Skip to content
Agent Threat Rules (ATR)中文
ΖPrivilege Escalation
ATR-2026-01933
Recorded 2026-06-26 · Author ATR Community

LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102)

Detects CVE-2026-47102 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-269): LiteLLM's user-management endpoints /user/update and /user/bulk_update modify security-sensitive fields without field-level authorization.

role write bypass · pattern · confidence: high

Severity
critical
Lanes
alert · huntmarks and reports a match
Maturity
testnot yet settled
Scan target
llm_io
Status
experimental

Framework mappings

OWASP Agentic Top 10
  • ASI06:2026
  • ASI03:2026
OWASP LLM Top 10
  • LLM06:2025

ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.

Description

Detects CVE-2026-47102 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-269): LiteLLM's user-management endpoints /user/update and /user/bulk_update modify security-sensitive fields without field-level authorization. A low-privilege authenticated caller (e.g. internal_user) can write the user_role field directly and self-promote to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative control of the LiteLLM proxy. Affected: LiteLLM before 1.83.10. Detection covers: (a) /user/update or /user/bulk_update payload that sets user_role to an administrative role (proxy_admin / admin); (b) the bulk_update array form where a user object escalates user_role; (c) explicit CVE-2026-47102 exploitation framing. The detection target is the request shape — an admin-role write at the user-update endpoint — which is the exact privilege-escalation primitive, caught before the proxy applies the role change.

Suggested responsealertblock input
Author: ATR Community · Created 2026-06-26 · Last modified 2026-11-16

Detection conditions

Combinator: any
  1. 01
    /user/update or /user/bulk_update payload writing user_role to an administrative proxy_admin value — direct CVE-2026-47102 escalation.
    field: contentop: regex
  2. 02
    A user object pairing a user_id with a user_role of proxy_admin in an update body — the bulk_update self-promotion shape.
    field: contentop: regex
  3. 03
    Explicit CVE-2026-47102 reference combined with LiteLLM role-escalation language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.
    field: contentop: regex

Attacks it catches

  1. POST /user/update {"user_id": "u_self", "user_role": "proxy_admin"}
  2. POST /user/bulk_update {"users": [{"user_id": "u_self", "user_role": "proxy_admin"}]}
  3. Exploiting CVE-2026-47102 on LiteLLM: set user_role to proxy_admin via /user/update to escalate privilege.

Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.

Benign inputs it leaves alone

  1. Legitimate budget update, no user_role field
    POST /user/update {"user_id": "u_123", "max_budget": 100}
  2. Setting a non-administrative role
    POST /user/update {"user_id": "u_123", "user_role": "internal_user"}
  3. General question, not an update payload writing proxy_admin
    How do I update a user's role in the LiteLLM proxy?
  4. Read-only user lookup
    GET /user/info?user_id=u_123

Known false positives

  • ▸Legitimate proxy_admin provisioning a new administrator through /user/update — expected to match; review confirms intent.
  • ▸Security advisory or PR text quoting the CVE-2026-47102 payload.
  • ▸User updates that set a non-administrative role (internal_user, internal_user_viewer).
title: "LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102)"
id: ATR-2026-01933
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects CVE-2026-47102 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-269): LiteLLM's user-management
  endpoints /user/update and /user/bulk_update modify security-sensitive
  fields without field-level authorization. A low-privilege authenticated
  caller (e.g. internal_user) can write the user_role field directly and
  self-promote to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative control of the
  LiteLLM proxy. Affected: LiteLLM before 1.83.10.

  Detection covers:
  (a) /user/update or /user/bulk_update payload that sets user_role to an
      administrative role (proxy_admin / admin);
  (b) the bulk_update array form where a user object escalates user_role;
  (c) explicit CVE-2026-47102 exploitation framing.

