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ΖPrivilege Escalation
ATR-2026-01934
Recorded 2026-06-26 · Author ATR Community

LiteLLM allowed_routes Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-47101)

Detects CVE-2026-47101 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-285): LiteLLM's virtual-key endpoints /key/generate, /key/update, /key/regenerate and /key/service-account/generate accept an allowed_routes parameter without validating it against the caller's own role.

route grant bypass · pattern · confidence: high

Severity
critical
Lanes
alert · huntmarks and reports a match
Maturity
testnot yet settled
Scan target
llm_io
Status
experimental

Framework mappings

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI06:2026
  • ASI03:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025

ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.

Description

Detects CVE-2026-47101 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-285): LiteLLM's virtual-key endpoints /key/generate, /key/update, /key/regenerate and /key/service-account/generate accept an allowed_routes parameter without validating it against the caller's own role. A low-privilege internal_user can mint or update a key whose allowed_routes reach administrative routes (user/key/team/global management), bypassing route authorization and pivoting toward proxy_admin functionality. Affected: LiteLLM before 1.83.14. Detection covers: (a) a /key/* generation or update payload whose allowed_routes include administrative/management routes or a wildcard; (b) explicit CVE-2026-47101 exploitation framing. The detection target is the request shape — a key-mint that grants itself admin routes via allowed_routes — i.e. the authorization-bypass primitive.

Suggested responsealertblock input
Author: ATR Community · Created 2026-06-26 · Last modified 2026-11-16

Detection conditions

Combinator: any
  1. 01
    A /key/* generation or update payload whose allowed_routes reach administrative/management routes or a wildcard — CVE-2026-47101 authorization bypass shape.
    field: contentop: regex
  2. 02
    An allowed_routes array containing admin management routes or a wildcard in a LiteLLM key-mint body.
    field: contentop: regex
  3. 03
    Explicit CVE-2026-47101 reference combined with LiteLLM route-bypass language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.
    field: contentop: regex

Attacks it catches

  1. POST /key/generate {"allowed_routes": ["/user/new", "/user/update", "/chat/completions"]}
  2. POST /key/service-account/generate {"allowed_routes": ["*"]}
  3. CVE-2026-47101: on LiteLLM call /key/generate with allowed_routes including /key/generate to bypass route authorization.

Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.

Benign inputs it leaves alone

  1. Key scoped to inference routes only
    POST /key/generate {"models": ["gpt-4o"], "allowed_routes": ["/chat/completions", "/embeddings"]}
  2. Key generation with no allowed_routes grant
    POST /key/generate {"duration": "24h", "max_budget": 50}
  3. General question about the field, not an admin-route grant
    What does the allowed_routes field do when generating a LiteLLM key?
  4. Read-only key lookup
    GET /key/info?key=sk-abc123

Known false positives

  • ▸A proxy_admin generating a key with broad allowed_routes intentionally — expected to match; review confirms intent.
  • ▸Security advisory or PR text quoting the CVE-2026-47101 payload.
  • ▸Key generation scoped to inference routes only (/chat/completions, /embeddings, /v1/models).
title: "LiteLLM allowed_routes Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-47101)"
id: ATR-2026-01934
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects CVE-2026-47101 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-285): LiteLLM's virtual-key
  endpoints /key/generate, /key/update, /key/regenerate and
  /key/service-account/generate accept an allowed_routes parameter without
  validating it against the caller's own role. A low-privilege internal_user
  can mint or update a key whose allowed_routes reach administrative routes
  (user/key/team/global management), bypassing route authorization and
  pivoting toward proxy_admin functionality. Affected: LiteLLM before 1.83.14.

  Detection covers:
  (a) a /key/* generation or update payload whose allowed_routes include
      administrative/management routes or a wildcard;
  (b) explicit CVE-2026-47101 exploitation framing.

