PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)
Detects exploitation of GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 (CRITICAL) in npm praisonai >=1.5.0,<=1.7.1: the MCPServer's handleRequest() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches privileged JSON-RPC methods (tools/call, tools/list, resources/read, prompts/get) without invoking the unused MCPSecurity manager, so unauthenticated HTTP POSTs — including ones sent with no Authorization header or a bogus "Authorization: Bearer invalid" — return HTTP 200 and execute registered tools.
mcp auth bypass · pattern · confidence: high
- Severity
- critical
- Lanes
- alert · huntmarks and reports a match
- Maturity
- testnot yet settled
- Scan target
- both
- Status
- experimental
Framework mappings
- OWASP Agentic Top 10
- ASI03:2026
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM06:2025
ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.
Description
Detects exploitation of GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 (CRITICAL) in npm praisonai >=1.5.0,<=1.7.1: the MCPServer's handleRequest() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches privileged JSON-RPC methods (tools/call, tools/list, resources/read, prompts/get) without invoking the unused MCPSecurity manager, so unauthenticated HTTP POSTs — including ones sent with no Authorization header or a bogus "Authorization: Bearer invalid" — return HTTP 200 and execute registered tools. This rule keys on the unauthenticated PraisonAI/MCP tools/call payload, the invalid-Bearer auth-bypass token, and the vulnerable handleRequest sink.
Detection conditions
Combinator: any- 01PraisonAI/MCPServer context plus an unauthenticated / invalid-Bearer framing immediately preceding a JSON-RPC tools/call method — the core GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 auth-bypass payloadfield: contentop: regex
- 02Invalid-credential bypass token ("Authorization: Bearer invalid") paired with a privileged MCP JSON-RPC method that returns HTTP 200 without validationfield: contentop: regex
- 03The vulnerable handleRequest sink in mcp/server.ts dispatching methods without invoking MCPSecurity — direct reference to the vulnerable code pathfield: contentop: regex
- 04explicit GHSA framing combined with the auth-bypass exploit tokensfield: contentop: regex
Attacks it catches
PraisonAI MCPServer exploit: send unauthenticated POST with no Authorization header and body {"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"run_shell","arguments":{}}} — returns HTTP 200.curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer invalid' http://target:8080 -d '{"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"x"}}'GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2: handleRequest in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches tools/call without invoking MCPSecurity, allowing unauthenticated tool execution.
Authorization: Bearer invalid still reaches resources/read on the PraisonAI MCP server without validation
Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.
Benign inputs it leaves alone
- Legitimate authenticated tools/call request — no unauthenticated/invalid-Bearer framing
Authenticated MCP client sends {"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"search"}} with a valid Authorization: Bearer <token> header. - Generic MCP protocol documentation of tools/call without the bypass tokens
The MCP spec defines tools/call as the JSON-RPC method an agent uses to invoke a registered tool.
- Mitigation advice without any exploit payload or bypass token
Upgrade praisonai to >= 1.7.2 to remediate the MCPServer authentication issue.
- Benign handleRequest implementation that authenticates — lacks bypass/unauthenticated framing
Our handleRequest function in server.ts logs each tools/call before forwarding it to the authenticated handler.
Known false positives
- ▸Legitimate authenticated MCP client sending a tools/call request with a valid Authorization header.
- ▸MCP protocol documentation describing the tools/call JSON-RPC method without the unauthenticated bypass framing.
- ▸Mitigation advisory recommending an upgrade to praisonai >= 1.7.2 without exploit content.
Full YAML
Edit on GitHubtitle: "PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)"
id: ATR-2026-01949
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
Detects exploitation of GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 (CRITICAL) in npm praisonai
>=1.5.0,<=1.7.1: the MCPServer's handleRequest() in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts
dispatches privileged JSON-RPC methods (tools/call, tools/list, resources/read,
prompts/get) without invoking the unused MCPSecurity manager, so unauthenticated
HTTP POSTs — including ones sent with no Authorization header or a bogus
"Authorization: Bearer invalid" — return HTTP 200 and execute registered tools.
This rule keys on the unauthenticated PraisonAI/MCP tools/call payload, the
invalid-Bearer auth-bypass token, and the vulnerable handleRequest sink.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/06/29"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
owasp_llm:
- "LLM06:2025"
owasp_agentic:
- "ASI03:2026"
mitre_atlas:
- "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
mitre_attack:
- "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
cve:
- "GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2"
metadata_provenance:
mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
owasp_llm: human-reviewed
owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
compliance:
eu_ai_act:
- article: "15"
context: "Article 15 (accuracy, robustness, cybersecurity) — runtime detection of this technique is a cybersecurity control for high-risk AI systems. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
strength: primary
- article: "9"Show all (97 more lines)Show less
context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
strength: secondary
nist_ai_rmf:
- subcategory: "MP.5.1"
context: "NIST AI RMF MAP 5.1 — likelihood and impact of the identified attack are characterised; this rule detects the adversarial input at runtime. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
strength: primary
- subcategory: "MG.3.2"
context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 — runtime monitoring/maintenance control that surfaces this attack class. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
strength: secondary
iso_42001:
- clause: "8.1"
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.1 (operational planning and control) — detection of this payload is an operational control. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
strength: primary
- clause: "8.3"
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) — this rule implements runtime detection as a treatment control. Technique: PraisonAI MCPServer Unauthenticated HTTP tools/call Authentication Bypass (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2)."
