Destructive tool invocation without prior human approval

Detects a destructive tool call in an agent execution trace that is NOT preceded by an explicit human-approval span. This is a trace-method rule using the `require` primitive (spec/atr-method-v1.1.md §8.3.2), which fires when an expected predecessor is MISSING — the canonical mechanism for catching silent failures. Threat model: many agent frameworks let operators classify tool calls by privilege (read / write / destructive). Production policy says destructive calls (e.g., file deletion, transaction commit, schema migration) MUST be gated by a human-in-the-loop approval. In practice, prompt-injection attacks or runaway agents bypass this gate by inducing the LLM to issue a destructive call directly without surfacing it for approval. The trace emits the destructive TOOL span without an AGENT span carrying attributes.human_approval=true at any earlier point in the same trace. No error is thrown. The action succeeds. The trace looks "normal" if you only inspect tool inputs/outputs. The rule fires by detecting the absence of the required predecessor — the trace-method capability that pattern-based detection cannot express.

Response Actions

References

1. 01

   Engine emits this synthetic field when the require primitive fires; trace-native engines evaluate detection.trace below.

   field: trace.require_violationop: regex

Attack Examples (Rule Triggers)

1. {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"orchestrator"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_table","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

2. {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"orchestrator","human_approval":false}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.delete","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

3. {"spans":[{"id":"r1","kind":"RETRIEVER","attributes":{"source":"untrusted"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"git.force_push","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

4. {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"planner"}},{"id":"a2","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"executor"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"k8s.delete_namespace","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

5. {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"sub_orchestrator","human_approval_status":"approved"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"prod.deploy","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

Real-world attack payloads (sanitized). Used for regression testing.

Benign Examples (Rule Doesn't Trigger)

1. Approval span IS present before destructive tool — no violation

   {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"approver","human_approval":true}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.read","tool.privilege":"read"}},{"id":"t2","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.truncate","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

2. human_approval=true on preceding AGENT span — invariant satisfied

   {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"executor","human_approval":true}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_table","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

3. Tool privilege is read, not destructive — rule does not apply

   {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"reader"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.read","tool.privilege":"read"}}]}
   

4. write privilege (not destructive) — rule does not apply

   {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"plan"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.write","tool.privilege":"write"}}]}
   

5. No TOOL span at all — nothing to check

   {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"thinker"}}]}
   

6. Approval covers all subsequent destructive spans within the trace

   {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"human_approval":true}},{"id":"a2","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"executor"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_index","tool.privilege":"destructive"}},{"id":"t2","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_index","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

7. Dedicated HUMAN span kind (LangChain HITL convention) — one_of_shapes branch matches, rule does not fire

   {"spans":[{"id":"h1","kind":"HUMAN","attributes":{"action":"approved"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_table","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
   

title: "Destructive tool invocation without prior human approval"
id: ATR-2026-00549
rule_version: 1
status: draft
description: >
  Detects a destructive tool call in an agent execution trace that is NOT
  preceded by an explicit human-approval span. This is a trace-method rule
  using the `require` primitive (spec/atr-method-v1.1.md §8.3.2), which
  fires when an expected predecessor is MISSING — the canonical mechanism
  for catching silent failures.

  Threat model: many agent frameworks let operators classify tool calls by
  privilege (read / write / destructive). Production policy says destructive
  calls (e.g., file deletion, transaction commit, schema migration) MUST be
  gated by a human-in-the-loop approval. In practice, prompt-injection
  attacks or runaway agents bypass this gate by inducing the LLM to issue
  a destructive call directly without surfacing it for approval. The trace
  emits the destructive TOOL span without an AGENT span carrying
  attributes.human_approval=true at any earlier point in the same trace.

  No error is thrown. The action succeeds. The trace looks "normal" if you
  only inspect tool inputs/outputs. The rule fires by detecting the
  absence of the required predecessor — the trace-method capability that
  pattern-based detection cannot express.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/05/28"
schema_version: "1.0"
maturity: draft
severity: critical

references:
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI04:2026 - Unauthorized Resource Access"
    - "ASI05:2026 - Unexpected Code Execution"
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0053 - LLM Plugin Compromise"
  research:
    - "TraceAegis: Behavioral Constraints over Agent Execution Traces (arXiv:2510.11203)"
    - "AgentArmor: Type-System for Agent Trace Analysis (arXiv:2508.01249)"
    - "Anthropic Computer Use threat model (Build 2024)"

