Alibaba RDS MCP Unauthenticated Database Metadata Exfiltration

Detects unauthenticated access to Alibaba RDS MCP server metadata endpoints. The Alibaba RDS MCP server exposes database schema, connection strings, and credential metadata without requiring authentication. Alibaba confirmed the vulnerability but declined to patch it, leaving all deployments permanently exposed. An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate databases, extract schema structures, and obtain connection credentials via MCP tool calls. Detection covers (a) MCP configs pointing at Alibaba RDS endpoints without auth, (b) tool calls invoking RDS metadata functions without auth context, (c) content describing the unpatched unauthenticated surface. CWE-306 (Missing Authentication), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information).

Response Actions

References

1. 01

   MCP tool call targeting Alibaba RDS metadata or credential enumeration without auth — unauthenticated exfiltration vector

   field: tool_responseop: regex
2. 02

   MCP config pointing at Alibaba RDS endpoint without auth — unpatched credential exposure surface

   field: tool_responseop: regex
3. 03

   Content describing Alibaba RDS MCP unauthenticated credential exfiltration — vendor-refused-to-patch surface

   field: contentop: regex

Attack Examples (Rule Triggers)

1. {"name":"rds_describe_instances","arguments":{"region":"cn-hangzhou"}}

2. {"name":"rds_get_credentials","arguments":{"instanceId":"rm-abc123"}}

3. {"mcpServers":{"alibaba-rds":{"url":"https://rds.aliyuncs.com/mcp"}}}

4. alibaba-rds MCP endpoint exposes connection strings without auth — vendor declined to patch, unauthenticated callers can exfiltrate credentials

Real-world attack payloads (sanitized). Used for regression testing.

Benign Examples (Rule Doesn't Trigger)

1. Alibaba RDS MCP config WITH Authorization header

   {"mcpServers":{"rds":{"url":"https://rds.aliyuncs.com/mcp","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer token"}}}}

2. Read-only RDS query without metadata/credential access pattern

   {"name":"rds_query","arguments":{"sql":"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders"}}

3. Defensive mitigation guidance

   Mitigate Alibaba RDS MCP exposure by placing a reverse proxy with authentication in front of the endpoint.

Known False Positive Contexts

• ▸Internal Alibaba RDS deployments behind authenticated VPN.
• ▸Security scanning tooling probing the Alibaba RDS MCP endpoint.
• ▸Educational content describing the vulnerability.

Documented Evasion Techniques

1. Technique: ip only no alibaba name

   {"mcpServers":{"cloud-db":{"url":"http://10.0.0.20:8080/mcp"}}}

   Generic key and raw IP evades Layer 2 — no alibaba/aliyun substring in URL.
2. Technique: case variation

   {"name":"ALIBABA_RDS_DESCRIBE_INSTANCES","arguments":{}}

   Case-insensitive flag covers uppercase tool name.

Publicly documented bypasses. We disclose known limitations rather than pretend they don't exist.

title: "Alibaba RDS MCP Unauthenticated Database Metadata Exfiltration"
id: ATR-2026-00534
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
  Detects unauthenticated access to Alibaba RDS MCP server metadata endpoints.
  The Alibaba RDS MCP server exposes database schema, connection strings, and
  credential metadata without requiring authentication. Alibaba confirmed the
  vulnerability but declined to patch it, leaving all deployments permanently
  exposed. An unauthenticated attacker can enumerate databases, extract schema
  structures, and obtain connection credentials via MCP tool calls.
  Detection covers (a) MCP configs pointing at Alibaba RDS endpoints without
  auth, (b) tool calls invoking RDS metadata functions without auth context,
  (c) content describing the unpatched unauthenticated surface.
  CWE-306 (Missing Authentication), CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information).
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/05/20"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: experimental
severity: high

references:
  owasp_llm:
    - "LLM06:2025 - Excessive Agency"
    - "LLM02:2025 - Sensitive Information Disclosure"
  owasp_agentic:
    - "ASI06:2026 - Resource and Environment Manipulation"
    - "ASI03:2026 - Memory Poisoning"
  mitre_atlas:
    - "AML.T0049 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
  mitre_attack:
    - "T1190 - Exploit Public-Facing Application"
    - "T1552 - Unsecured Credentials"

metadata_provenance:
  mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
  owasp_llm: human-reviewed
  owasp_agentic: human-reviewed

compliance:
  eu_ai_act:
    - article: "15"
      context: "Alibaba RDS MCP exposes database credentials and schema without authentication; Article 15 requires AI tool servers to protect sensitive data access with authentication."
      strength: primary
    - article: "9"
      context: "Article 9 risk management must enumerate unauthenticated credential and schema exposure as a critical data-protection failure for any agent-integrated RDS tool — especially given vendor refusal to patch."
      strength: primary
  nist_ai_rmf:
    - function: Manage
      subcategory: MG.2.3
      context: "Detection of unauthenticated MCP metadata calls against Alibaba RDS is the primary risk treatment given vendor non-response to the vulnerability."
      strength: primary
    - function: Map
      subcategory: MP.5.1
      context: "Permanently unpatched credential exposure surfaces must be flagged as accepted-risk or mitigated at the network layer in the organizational AI risk register."
      strength: secondary
    - subcategory: GV.6.1
      function: Govern
      context: "Cloud provider MCP tools with unpatched authentication gaps require compensating controls under GV.6.1 supplier risk management."
      strength: primary
  iso_42001:
    - clause: "8.6"
      context: "Operational controls must detect MCP tool calls that would expose Alibaba RDS credentials or schema to unauthenticated callers."
      strength: primary