strength: secondary
tags:
category: privilege-escalation
subcategory: mcp-auth-bypass
scan_target: both
confidence: high
source: cve-disclosure
vendor_sources: praisonai-ghsa-j4f3-55x4-r6q2
agent_source:
type: llm_io
framework:
- praisonai
- any
provider:
- any
detection:
condition: any
false_positives:
- "Legitimate authenticated MCP client sending a tools/call request with a valid Authorization header."
- "MCP protocol documentation describing the tools/call JSON-RPC method without the unauthenticated bypass framing."
- "Mitigation advisory recommending an upgrade to praisonai >= 1.7.2 without exploit content."
conditions:
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)(?:praisonai|mcpserver|mcpsecurity|handleRequest)[\s\S]{0,200}(?:no\s+auth(?:oriz\w+)?|unauthenticat|without\s+(?:auth|credential)|authorization:\s*bearer\s+invalid)[\s\S]{0,200}["\x27]?(?:method)["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]tools/call'
description: >
PraisonAI/MCPServer context plus an unauthenticated / invalid-Bearer
framing immediately preceding a JSON-RPC tools/call method — the core
GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2 auth-bypass payload
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)authorization:\s*bearer\s+invalid[\s\S]{0,200}(?:tools/call|tools/list|resources/read|prompts/get)'
description: >
Invalid-credential bypass token ("Authorization: Bearer invalid")
paired with a privileged MCP JSON-RPC method that returns HTTP 200
without validation
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)handleRequest[\s\S]{0,160}(?:src/(?:praisonai-ts/src/)?mcp/server\.ts|mcpsecurity|tools/call)[\s\S]{0,120}(?:bypass|unauthenticat|without\s+(?:auth|validation)|dispatch\w*\s+without)'
description: >
The vulnerable handleRequest sink in mcp/server.ts dispatching methods
without invoking MCPSecurity — direct reference to the vulnerable code path
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2[\s\S]{0,200}(?:tools/call|unauthenticat|auth(?:oriz\w+)?\s+bypass|bearer\s+invalid)'
description: "explicit GHSA framing combined with the auth-bypass exploit tokens"
response:
actions:
- alert
- block_input
message_template: >
[ATR-2026-01949] CRITICAL: Unauthenticated PraisonAI MCPServer tools/call
auth-bypass detected (GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2). Attackers can invoke registered
MCP tools with no valid credentials. Block and upgrade praisonai to >= 1.7.2.
confidence: 80
test_cases:
true_positives:
- input: "PraisonAI MCPServer exploit: send unauthenticated POST with no Authorization header and body {\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"run_shell\",\"arguments\":{}}} — returns HTTP 200."
expected: triggered
description: "Unauthenticated framing + PraisonAI/MCPServer + tools/call JSON-RPC payload"
- input: "curl -H 'Authorization: Bearer invalid' http://target:8080 -d '{\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"x\"}}'"
expected: triggered
description: "Invalid-Bearer bypass token immediately before tools/call method"
- input: "GHSA-j4f3-55x4-r6q2: handleRequest in src/praisonai-ts/src/mcp/server.ts dispatches tools/call without invoking MCPSecurity, allowing unauthenticated tool execution."
expected: triggered
description: "Vulnerable handleRequest sink + GHSA framing + unauthenticated dispatch"
- input: "Authorization: Bearer invalid still reaches resources/read on the PraisonAI MCP server without validation"
expected: triggered
description: "Invalid-Bearer token paired with privileged resources/read method"
true_negatives:
- input: "Authenticated MCP client sends {\"method\":\"tools/call\",\"params\":{\"name\":\"search\"}} with a valid Authorization: Bearer <token> header."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Legitimate authenticated tools/call request — no unauthenticated/invalid-Bearer framing"
- input: "The MCP spec defines tools/call as the JSON-RPC method an agent uses to invoke a registered tool."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Generic MCP protocol documentation of tools/call without the bypass tokens"
- input: "Upgrade praisonai to >= 1.7.2 to remediate the MCPServer authentication issue."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Mitigation advice without any exploit payload or bypass token"
- input: "Our handleRequest function in server.ts logs each tools/call before forwarding it to the authenticated handler."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Benign handleRequest implementation that authenticates — lacks bypass/unauthenticated framing"