LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102)
Detects CVE-2026-47102 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-269): LiteLLM's user-management endpoints /user/update and /user/bulk_update modify security-sensitive fields without field-level authorization.
role write bypass · pattern · confidence: high
- Severity
- critical
- Lanes
- alert · huntmarks and reports a match
- Maturity
- testnot yet settled
- Scan target
- llm_io
- Status
- experimental
Framework mappings
- OWASP Agentic Top 10
- ASI06:2026
- ASI03:2026
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM06:2025
ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.
Description
Detects CVE-2026-47102 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-269): LiteLLM's user-management endpoints /user/update and /user/bulk_update modify security-sensitive fields without field-level authorization. A low-privilege authenticated caller (e.g. internal_user) can write the user_role field directly and self-promote to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative control of the LiteLLM proxy. Affected: LiteLLM before 1.83.10. Detection covers: (a) /user/update or /user/bulk_update payload that sets user_role to an administrative role (proxy_admin / admin); (b) the bulk_update array form where a user object escalates user_role; (c) explicit CVE-2026-47102 exploitation framing. The detection target is the request shape — an admin-role write at the user-update endpoint — which is the exact privilege-escalation primitive, caught before the proxy applies the role change.
Detection conditions
Combinator: any- 01/user/update or /user/bulk_update payload writing user_role to an administrative proxy_admin value — direct CVE-2026-47102 escalation.field: contentop: regex
- 02A user object pairing a user_id with a user_role of proxy_admin in an update body — the bulk_update self-promotion shape.field: contentop: regex
- 03Explicit CVE-2026-47102 reference combined with LiteLLM role-escalation language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.field: contentop: regex
Attacks it catches
POST /user/update {"user_id": "u_self", "user_role": "proxy_admin"}POST /user/bulk_update {"users": [{"user_id": "u_self", "user_role": "proxy_admin"}]}Exploiting CVE-2026-47102 on LiteLLM: set user_role to proxy_admin via /user/update to escalate privilege.
Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.
Benign inputs it leaves alone
- Legitimate budget update, no user_role field
POST /user/update {"user_id": "u_123", "max_budget": 100} - Setting a non-administrative role
POST /user/update {"user_id": "u_123", "user_role": "internal_user"} - General question, not an update payload writing proxy_admin
How do I update a user's role in the LiteLLM proxy?
- Read-only user lookup
GET /user/info?user_id=u_123
Known false positives
- ▸Legitimate proxy_admin provisioning a new administrator through /user/update — expected to match; review confirms intent.
- ▸Security advisory or PR text quoting the CVE-2026-47102 payload.
- ▸User updates that set a non-administrative role (internal_user, internal_user_viewer).
Full YAML
Edit on GitHubtitle: "LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102)"
id: ATR-2026-01933
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
Detects CVE-2026-47102 (CVSS 9.9 chain, CWE-269): LiteLLM's user-management
endpoints /user/update and /user/bulk_update modify security-sensitive
fields without field-level authorization. A low-privilege authenticated
caller (e.g. internal_user) can write the user_role field directly and
self-promote to proxy_admin, gaining full administrative control of the
LiteLLM proxy. Affected: LiteLLM before 1.83.10.
Detection covers:
(a) /user/update or /user/bulk_update payload that sets user_role to an
administrative role (proxy_admin / admin);
(b) the bulk_update array form where a user object escalates user_role;
(c) explicit CVE-2026-47102 exploitation framing.
The detection target is the request shape — an admin-role write at the
user-update endpoint — which is the exact privilege-escalation primitive,
caught before the proxy applies the role change.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/06/26"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: test
severity: critical
references:
owasp_llm:
- "LLM06:2025"
owasp_agentic:
- "ASI06:2026"
- "ASI03:2026"
mitre_atlas:
- "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
mitre_attack:
- "T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation"
- "T1078 - Valid Accounts"
cve:Show all (119 more lines)Show less
- "CVE-2026-47102"
metadata_provenance:
mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
owasp_llm: human-reviewed
owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
compliance:
eu_ai_act:
- article: "15"
context: >
CVE-2026-47102 lets a low-privilege caller write user_role directly
at the LiteLLM user-update endpoint and self-promote to proxy_admin;
Article 15 cybersecurity requirements mandate field-level
authorization on AI proxy account-management APIs.