  The detection target is the request shape — an admin-role write at the
  user-update endpoint — which is the exact privilege-escalation primitive,
  caught before the proxy applies the role change.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/06/26"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI06:2026"
    - "ASI03:2026"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
    - "T1078 - Valid Accounts"
  cve:
Show all (119 more lines)
    - "CVE-2026-47102"

metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: >
        CVE-2026-47102 lets a low-privilege caller write user_role directly
        at the LiteLLM user-update endpoint and self-promote to proxy_admin;
        Article 15 cybersecurity requirements mandate field-level
        authorization on AI proxy account-management APIs.
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102))."
      strength: secondary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MP.5.1"
      context: >
        An attacker-controlled user_role write reaching the proxy is an
        adversarial input; MP.5.1 requires scanning user-management payloads
        for unauthorized administrative role escalation.
      strength: primary
    - subcategory: "MG.3.2"
      context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 is supported where this rule detects the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102))."
      strength: secondary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.1"
      context: >
        Operational controls must detect user-management payloads that set an
        administrative user_role at the LiteLLM update endpoint before the
        proxy applies the role change.
      strength: primary
    - clause: "8.3"
      context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is supported by this rule, which implements runtime detection of the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102)) as a treatment control."
      strength: secondary

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: role-write-bypass
  scan_target: llm_io
  confidence: high
  source: cve-disclosure
  vendor_sources: litellm-cve-2026-47102

agent_source:
  type: llm_io
  framework:
    - litellm
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "Legitimate proxy_admin provisioning a new administrator through /user/update — expected to match; review confirms intent."
    - "Security advisory or PR text quoting the CVE-2026-47102 payload."
    - "User updates that set a non-administrative role (internal_user, internal_user_viewer)."
  conditions:
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)/user/(?:update|bulk_update)[\s\S]{0,400}["\x27]?user_role["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?(?:proxy_admin|proxy[_-]admin)\b'
      description: >
        /user/update or /user/bulk_update payload writing user_role to an
        administrative proxy_admin value — direct CVE-2026-47102 escalation.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)["\x27]user_role["\x27]\s*:\s*["\x27]proxy_admin["\x27][\s\S]{0,300}["\x27]user_id["\x27]\s*:|["\x27]user_id["\x27]\s*:[\s\S]{0,300}["\x27]user_role["\x27]\s*:\s*["\x27]proxy_admin["\x27]'
      description: >
        A user object pairing a user_id with a user_role of proxy_admin in an
        update body — the bulk_update self-promotion shape.
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: '(?i)CVE-2026-47102[\s\S]{0,200}(?:litellm|user_role|proxy_admin|privileg|escalat)'
      description: >
        Explicit CVE-2026-47102 reference combined with LiteLLM role-escalation
        language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.

response:
  actions:
    - alert
    - block_input
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-01933] CRITICAL: LiteLLM user_role privilege escalation detected
    (CVE-2026-47102, CWE-269). A user-update payload writes an administrative
    proxy_admin role; LiteLLM before 1.83.10 applies this without field-level
    authorization. Block the request and upgrade LiteLLM to >= 1.83.10.

confidence: 80


test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: "POST /user/update {\"user_id\": \"u_self\", \"user_role\": \"proxy_admin\"}"
      expected: triggered
      description: "Low-priv user self-promotes to proxy_admin via /user/update"
    - input: "POST /user/bulk_update {\"users\": [{\"user_id\": \"u_self\", \"user_role\": \"proxy_admin\"}]}"
      expected: triggered
      description: "bulk_update array escalates a user to proxy_admin"
    - input: "Exploiting CVE-2026-47102 on LiteLLM: set user_role to proxy_admin via /user/update to escalate privilege."
      expected: triggered
      description: "Explicit CVE-2026-47102 LiteLLM escalation framing"
  true_negatives:
    - input: "POST /user/update {\"user_id\": \"u_123\", \"max_budget\": 100}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Legitimate budget update, no user_role field"
    - input: "POST /user/update {\"user_id\": \"u_123\", \"user_role\": \"internal_user\"}"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Setting a non-administrative role"
    - input: "How do I update a user's role in the LiteLLM proxy?"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "General question, not an update payload writing proxy_admin"
    - input: "GET /user/info?user_id=u_123"
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Read-only user lookup"

Revision history

Created
2026-06-26
Last modified
2026-11-16
Full commit history on GitHub