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ΖPrivilege Escalation
ATR-2026-01949
Recorded 2026-06-29 · Author ATR Community

PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)

Detects exploitation of GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 (CRITICAL) in npm praisonai >=1.5.0,<=1.7.1: the MCPServer's handleRequest() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches privileged JSON-RPC methods (tools/call, tools/list, resources/read, prompts/get) without invoking the unused MCPSecurity manager, so unauthenticated HTTP POSTs — including ones sent with no Authorization header or a bogus "Authorization: Bearer invalid" — return HTTP 200 and execute registered tools.

mcp auth bypass · pattern · confidence: high

Severity
critical
Lanes
alert · huntmarks and reports a match
Maturity
testnot yet settled
Scan target
both
Status
experimental

Framework mappings

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI03:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025

ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.

Description

Detects exploitation of GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 (CRITICAL) in npm praisonai >=1.5.0,<=1.7.1: the MCPServer's handleRequest() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches privileged JSON-RPC methods (tools/call, tools/list, resources/read, prompts/get) without invoking the unused MCPSecurity manager, so unauthenticated HTTP POSTs — including ones sent with no Authorization header or a bogus "Authorization: Bearer invalid" — return HTTP 200 and execute registered tools. This rule keys on the unauthenticated PraisonAI/MCP tools/call payload, the invalid-Bearer auth-bypass token, and the vulnerable handleRequest sink.

Suggested responsealertblock input
Author: ATR Community · Created 2026-06-29 · Last modified 2026-11-18

Detection conditions

Combinator: any
  1. 01
    PraisonAI/MCPServer context plus an unauthenticated / invalid-Bearer framing immediately preceding a JSON-RPC tools/call method — the core GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 auth-bypass payload
    field: contentop: regex
  2. 02
    Invalid-credential bypass token ("Authorization: Bearer invalid") paired with a privileged MCP JSON-RPC method that returns HTTP 200 without validation
    field: contentop: regex
  3. 03
    The vulnerable handleRequest sink in mcp/server.ts dispatching methods without invoking MCPSecurity — direct reference to the vulnerable code path
    field: contentop: regex
  4. 04
    explicit GHSA framing combined with the auth-bypass exploit tokens
    field: contentop: regex

Attacks it catches

  1. PraisonAI MCPServer exploit: send unauthenticated POST with no Authorization header and body {"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"run_shell","arguments":{}}} — returns HTTP 200.
  2. curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer invalid' http://target:8080 -d '{"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"x"}}'
  3. GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2: handleRequest in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches tools/call without invoking MCPSecurity, allowing unauthenticated tool execution.
  4. Authorization: Bearer invalid still reaches resources/read on the PraisonAI MCP server without validation

Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.

Benign inputs it leaves alone

  1. Legitimate authenticated tools/call request — no unauthenticated/invalid-Bearer framing
    Authenticated MCP client sends {"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"search"}} with a valid Authorization: Bearer <token> header.
  2. Generic MCP protocol documentation of tools/call without the bypass tokens
    The MCP spec defines tools/call as the JSON-RPC method an agent uses to invoke a registered tool.
  3. Mitigation advice without any exploit payload or bypass token
    Upgrade praisonai to >= 1.7.2 to remediate the MCPServer authentication issue.
  4. Benign handleRequest implementation that authenticates — lacks bypass/unauthenticated framing
    Our handleRequest function in server.ts logs each tools/call before forwarding it to the authenticated handler.