strength: primary
- article: "9"
context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102))."
strength: secondary
nist_ai_rmf:
- subcategory: "MP.5.1"
context: >
An attacker-controlled user_role write reaching the proxy is an
adversarial input; MP.5.1 requires scanning user-management payloads
for unauthorized administrative role escalation.
strength: primary
- subcategory: "MG.3.2"
context: "NIST AI RMF MANAGE 3.2 is supported where this rule detects the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102))."
strength: secondary
iso_42001:
- clause: "8.1"
context: >
Operational controls must detect user-management payloads that set an
administrative user_role at the LiteLLM update endpoint before the
proxy applies the role change.
strength: primary
- clause: "8.3"
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 8.3 (AI risk treatment) is supported by this rule, which implements runtime detection of the privilege-escalation technique (LiteLLM User-Role Privilege Escalation (CVE-2026-47102)) as a treatment control."
strength: secondary
tags:
category: privilege-escalation
subcategory: role-write-bypass
scan_target: llm_io
confidence: high
source: cve-disclosure
vendor_sources: litellm-cve-2026-47102
agent_source:
type: llm_io
framework:
- litellm
- any
provider:
- any
detection:
condition: any
false_positives:
- "Legitimate proxy_admin provisioning a new administrator through /user/update — expected to match; review confirms intent."
- "Security advisory or PR text quoting the CVE-2026-47102 payload."
- "User updates that set a non-administrative role (internal_user, internal_user_viewer)."
conditions:
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)/user/(?:update|bulk_update)[\s\S]{0,400}["\x27]?user_role["\x27]?\s*[:=]\s*["\x27]?(?:proxy_admin|proxy[_-]admin)\b'
description: >
/user/update or /user/bulk_update payload writing user_role to an
administrative proxy_admin value — direct CVE-2026-47102 escalation.
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)["\x27]user_role["\x27]\s*:\s*["\x27]proxy_admin["\x27][\s\S]{0,300}["\x27]user_id["\x27]\s*:|["\x27]user_id["\x27]\s*:[\s\S]{0,300}["\x27]user_role["\x27]\s*:\s*["\x27]proxy_admin["\x27]'
description: >
A user object pairing a user_id with a user_role of proxy_admin in an
update body — the bulk_update self-promotion shape.
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)CVE-2026-47102[\s\S]{0,200}(?:litellm|user_role|proxy_admin|privileg|escalat)'
description: >
Explicit CVE-2026-47102 reference combined with LiteLLM role-escalation
language — attack framing in a skill or tool description.
response:
actions:
- alert
- block_input
message_template: >
[ATR-2026-01933] CRITICAL: LiteLLM user_role privilege escalation detected
(CVE-2026-47102, CWE-269). A user-update payload writes an administrative
proxy_admin role; LiteLLM before 1.83.10 applies this without field-level
authorization. Block the request and upgrade LiteLLM to >= 1.83.10.
confidence: 80
test_cases:
true_positives:
- input: "POST /user/update {\"user_id\": \"u_self\", \"user_role\": \"proxy_admin\"}"
expected: triggered
description: "Low-priv user self-promotes to proxy_admin via /user/update"
- input: "POST /user/bulk_update {\"users\": [{\"user_id\": \"u_self\", \"user_role\": \"proxy_admin\"}]}"
expected: triggered
description: "bulk_update array escalates a user to proxy_admin"
- input: "Exploiting CVE-2026-47102 on LiteLLM: set user_role to proxy_admin via /user/update to escalate privilege."
expected: triggered
description: "Explicit CVE-2026-47102 LiteLLM escalation framing"
true_negatives:
- input: "POST /user/update {\"user_id\": \"u_123\", \"max_budget\": 100}"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Legitimate budget update, no user_role field"
- input: "POST /user/update {\"user_id\": \"u_123\", \"user_role\": \"internal_user\"}"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Setting a non-administrative role"
- input: "How do I update a user's role in the LiteLLM proxy?"
expected: not_triggered
description: "General question, not an update payload writing proxy_admin"
- input: "GET /user/info?user_id=u_123"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Read-only user lookup"