approvals/?status=pending -> 200, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
tool_description: Exploiting GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj: the network-ai ApprovalInbox has no auth, so I can approve any pending action via CORS.
Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.
Benign inputs it leaves alone
- Authenticated operator approval with a Bearer token present
tool_description: POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve {"approvedBy": "ops-lead", "Authorization": "Bearer sk_live_abc123"} - General question about the feature, not an exploitation request
tool_description: How does the ApprovalInbox approve/deny flow work in network-ai?
- Read-only health check on an unrelated route, no wildcard CORS marker present
tool_description: GET /approvals/health
- Approve call description explicitly noting mTLS-gated internal deployment, no anonymous/attacker/no-auth marker
tool_description: POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve {"approvedBy": "ops-lead"} behind an internal VPN with mTLS client cert required
Known false positives
- ▸Legitimate operator approving a pending action through an authenticated ApprovalInbox deployment that has been hardened with a reverse-proxy auth layer — expected to match; review confirms intent.
- ▸Security advisory or PR text quoting the GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj PoC.
- ▸A read-only status check against an endpoint that is not the approvals control plane.
Full YAML
Edit on GitHubtitle: "Network-AI ApprovalInbox Unauthenticated Cross-Origin Approval Bypass (GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj)"
id: ATR-2026-01981
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
Detects GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj (CWE-862 Missing Authorization + CWE-352 CSRF via
wildcard CORS): network-ai's ApprovalInbox HTTP server (lib/approval-inbox.ts)
has no authentication of any kind and sets Access-Control-Allow-Origin: * on
every route, including the state-changing POST /approvals/:id/approve and
/deny. ApprovalInbox is the network surface of the human-in-the-loop Approval
Gate that gates high-risk operations (writes, shell commands, budget spend).
Any caller that can reach the inbox port — a co-located process, an SSRF, a
non-loopback remote client, or any website the operator visits in a browser
via the wildcard CORS — can enumerate pending approvals (GET /approvals/) and
approve them (POST /approvals/:id/approve) with no Authorization header,
defeating the Approval Gate so a gated shell command executes without
consent. Affected: network-ai <= 5.11.0.
Detection covers:
(a) a state-changing request to the approval control plane
(/approvals/<id>/approve or /deny) with no auth context, matching the
unauthenticated-client PoC shape;
(b) an enumeration request to the approval queue (GET /approvals/) paired
with the wildcard-CORS marker on the approval control plane;
(c) explicit GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj / ApprovalInbox exploitation framing.
The detection target is the request shape at the approval control plane —
an unauthenticated approve/deny or enumerate call combined with the
wildcard-CORS marker — which is the exact bypass primitive, caught before
the gated action is released.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/07/04"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: high
references:
owasp_llm:
- "LLM06:2025"Show all (111 more lines)Show less
owasp_agentic:
- "ASI03:2026"
- "ASI06:2026"
mitre_atlas:
- "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
mitre_attack:
- "T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
- "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
ghsa:
- "GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj"
metadata_provenance:
mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
owasp_llm: human-reviewed
owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
compliance:
eu_ai_act:
- { article: "15", context: "Article 15 cybersecurity — runtime detection of unauthenticated cross-origin approval-gate bypass on network-ai's ApprovalInbox control plane.", strength: primary }
- { article: "9", context: "Article 9 risk management — runtime risk-treatment control for unauthenticated cross-origin approval-gate bypass.", strength: secondary }
nist_ai_rmf:
- { subcategory: "MP.5.1", context: "MAP 5.1 — adversarial input characterised/detected for unauthenticated cross-origin approval-gate bypass.", strength: primary }
- { subcategory: "MG.3.2", context: "MANAGE 3.2 — runtime monitoring control for unauthenticated cross-origin approval-gate bypass.", strength: secondary }
iso_42001:
- { clause: "8.1", context: "Clause 8.1 operational control — detection of unauthenticated cross-origin approval-gate bypass payload.", strength: primary }
- { clause: "8.3", context: "Clause 8.3 AI risk treatment — runtime detection as treatment control.", strength: secondary }
tags:
category: privilege-escalation
subcategory: unauth-approval-gate-bypass
scan_target: tool_call
confidence: high
source: ghsa-disclosure
vendor_sources: network-ai-ghsa-mxjx-28vx-xjjj
agent_source:
type: tool_call
framework:
- network-ai
- any
provider:
- any
detection:
condition: any
false_positives:
- "Legitimate operator approving a pending action through an authenticated ApprovalInbox deployment that has been hardened with a reverse-proxy auth layer — expected to match; review confirms intent."
- "Security advisory or PR text quoting the GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj PoC."
- "A read-only status check against an endpoint that is not the approvals control plane."
conditions:
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)POST\s+/approvals/[a-f0-9]+/(?:approve|deny)\b[\s\S]{0,300}(?:approvedBy["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?(?:anonymous|attacker)|no\s+auth|Authorization["\x27]?\s*:\s*(?:null|undefined|absent|none))'
description: >
Unauthenticated POST to the approval control plane's approve/deny
route — approvedBy defaults to anonymous/attacker with no
Authorization header, matching the GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj PoC shape.
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)GET\s+/approvals/\??(?:status=pending)?\b[\s\S]{0,200}Access-Control-Allow-Origin["\x27]?\s*:\s*["\x27]?\*'
description: >
Enumeration of the pending-approvals queue paired with a wildcard
Access-Control-Allow-Origin marker on the approval control plane —
the cross-origin approval-inbox reconnaissance step.
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj[\s\S]{0,200}(?:approval[- ]?inbox|network-ai|approve|CORS)'
description: >
Explicit GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj reference combined with ApprovalInbox
exploitation language — attack framing in a skill or tool
description.
response:
actions:
- alert
- block_input
message_template: >
[ATR-2026-01981] HIGH: network-ai ApprovalInbox unauthenticated
cross-origin approval bypass detected (GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj, CWE-862 +
CWE-352). A caller with no Authorization header reached the approval
control plane's approve/deny or enumeration route, defeating the
human-in-the-loop Approval Gate. Block the request and upgrade network-ai
past 5.11.0 / put ApprovalInbox behind an authenticated reverse proxy.
confidence: 78
test_cases:
true_positives:
- tool_description: "POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve {\"approvedBy\": \"anonymous\"}"
expected: triggered
description: "Unauthenticated approve call defaults approvedBy to anonymous — GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj PoC shape"
- tool_description: "GET /approvals/?status=pending -> 200, Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *"
expected: triggered
description: "Cross-origin enumeration of pending approvals via wildcard CORS marker"
- tool_description: "Exploiting GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj: the network-ai ApprovalInbox has no auth, so I can approve any pending action via CORS."
expected: triggered
description: "Explicit GHSA-mxjx-28vx-xjjj ApprovalInbox exploitation framing"
true_negatives:
- tool_description: "POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve {\"approvedBy\": \"ops-lead\", \"Authorization\": \"Bearer sk_live_abc123\"}"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Authenticated operator approval with a Bearer token present"
- tool_description: "How does the ApprovalInbox approve/deny flow work in network-ai?"
expected: not_triggered
description: "General question about the feature, not an exploitation request"
- tool_description: "GET /approvals/health"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Read-only health check on an unrelated route, no wildcard CORS marker present"
- tool_description: "POST /approvals/07d6f277efe35ac1/approve {\"approvedBy\": \"ops-lead\"} behind an internal VPN with mTLS client cert required"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Approve call description explicitly noting mTLS-gated internal deployment, no anonymous/attacker/no-auth marker"