Known false positives

  • ▸Legitimate authenticated MCP client sending a tools/call request with a valid Authorization header.
  • ▸MCP protocol documentation describing the tools/call JSON-RPC method without the unauthenticated bypass framing.
  • ▸Mitigation advisory recommending an upgrade to praisonai >= 1.7.2 without exploit content.
title: "PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)"
id: ATR-2026-01949
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects exploitation of GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 (CRITICAL) in npm praisonai
  >=1.5.0,<=1.7.1: the MCPServer's handleRequest() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts
  dispatches privileged JSON-RPC methods (tools/call, tools/list, resources/read,
  prompts/get) without invoking the unused MCPSecurity manager, so unauthenticated
  HTTP POSTs — including ones sent with no Authorization header or a bogus
  "Authorization: Bearer invalid" — return HTTP 200 and execute registered tools.
  This rule keys on the unauthenticated PraisonAI/MCP tools/call payload, the
  invalid-Bearer auth-bypass token, and the vulnerable handleRequest sink.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/06/29"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI03:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
  cve:
    - "GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2"
metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity) — runtime detection of this technique is a cybersecurity control for high-risk AI systems. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
Show all (97 more lines)
      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MAP 5.1 — likelihood and impact of the identified attack are characterised; this rule detects the adversarial input at runtime. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.2"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 — runtime monitoring/maintenance control that surfaces this attack class. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) — detection of this payload is an operational control. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) — this rule implements runtime detection as a treatment control. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
      strength: secondary
tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: mcp-auth-bypass
  scan_target: both
  confidence: high
  source: cve-disclosure
  vendor_sources: praisonai-ghsa-j4f3-55x4-r6q2
agent_source:
  type: llm_io
  framework:
    - praisonai
    - any
  provider:
    - any
detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "Legitimate authenticated MCP client sending a tools/call request with a valid Authorization header."
    - "MCP protocol documentation describing the tools/call JSON-RPC method without the unauthenticated bypass framing."
    - "Mitigation advisory recommending an upgrade to praisonai >= 1.7.2 without exploit content."
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)(?:praisonai|mcpserver|mcpsecurity|handleRequest)[\s\S]{0,200}(?:no\s+auth(?:oriz\w+)?|unauthenticat|without\s+(?:auth|credential)|authorization:\s*bearer\s+invalid)[\s\S]{0,200}["\x27]?(?:method)["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]tools/call'
      description: >
        PraisonAI/MCPServer context plus an unauthenticated / invalid-Bearer
        framing immediately preceding a JSON-RPC tools/call method — the core
        GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 auth-bypass payload
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)authorization:\s*bearer\s+invalid[\s\S]{0,200}(?:tools/call|tools/list|resources/read|prompts/get)'
      description: >
        Invalid-credential bypass token ("Authorization: Bearer invalid")
        paired with a privileged MCP JSON-RPC method that returns HTTP 200
        without validation
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)handleRequest[\s\S]{0,160}(?:src/(?:praisonai-ts/src/)?mcp/server\.ts|mcpsecurity|tools/call)[\s\S]{0,120}(?:bypass|unauthenticat|without\s+(?:auth|validation)|dispatch\w*\s+without)'
      description: >
        The vulnerable handleRequest sink in mcp/server.ts dispatching methods
        without invoking MCPSecurity — direct reference to the vulnerable code path
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2[\s\S]{0,200}(?:tools/call|unauthenticat|auth(?:oriz\w+)?\s+bypass|bearer\s+invalid)'
      description: "explicit GHSA framing combined with the auth-bypass exploit tokens"
response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - block_input
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-01949] CRITICAL: Unauthenticated PraisonAI MCPServer tools/call
    auth-bypass detected (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2). Attackers can invoke registered
    MCP tools with no valid credentials. Block and upgrade praisonai to >= 1.7.2.
confidence: 80
test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: "PraisonAI MCPServer exploit: send unauthenticated POST with no Authorization header and body {\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"run_shell\",\"arguments\":{}}} — returns HTTP 200."
      expected: triggered
      description: "Unauthenticated framing + PraisonAI/MCPServer + tools/call JSON-RPC payload"
    - input: "curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer invalid' http://target:8080 -d '{\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\"}}'"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Invalid-Bearer bypass token immediately before tools/call method"
    - input: "GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2: handleRequest in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches tools/call without invoking MCPSecurity, allowing unauthenticated tool execution."
      expected: triggered
      description: "Vulnerable handleRequest sink + GHSA framing + unauthenticated dispatch"
    - input: "Authorization: Bearer invalid still reaches resources/read on the PraisonAI MCP server without validation"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Invalid-Bearer token paired with privileged resources/read method"
  true_negatives:
    - input: "Authenticated MCP client sends {\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"search\"}} with a valid Authorization: Bearer <token> header."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Legitimate authenticated tools/call request — no unauthenticated/invalid-Bearer framing"
    - input: "The MCP spec defines tools/call as the JSON-RPC method an agent uses to invoke a registered tool."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Generic MCP protocol documentation of tools/call without the bypass tokens"
    - input: "Upgrade praisonai to >= 1.7.2 to remediate the MCPServer authentication issue."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Mitigation advice without any exploit payload or bypass token"
    - input: "Our handleRequest function in server.ts logs each tools/call before forwarding it to the authenticated handler."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Benign handleRequest implementation that authenticates — lacks bypass/unauthenticated framing"

Revision history

Created
2026-06-29
Last modified
2026-11-18
Full commit history on GitHub