  The detection target is the request shape — a key-mint that grants itself
  admin routes via allowed_routes — i.e. the authorization-bypass primitive.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/06/26"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI06:2026"
    - "ASI03:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
    - "T1078 - Valid Accounts"
  cve:
    - "CVE-2026-47101"
Show all (120 more lines)

metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: >
        CVE-2026-47101 lets a low-privilege caller mint a LiteLLM key whose
        allowed_routes reach administrative routes; Article 15 cybersecurity
        requirements mandate that route grants on AI proxy key-management APIs
        be validated against the caller's own role.
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM allowed_routes Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-47101))."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: >
        An attacker-controlled allowed_routes grant reaching the proxy is an
        adversarial input; MP.5.1 requires scanning key-management payloads for
        unauthorized administrative route grants.
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.2"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 is supported where this rule detects the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM allowed_routes Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-47101))."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: >
        Operational controls must detect key-management payloads that grant
        administrative allowed_routes at the LiteLLM key endpoints before the
        proxy issues the over-privileged key.
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is supported by this rule, which implements runtime detection of the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM allowed_routes Authorization Bypass (CVE-2026-47101)) as a treatment control."
      strength: secondary

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: route-grant-bypass
  scan_target: llm_io
  confidence: high
  source: cve-disclosure
  vendor_sources: litellm-cve-2026-47101

agent_source:
  type: llm_io
  framework:
    - litellm
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "A proxy_admin generating a key with broad allowed_routes intentionally — expected to match; review confirms intent."
    - "Security advisory or PR text quoting the CVE-2026-47101 payload."
    - "Key generation scoped to inference routes only (/chat/completions, /embeddings, /v1/models)."
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)/key/(?:generate|update|regenerate|service-account/generate)[\s\S]{0,400}["\x27]?allowed_routes["\x27]?\s*[:=][\s\S]{0,200}(?:["\x27]/(?:user|key|team|global|organization|customer)/|["\x27]/?\*["\x27]|management_routes|admin_only_routes)'
      description: >
        A /key/* generation or update payload whose allowed_routes reach
        administrative/management routes or a wildcard — CVE-2026-47101
        authorization bypass shape.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)["\x27]allowed_routes["\x27]\s*:\s*\[[^\]]*(?:["\x27]/(?:user|key|team|global)/(?:new|update|delete|bulk_update)|["\x27]/?\*["\x27]|/key/generate)[^\]]*\][\s\S]{0,300}(?:litellm|/key/(?:generate|service-account))'
      description: >
        An allowed_routes array containing admin management routes or a
        wildcard in a LiteLLM key-mint body.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)CVE-2026-47101[\s\S]{0,200}(?:litellm|allowed_routes|authoriz|bypass|route)'
      description: >
        Explicit CVE-2026-47101 reference combined with LiteLLM route-bypass
        language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.

response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - block_input
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-01934] CRITICAL: LiteLLM allowed_routes authorization bypass
    detected (CVE-2026-47101, CWE-285). A key-mint payload grants itself
    administrative routes; LiteLLM before 1.83.14 does not validate
    allowed_routes against the caller's role. Block the request and upgrade
    LiteLLM to >= 1.83.14.

confidence: 78


test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: "POST /key/generate {\"allowed_routes\": [\"/user/new\", \"/user/update\", \"/chat/completions\"]}"
      expected: triggered
      description: "internal_user mints a key granting admin user-management routes"
    - input: "POST /key/service-account/generate {\"allowed_routes\": [\"*\"]}"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Service-account key minted with wildcard allowed_routes"
    - input: "CVE-2026-47101: on LiteLLM call /key/generate with allowed_routes including /key/generate to bypass route authorization."
      expected: triggered
      description: "Explicit CVE-2026-47101 LiteLLM route-bypass framing"
  true_negatives:
    - input: "POST /key/generate {\"models\": [\"gpt-4o\"], \"allowed_routes\": [\"/chat/completions\", \"/embeddings\"]}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Key scoped to inference routes only"
    - input: "POST /key/generate {\"duration\": \"24h\", \"max_budget\": 50}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Key generation with no allowed_routes grant"
    - input: "What does the allowed_routes field do when generating a LiteLLM key?"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "General question about the field, not an admin-route grant"
    - input: "GET /key/info?key=sk-abc123"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Read-only key lookup"

Revision history

Created
2026-06-26
Last modified
2026-11-16
Full commit history on GitHub