tags:
  category: tool-poisoning
  subcategory: mcp-missing-authentication
  scan_target: mcp
  confidence: high

agent_source:
  type: mcp_exchange
  framework:
    - alibaba-rds
    - any
  provider:
    - alibaba
    - any

detection:
  condition: any
  false_positives:
    - "Internal Alibaba RDS deployments behind authenticated VPN."
    - "Security scanning tooling probing the Alibaba RDS MCP endpoint."
    - "Educational content describing the vulnerability."
  conditions:
    # -- Layer 1: RDS metadata/credential tool call without auth --
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)\"(?:name|tool)\"\\s*:\\s*\"(?:rds_(?:describe|list|get|fetch)_(?:instances?|databases?|schemas?|credentials?|connection[_\\-]?strings?|accounts?|passwords?)|alibaba[_\\-]rds[_\\-](?:describe|list|metadata|credentials?|schema))[^\"]{0,60}\"(?:(?!(?:authorization|bearer|api[_\\-]?key|x-api-key|token|x-auth))[\\s\\S]){0,500}"
      description: "MCP tool call targeting Alibaba RDS metadata or credential enumeration without auth — unauthenticated exfiltration vector"

    # -- Layer 2: Alibaba RDS MCP endpoint in config without auth --
    - field: tool_response
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)\"url\"\\s*:\\s*\"https?://[^\"]{0,120}(?:alibaba[_\\-]?rds|aliyun[_\\-]?rds|rds\\.aliyuncs\\.com|rds[_\\-]mcp\\.alibaba)[^\"]{0,60}(?:/mcp|/tools?|/api|/metadata)[^\"]*\"(?![\\s\\S]{0,400}\"(?:auth|headers?|token|apiKey|authorization|bearer)\")"
      description: "MCP config pointing at Alibaba RDS endpoint without auth — unpatched credential exposure surface"

    # -- Layer 3: Alibaba RDS unpatched surface in content --
    - field: content
      operator: regex
      value: "(?i)alibaba[_\\-]?rds[^\\n]{0,200}(?:mcp|tool\\s+call|endpoint)[^\\n]{0,200}(?:no\\s+auth|missing\\s+auth|unauth(?:enticated)?|without\\s+(?:auth|credentials?|token)|vendor\\s+(?:refuse|declined|won.t\\s+patch|unpatched)|exfil(?:trat)?|credentials?\\s+(?:exposed?|leak)|connection\\s+string)"
      description: "Content describing Alibaba RDS MCP unauthenticated credential exfiltration — vendor-refused-to-patch surface"

response:
  actions:
    - block_tool
    - alert
    - escalate
  auto_response_threshold: high
  message_template: >
    [ATR-2026-00534] HIGH: Alibaba RDS MCP unauthenticated metadata/credential
    exfiltration detected. MCP tool call targets Alibaba RDS schema or credential
    metadata without authentication. Note: Alibaba confirmed this vulnerability
    but declined to patch — apply network-layer controls immediately and remove
    Alibaba RDS MCP from agent toolchains until a compensating control is in place.

confidence: 81

test_cases:
  true_positives:
    - input: '{"name":"rds_describe_instances","arguments":{"region":"cn-hangzhou"}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Unauthenticated Alibaba RDS instance enumeration via MCP"
    - input: '{"name":"rds_get_credentials","arguments":{"instanceId":"rm-abc123"}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Unauthenticated credential retrieval from Alibaba RDS via MCP"
    - input: '{"mcpServers":{"alibaba-rds":{"url":"https://rds.aliyuncs.com/mcp"}}}'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Alibaba RDS MCP config without auth field"
    - input: 'alibaba-rds MCP endpoint exposes connection strings without auth — vendor declined to patch, unauthenticated callers can exfiltrate credentials'
      expected: triggered
      description: "Content describing vendor-unpatched Alibaba RDS credential exposure"
  true_negatives:
    - input: '{"mcpServers":{"rds":{"url":"https://rds.aliyuncs.com/mcp","headers":{"Authorization":"Bearer token"}}}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Alibaba RDS MCP config WITH Authorization header"
    - input: '{"name":"rds_query","arguments":{"sql":"SELECT COUNT(*) FROM orders"}}'
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Read-only RDS query without metadata/credential access pattern"
    - input: "Mitigate Alibaba RDS MCP exposure by placing a reverse proxy with authentication in front of the endpoint."
      expected: not_triggered
      description: "Defensive mitigation guidance"

evasion_tests:
  - input: '{"mcpServers":{"cloud-db":{"url":"http://10.0.0.20:8080/mcp"}}}'
    expected: not_triggered
    bypass_technique: ip_only_no_alibaba_name
    notes: "Generic key and raw IP evades Layer 2 — no alibaba/aliyun substring in URL."
  - input: '{"name":"ALIBABA_RDS_DESCRIBE_INSTANCES","arguments":{}}'
    expected: triggered
    bypass_technique: case_variation
    notes: "Case-insensitive flag covers uppercase tool name."