compliance:
  nist_csf:
    - "PR.AC-04"
    - "PR.IR-01"
  etsi_ts_104223:
    - "P5.2"
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "14"
      context: >
        Human oversight — destructive actions must be subject to human
        review per Article 14. Trace evidence of skipped approval is a
        direct violation.
      strength: primary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - subcategory: "MG.4.1"
      context: >
        Risk management governance — destructive autonomous actions
        without approval are unmitigated risks; trace evidence is
        normative for assessment.
      strength: primary

tags:
  category: privilege-escalation
  subcategory: missing-human-approval
  scan_target: runtime
  confidence: high
  source: trace-rule

agent_source:
  type: agent_trace
  framework:
    - any
  provider:
    - any

detection:
  method: trace
  condition: any
  conditions:
    - field: trace.require_violation
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)require_violation:destructive_tool_without_approval"
      description: >
        Engine emits this synthetic field when the require primitive
        fires; trace-native engines evaluate detection.trace below.
  trace:
    ingest_format: openinference
    require:
      - target_shape:
          span.kind: "TOOL"
          attributes:
            tool.privilege: "destructive"
        must_be_preceded_by:
          # Match any of the canonical approval signals. Frameworks vary:
          # LangChain HITL emits span.kind: "HUMAN"; AutoGen sets
          # attributes.human_approval=true on AGENT spans; some emit
          # attributes.operator_approved or attributes.confirmed_by_user.
          # An approval is recognized if EITHER the span kind is HUMAN OR
          # any of the canonical approval attributes is truthy.
          one_of_shapes:
            - span.kind: "HUMAN"
            - span.kind: "AGENT"
              attributes:
                human_approval: true
            - span.kind: "AGENT"
              attributes:
                operator_approved: true
            - span.kind: "AGENT"
              attributes:
                approval_granted: true
            - span.kind: "AGENT"
              attributes:
                confirmed_by_user: true
          within_trace: true
        description: >
          Every destructive TOOL span MUST have at least one preceding
          approval span anywhere earlier in the same trace. Recognized
          forms: dedicated HUMAN span kind (OpenInference), or AGENT
          span carrying any canonical approval attribute. The
          `one_of_shapes` matcher is normative per atr-method-v1.1.md
          §8.3 (extends `must_be_preceded_by` to accept a disjunction).

response:
  actions:
    - block_tool
    - alert
    - escalate
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-00549] CRITICAL: Destructive tool call without human approval
    detected. Tool {{trace.matched_span.attributes.tool.name}} ran at span
    {{trace.matched_span.id}} with privilege=destructive but no preceding
    AGENT span carried human_approval=true. Block this tool call, require
    operator review, and audit policy on the calling agent.

confidence: 90

wild_fp_rate: 0

test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"orchestrator"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_table","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: triggered
      description: "Destructive tool runs without any preceding human approval"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"orchestrator","human_approval":false}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.delete","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: triggered
      description: "AGENT span explicitly sets human_approval=false; destructive tool follows"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"r1","kind":"RETRIEVER","attributes":{"source":"untrusted"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"git.force_push","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: triggered
      description: "Destructive tool preceded only by untrusted retrieval (no approval span)"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"planner"}},{"id":"a2","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"executor"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"k8s.delete_namespace","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: triggered
      description: "Two AGENT spans without any setting human_approval=true; destructive tool fires"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"sub_orchestrator","human_approval_status":"approved"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"prod.deploy","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: triggered
      description: "Non-canonical approval attribute name (human_approval_status string instead of human_approval boolean) — not recognized, rule fires correctly. Documents the limitation that approval-signal vocabulary is not standardized across frameworks."

  true_negatives:
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"approver","human_approval":true}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.read","tool.privilege":"read"}},{"id":"t2","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.truncate","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Approval span IS present before destructive tool — no violation"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"executor","human_approval":true}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_table","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "human_approval=true on preceding AGENT span — invariant satisfied"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"reader"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.read","tool.privilege":"read"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Tool privilege is read, not destructive — rule does not apply"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"plan"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"file.write","tool.privilege":"write"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "write privilege (not destructive) — rule does not apply"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"thinker"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "No TOOL span at all — nothing to check"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"a1","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"human_approval":true}},{"id":"a2","kind":"AGENT","attributes":{"agent.name":"executor"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_index","tool.privilege":"destructive"}},{"id":"t2","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_index","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Approval covers all subsequent destructive spans within the trace"
    - input: |
        {"spans":[{"id":"h1","kind":"HUMAN","attributes":{"action":"approved"}},{"id":"t1","kind":"TOOL","attributes":{"tool.name":"db.drop_table","tool.privilege":"destructive"}}]}
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Dedicated HUMAN span kind (LangChain HITL convention) — one_of_shapes branch matches, rule does not fire"